Williams v. United States

1

JOHN TODD WILLIAMS, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOHN TODD WILLIAMS, Defendant.

No. 20-cv-1554 (RJS)

No. 14-cr-784 (RJS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 25, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:

John Todd Williams, proceeding pro se, moves the Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate or set aside his 2016 conviction and sentence for conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, to commit wire fraud (a substantive offense defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1343). For the reasons set forth below Williams's motion is DENIED.

I. Background^[1]

Williams is the former owner and manager of Williams Scott & Associates, LLC (“WSA”), a debt collection agency based in Georgia. (PSR ¶ 14.) From 2009 through May 2014, Williams supervised and directed a ring of WSA employees in a scheme to collect payment from victims on their actual or purported debts by making fraudulent, misleading, and coercive statements to such victims over the telephone and by email. (PSR ¶¶ 1, 2, 14, 19.) Specifically, WSA employees induced victims to pay WSA by falsely claiming to represent various law enforcement agencies, either real (e.g., the United States Marshals Service and Department of Justice) or fictitious (e.g., the “Warrant Services Association, A Division of the Federal Government Task Force”), then falsely threatening victims with arrest or suspension of their drivers' licenses unless they immediately paid WSA. (PSR ¶¶ 21-23.) During the duration of Williams's time supervising the scheme, WSA received approximately $3.9 million in debit and credit card payments from 6, 005 victims. (PSR ¶ 17.)

In November 2014, Williams was arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud. (PSR at 1.) After a five-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on July 12, 2016.^[2](Doc. No. 192.) In November 2016, the Court sentenced Williams to a term of five years' imprisonment, to be followed by three years' supervised release, and imposed orders of forfeiture and restitution, each in the amount of $3, 995, 443.53. (Doc. No. 218, at 57, 58, 60, 63-64.) Williams appealed from the Court's judgment on twelve grounds, including several that he attempts to revive here. (Doc. Nos. 220, 221, 222; 2d. Cir. No. 16-4186, Doc. No. 116.) The Second Circuit appointed appellate counsel for Williams under the Criminal Justice Act (2d Cir. No. 16-4186, Doc. No. 22), but he requested that such counsel be relieved and chose instead to proceed pro se on appeal (2d Cir. No. 16-4186, Doc. No. 39). The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on May 30, 2018. United States v. Williams, 736 Fed.Appx. 267, 273 (2d Cir. 2018).

On February 20, 2020, Williams filed a pro se petition for the Court to vacate or set aside his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 278.) The Court ordered the government to respond (Doc. No. 279), which it did on May 15, 2020 (Doc. No. 284).

On May 29, 2020, Williams moved this Court, in essence, to immediately grant his section 2255 petition on the ground that the government had putatively defaulted by allegedly failing to file a timely response to the petition. (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. No. 10 (styled as “motion to di[s]miss [Williams's criminal] case for non[]response . . . to plaintiff[']s motion 28 U.S.C. 2255”).) The Court terminated that motion in a June 9, 2020 order noting that the government had in fact filed a timely response and therefore “declin[ing] to rule on Williams's § 2255 motion at th[at] time.” (Doc. No. 286.) Williams filed a second, largely identical “motion to di[s]miss [his criminal] case for non[]response . . . to plaintiff[']s motion 28 U.S.C. 2255” on June 23, 2020. (Doc. No. 287.) In a July 31, 2020 order, the Court again “decline[d] to rule on Williams's § 2255 motion at th[at] time, ” for “the same reasons outlined in its June 9, 2020 order.” (Doc No. 288 at 1.) Williams appealed from the June 9 order denying his first such motion (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. No. 17), but on February 9, 2021, the Second Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that this Court had “not issued a final order as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1291” (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. No. 30 at 1).

While his appeal was pending, Williams also filed a recusal motion in the district court (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. No. 16), which this Court denied on July 31, 2020 (Doc. No. 289). Between August 31 and September 9, 2020, Williams filed three additional motions (1) for stay pending appeal, (2) to appoint counsel, and (3) to provide minutes for a (nonexistent) February 20, 2020 proceeding before Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger. (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. Nos. 21, 22, 23.) The Court denied these three motions in a single consolidated order on September 18, 2020. (Doc. No. 291.) Williams appealed from the July 31 and September 18 orders denying his various motions (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. No. 28), but then moved in the Second Circuit to voluntarily withdraw this appeal; the Second Circuit granted that motion and deemed Williams's appeal as to those motions withdrawn on January 6, 2021 (see No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. No. 29).

Since August 6, 2021, Williams has sent several letters to various judges and employees of this Court, accusing the Court, “the FBI[, ] and U.S. Marshals [of] spying and illegally tracking Williams'[s] cell phone” and attempting to “intimidate and entrap Mr. Williams.” (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. Nos. 33, 34.) He has also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that his petition remained on the undersigned's docket pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291 even after the undersigned was appointed as a Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit. (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. Nos. 31, 32, 33.) It appears that Williams's dissatisfaction may be rooted in his previously expressed concern that the Court is now “weigh[ing] in on this case as an Appeals Judge” after having “formerly worked on the [same] case as a District Judge” - i.e., acting as “an Appeals Judge and a District Judge [in] the same [case]” - so as to create an “[i]mpression of bias” or “conflict of interest.” (No. 20-cv-1554, Doc. No. 16 at 1-2.) The Court has already sought to explain, in its July 31, 2020 order denying Williams's recusal motion, how that is not the case. (Doc. No. 289 at 1-4.) But to avoid even the possibility of confusion, it bears repeating that the undersigned is not sitting as a Circuit Judge reviewing the District Court judgment. Rather, the Court here is sitting by designation as a District Judge - specifically, in his capacity as the District Judge who presided over the trial and sentencing in the criminal case within which the instant section 2255 motion was brought. It is standard operating procedure - expressly provided for by statute and repeatedly upheld by the Second Circuit - that a section 2255 motion should come before the judge who oversaw the trial and sentencing in the court of conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a [federal] court . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” (emphasis added)); Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, Rule 3, Advisory Committee Notes (noting “the nature of a § 2255 motion as being a continuation of the criminal case whose judgment is under attack” (emphasis added)); Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1320 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that “it is not a ground for disqualification [from a section 2255 proceeding] that the . . . judge also handled the original trial and sentence”); Zovluck v. United States, 448 F.2d 339, 443 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding same); United States v. Delsanter, 433 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding same); Mirra v. United States, 379 F.2d 782, 787-88 (2d Cir.) (holding same). Importantly, Williams should understand that if he were to appeal from this order to the Second Circuit, the undersigned judge would be recused and would not take part in the appeal.

With that background, the Court now addresses Williams's petition to vacate or set aside his conviction and sentence under section 2255, which is the only motion still pending before this Court.^[3] (Doc. No. 278.)

II. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner “in custody” under sentence of a federal court “may move the court which imposed [that] sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” on the grounds that it “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).^[4] However, a collateral attack (i.e., a petition for habeas relief) under § 2255 is generally available “only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). “The reasons for narrowly limiting the relief permitted under § 2255 - a respect for the finality of criminal sentences, the efficient allocation of judicial resources, and an aversion to retrying issues years after the underlying events took place - are ‘well known and basic to our adversary system of justice.'” Id. (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 & n. 11 (1979)). To those ends, “the courts have established” certain rules, or procedural bars, “that make it more difficult for a defendant to upset a conviction by collateral, as opposed to direct, attack.” Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

For one, a habeas petition under section 2255 generally ...