Williams v. United States

457 F.Supp.3d 1240

Michael Leon WILLIAMS, Petitioner,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-473-J-34PDB

3:15-cr-54-J-34PDB

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division.

Signed May 1, 2020

Kelly Karase, US Attorney's Office, Jacksonville, FL, for Respondent.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge

This case is before the Court on Petitioner Michael Leon Williams's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. 1, § 2255 Motion; Civ. Doc. 1-1, Attachments) and Memorandum of Law (Civ. Doc. 1-2, Memorandum).¹ Williams raises three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, each related to Williams's sentence as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The United States has responded (Civ. Doc. 5, Response), and Williams has replied (Civ. Doc. 8, Reply). Williams also filed two motions for leave to supplement (Civ. Doc. 9, First Motion for Leave to Supplement; Civ. Doc. 17, Second Motion for Leave to Supplement), to which the United States has responded as well (Civ. Doc. 11, Response to First Motion for Leave to Supplement; Civ. Doc. 20, Response to Second Motion for Leave to Supplement). In addition, Williams filed two freestanding sets of "Supplemental Arguments," which the Court has also reviewed. (Civ. Doc. 8-1, First Supplement to Arguments; Civ. Doc. 16, Second Supplement to Arguments). The case is ripe for a decision.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings² , the Court has considered the need for an evidentiary hearing and determines that a hearing is not necessary to resolve the merits of this action. See Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion is not required when the petitioner asserts allegations that are affirmatively contradicted by the record or patently frivolous, or if in assuming the facts that he alleges are true, he still would not be entitled to any relief); Patel v. United States, 252 F. App'x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2007).³ For the reasons set forth below, Williams's request for § 2255 relief is due to be denied.

I. Background

On April 23, 2015, a federal grand jury charged Williams with a single count of attempting to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 846. (Crim. Doc. 11, Indictment). Williams pled guilty to the charge pursuant to a written plea agreement on June 8, 2015. (Crim. Doc. 38, Plea Agreement; Crim. Doc. 68, Plea Transcript). According to the factual basis included in his Plea Agreement, between March 2015 and April 2015, Williams had several conversations about purchasing cocaine from an undercover agent, who he believed to be a drug supplier. Plea Agreement at 17-19; Plea Tr. at 24-27. Although he eventually wanted to purchase more, Williams agreed to buy five kilograms of cocaine. Plea Agreement at 18; Plea Tr. at 26. On April 16, 2015, Williams met the undercover agent in a parking lot to consummate the transaction, bringing with him a money counter and a green bag containing $50,020 in cash. Plea Agreement at 18-19; Plea Tr. at 26-27. Law enforcement arrested Williams at the meeting without incident. The Magistrate Judge who presided over the change-of-plea colloquy found that Williams's guilty plea "was intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily made, and that the facts that he admitted establish[ed] the elements of the charged offense." (Crim. Doc. 39, Report and Recommendation Concerning Guilty Plea). As such, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court accept it. Id. Without objection, the Court accepted Williams's guilty plea and adjudicated him guilty of the single charge in the Indictment. (Crim. Doc. 41, Acceptance of Plea).

According to the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), Williams's advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines was 188 to 235 months in prison. (Crim. Doc. 49, PSR at ¶ 85). The Probation Office arrived at this Guidelines range based on a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of VI. Id. Because Williams had two prior convictions for a controlled substance offense, the Probation Office determined that he qualified to be sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. See PSR at ¶¶ 19-29, 52, 53. This resulted in an increase of his base offense level from 30 to 34 and an increase in his criminal history category from III to VI. Id. ⁴ The two controlled substance convictions were (1) a 2005 conviction in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, for attempted possession with intent to distribute marijuana (for which he was arrested in July 2004), and (2) a 2006 conviction in Clay County, Florida, for the sale or delivery of cocaine, PSR at ¶¶ 25, 43, 45.

Williams's sentencing counsel, Clifford Stripling, did not object to the calculation of the Guidelines range, which he acknowledged was "properly calculated" and resulted in "no sustainable objections to the presentence report." (Crim. Doc. 51, Williams's Sentencing Memorandum at 2). However, counsel did hire a sentencing mitigation specialist, a former United States probation officer, to assist him in making the case for a downward variance. (See Crim. Doc. 67, Sentencing Transcript at 10). Counsel filed a sentencing memorandum in which he urged the Court to vary below the Guidelines range based on the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See generally, Williams's Sentencing Memorandum. Among other things, counsel argued that Williams's circumstances warranted a downward variance because he had a lengthy history of drug and alcohol problems which, combined with his emotional and intellectual deficiencies, contributed to his poor decision making. Counsel also submitted letters from friends and family members in support of Williams, see Sentencing Tr. at 4, 8, 23, and presented Williams's brother and sister to make a statement on his behalf at the sentencing hearing, id. at 17-20.

The Court adopted the PSR's recommended calculation of the Guidelines range. Id. at 3-4. Nevertheless, the Court varied downward, sentencing Williams to a term of imprisonment of 140 months, or four years below the low end of the Guidelines range. Id. at 25. In doing so, the Court noted that Williams's "very significant drug addiction for which he had gotten no treatment" was one factor in its decision, id. at 27, and that the longest sentence Williams had previously served was 35 months in prison, making his current sentence "much longer than any that Mr. Williams has faced in the past," id. at 27-28. Ultimately, the Court explained that it "varied downward simply because it appears to me that when I look at the circumstances of the offense and Mr. Williams's history, that 140 months is entirely sufficient to accomplish" the statutory purposes of sentencing. Id. at 28.

The Court entered judgment on March 3, 2016 (Crim. Doc. 54, Judgment), after which Williams filed a notice of appeal (Crim. Doc. 56). Williams's appellate counsel, Charles Truncale, filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Following an independent review of the record, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined "that counsel's assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct" and that "the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit." United States v. Williams, 678 F. App'x 814, 815 (11th Cir. 2017). As such, on January 30, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence. Id.

Williams did not petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review. Therefore, his conviction and sentence became final on Monday, May 1, 2017, when time expired to file a petition for certiorari review. Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002). Williams filed the § 2255 Motion 16 days before that date, on April 15, 2017. See § 2255 Motion at 6.

II. Discussion

Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, a person in federal custody may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Section 2255 permits collateral relief on four grounds: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the imposed sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law; and (4) the imposed sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C § 2255(a) (2008). Only jurisdictional claims, constitutional claims, and claims of error that are so fundamentally defective as to cause a complete miscarriage of justice will warrant relief through collateral attack. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-86, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) ; Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc) ("[A] district court lacks the authority to review the alleged error unless the claimed error constitute[s] a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has recognized that a petitioner's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment is properly brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003).

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a § 2255 petitioner must demonstrate both: (1) that his counsel's conduct amounted to constitutionally deficient performance, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662, 667 (11th Cir. 2020). In determining whether the petitioner has satisfied the first requirement, that counsel performed deficiently, the Court adheres to the standard of reasonably effective...