Williams v. United States

NALEN PIERRE WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 2:20-cv-00386-RAJ

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

April 28, 2022

ORDER

THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Nalen Pierre Williams' (“Petitioner”) Motion to Vacate Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Dkt. # 1. Respondent United States of America (“the Government”) opposes the motion. Dkt. # 4. Having reviewed the briefing, remaining record, supplemental authorities, and relevant law, the Court DENIES the motion.

II. BACKGROUND

On May 17, 2017, Petitioner was charged in a three-count indictment in the Western District of Washington for the following offenses:

(1) Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (2) Possession with Intent to Distribute Heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); and

(3) Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

United States v. Williams, No. 2:17-cr-00138-RAJ-1 (W.D. Wash. filed October 30, 2017) (Dkt. # 12).

On October 30, 2017, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c) in which he pleaded guilty to the first two counts, and the Government dismissed the third count. Id. (Dkt. # 23). The elements of the first count, Felon in Possession of a Firearm, were listed in the agreement as follows:

(1) The defendant knowingly possessed a firearm;

(2) At the time he possessed the firearm, the defendant had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

(3) The firearm had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Dkt. # 4-1 at 3. The plea agreement noted that at the time Petitioner possessed the firearm, he had been convicted of the following crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year:

(1) Murder in the Second Degree, under cause number 93-1-04779-3, in King County Superior Court, Washington, dated on or about January 14, 1994;

(2) Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act: Delivery of Cocaine, under cause number 12-1-01325-6, in King County Superior Court, Washington, dated on or about December 7, 2012.

Id. at 7.

At the April 13, 2018 sentencing hearing, Petitioner's trial counsel confirmed that he and Petitioner had reviewed Probation's Presentence Report and had no unresolved objections. Dkt. # 4 at 5. Probation recommended a sentence of 60 months, the Government recommended a sentence of 84 months, and Petitioner recommended a sentence of 18 months. Id. The Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 52 months on Count 1 and 52 months on Count 2, with terms to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release. Williams, No. 2:17-cr-00138-RAJ-1 (Dkt. # 31).

Petitioner appealed the sentence-which was 15 months above the high end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines-on several grounds. Dkt. # 1 at 3. On June 7, 2019, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court's sentence and remanded with an instruction to amend the Statement of Reasons form to conform with the oral pronouncement of the sentence. United States v. Williams, 773 Fed.Appx. 379, 383 (9th Cir. 2019).

Two weeks later, on June 21, 2019, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019), holding that in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove not only that a defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but that he knew he belonged to a category of persons who are barred from possessing a firearm. Petitioner then filed a petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc, arguing that his conviction and sentence could not stand pursuant to Rehaif. Dkt. # 1 at 3. On August 23, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing without addressing the merits of the Rehaif claim. Id. On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court similarly denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari without addressing the merits of the Rehaif claim. Williams v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 962 (2020).

On March 11, 2020, Petitioner filed the pending motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence for Felon in Possession of a Firearm in light of Rehaif. Petitioner does not challenge Count 2 of the indictment, possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Petitioner has since been released from custody and is currently on supervised release.^[1]

III. DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in custody may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence in the following circumstances:

(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or federal laws;

(2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; or

(3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law or otherwise subject to collateral attack.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A 2255 motion is timely if it is brought within one year from-as relevant here-the later of the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final or the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on review. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Petitioner's conviction became final on January 27, 2020, when the Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. The Rehaif decision, which the Ninth Circuit held applies retroactively, see United States v. Door, 996 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2021), was issued on June 20, 2019. Petitioner filed his 2255 motion on March 11, 2020. Dkt. # 1. Petitioner's motion is thus timely.

A. Jurisdiction

Petitioner argues that his conviction and sentence must be reversed because the indictment charging him with Felon in Possession of a Firearm did not charge a cognizable offense pursuant to Rehaif. Dkt. # 1 at 10. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court overturned a longstanding consensus among circuit courts in holding that to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government “must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” 139 S.Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019). Because the indictment did not allege that Petitioner knew he had the relevant status when he possessed the firearm, he contends that the indictment failed to charge a cognizable offense and that the Court therefore, lacked jurisdiction. Dkt. # 1 at 10.

In United States v. Johnson, 833 Fed.Appx. 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2020), the Ninth Circuit considered a similar Rehaif challenge raised by a defendant who pled guilty to a single count indictment charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1). The Court held that although the indictment did not contain the Rehaif knowledge element, “this omission does not require that we vacate his conviction.” Id. The Court explained that alleged “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case. Id. (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). This Court accordingly finds that it has jurisdiction.

B. Procedural Default

Petitioner also argues that because he did not enter his guilty plea to Count 1 “knowingly, ” as reconceptualized by the Supreme Court in Rehaif, his guilty plea is “constitutionally invalid.” Dkt. # 1-1 at 12. The Court had informed Petitioner that he was charged with knowingly possessing a firearm and that he “had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Id. (citing Williams, No. 2:17-cr-00138-RAJ-1 (Dkt. # 39 at 17)). Petitioner argues, however, that he “was never told during the plea proceedings that the crime required proof that he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year at the time he possessed the weapon.” Dkt. # 1-1 at 13. Petitioner concludes that, as a result, Petitioner did not understand the essential elements of Count 1, and his plea was thus unknowing and involuntary. Id.

The Government argues that Petitioner's 2255 motion is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to raise it on direct appeal. Dkt. # 4 at 8. The Court agrees. The Supreme Court has “strictly limited the circumstances under which a guilty plea may be attacked on collateral review.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). The voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea cannot be attacked on collateral review unless it is first challenged on direct appeal. See id. (holding “[h]abeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service for an appeal”). Because Petitioner did not raise his Rehaif claim on direct appeal, but rather on his petition for rehearing, Petitioner procedurally defaulted on his 2255 petition.

However, Petitioner may avoid procedural default in this matter if he can establish either (1) cause excusing his procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the error, or (2) actual innocence. Id. at 622. The “cause” prong can be satisfied by “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 15 (1984) (holding that “[c]ounsel's failure to raise a claim for which there was no reasonable basis in existing law does not seriously implicate any of the concerns that might otherwise require deference to a State's procedural bar”).

To establish “actual prejudice, ” a habeas petitioner “must show not merely that the errors at . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,...