Williams v. United States

1

TYRONE MAURICE WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 4:14-CR-43-FL-1

No. 4:18-CV-203-FL

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

January 22, 2024

ORDER

LOUISE W. FLANAGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on petitioner's motions to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2255 (DE 84, 94, 111, 141) and respondent's motions to dismiss (DE 102, 121). The issues raised have been briefed fully and are ripe for ruling.

BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2012, petitioner committed a violent armed robbery of a Dollar General store in New Bern, North Carolina. He entered the store wearing a mask and armed with a handgun, and without provocation jumped onto the cashier counter and fired several rounds at the cashier, striking him once in the chest. The cashier fled to a nearby office, but petitioner pursued him and again fired several rounds at the cashier and a manager in the office. The manager was shot twice and the injuries to his jaw and arm required multiple surgeries. Both victims survived, but they suffered extensive physical and emotional injuries.

On August 16, 2012, law enforcement in Winterville, North Carolina responded to a noise complaint in a residential area, and encountered petitioner along with several others consuming beer and loitering near a vehicle. As the officers approached, petitioner retrieved a handgun from his waistband and fled on foot. He ignored orders to stop, and the officers had to tase him to effectuate the arrest. The officers recovered petitioner's handgun from a nearby ditch.

On February 11, 2014, petitioner committed another robbery at the First Flight Federal Credit Union in New Bern. After entering the credit union and waiting in the teller line petitioner approached the teller and handed her a note that stated,

This is a robbery. Please do not stall, draw attention, or push the silent alarm. If you do or I think you did, I'm going to kill you. Put all the money in [an] envelope. No dye packs or tracers. Don't die for money that's not yours.

(PSR (DE 25) ¶ 10). The teller complied by placing $4,373 in an envelope and giving it to petitioner. Law enforcement quickly located petitioner, who fled on foot after seeing the officers. He was apprehended a short time later without further incident.

As a result, petitioner was charged by indictment with the following: 1) Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1951 (count one); 2) discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 924(c) (count two); 3) possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (count three); and 4) bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (count four). Defendant pleaded guilty to all counts without a plea agreement.

The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) prepared in advance of sentencing calculated a guidelines range of 110 to 137 months' imprisonment for counts one, three, and four, and a consecutive term of 120 months' imprisonment for count two. The sentencing range was based on total offense level 28 and criminal history category IV. As relevant here, petitioner's 2006 federal conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm contributed five points to the criminal history score, thereby raising the criminal history category from II to IV. (PSR (DE 25) ¶¶ 23, 26); see U.S.S.G. ch.5 pt. A, sentencing table (2014). The five points were based on the scoring rules for the conviction itself and the fact that petitioner committed the instant offenses while on supervised release for that conviction. (PSR (DE 25) ¶¶ 23, 26).

Prior to sentencing, petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking to vacate the 2006 conviction. See United States v. Williams, No. 2:06-CR-20105-JPM (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2014) (ECF No. 53). Petitioner asserted that the conviction was infirm in light of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Vacatur of this conviction prior to sentencing would have reduced petitioner's criminal history category from IV to II, producing a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months' imprisonment for counts one, three, and four, and the mandatory consecutive term of 120 months for count two. (See Resp't Suppl. Br. (DE 145) at 8 n.2; see also PSR (DE 25) ¶ 89 & n.6). However, the petition for writ of error coram nobis remained pending throughout petitioner's two sentencing proceedings in this court, as described below.

The court first sentenced petitioner on January 21, 2015, to aggregate term of 480 months' imprisonment, five years' supervised release, and restitution in the amount of $422,377.00. Six days later, the court reopened the sentencing hearing and reduced the term of imprisonment to 360 months' imprisonment. Petitioner appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed petitioner's convictions but vacated the sentence. The Fourth Circuit determined that the court lacked jurisdiction to reopen the sentencing hearing, and therefore reviewed only the 480 months' term of imprisonment imposed during the first proceeding. The court of appeals ultimately held that this sentence was substantively unreasonable and remanded for resentencing.^[1]

The resentencing proceeding convened on May 11, 2017. The court first determined that the guidelines range calculated with the 2006 conviction remained applicable for purposes of resentencing. But the court also acknowledged petitioner's argument, grounded in a motion for downward variance, that the petition for writ of error coram nobis was pending in the Western District of Tennessee, and that the guidelines range for counts one, three, and four would be reduced to 87 to 108 months' imprisonment if the 2006 conviction was removed. (Remand Tr. (DE 75) at 22; Mot. for Downward Variance (DE 59)). Nonetheless, the court declined to vary downward even assuming the Tennessee district court would vacate the conviction in the future. The court explained:

Even if I'm wrong in not subtracting criminal history points for the reasons you've argued, that the court in Tennessee properly should set aside the defendant's conviction . . . there's no way that a sentence in the range of 87 to 108 months on counts [one] and [four], plus 120 months on count [three] and 120 months consecutive on count [two], there's no way that a sentence of 228 months accomplishes the purposes of sentencing. So I'm not inclined, both under the guidelines and under [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)], to adopt defendant's arguments.

(Remand Tr. (DE 75) at 22).^[2]

The court instead imposed an upward variant sentence of 308 months' imprisonment, comprised of concurrent terms of 188 months on counts one and four, 120 months on count three, and a consecutive term of 120 months on count two. The court also sentenced petitioner to aggregate term of five years' supervised release and ordered $422,376.00 in restitution. As the court explained at sentencing, this sentence accounted for the “extreme” conduct engaged in by defendant and otherwise accomplished the sentencing goals reflected in § 3553(a). (Id. at 23). The court further emphasized:

And again, I reach this under [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)]. And even if I'm wrong, with respect to not viewing defendant in a criminal history category II, it's only a sentence of 308 months that is satisfactory here and accomplishes the purposes of sentencing.

(Id. at 24). Petitioner appealed the amended judgment, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Following conclusion of his direct appeal, petitioner filed the instant motions to vacate. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, brings the following claims in his December 13, 2019, motion to vacate:

1) The 2006 firearm conviction in the Western District of Tennessee is invalid and petitioner should be resentenced using a revised guidelines calculation without the criminal history points assigned for the conviction and without the additional points for committing the instant offenses while under a criminal justice sentence;

2) Petitioner is “legally innocent” of the instant § 922(g) conviction pursuant to Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), and separately because he does not have a valid predicate felony conviction; and

3) Ineffective assistance of counsel premised on counsel advising him to plead guilty despite the fact that he was innocent of the § 922(g) conviction in count three.

(DE 84, 94 ¶ 12). Respondent moves to dismiss the foregoing claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In particular, respondent argues that claim one is without merit where the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue during petitioner's direct appeal and petitioner cannot relitigate this sentencing claim on collateral review. With respect to the remaining claims, respondent argues the § 922(g) conviction in count three remains valid notwithstanding any potential vacatur of the 2006 conviction, that the Rehaif claim is procedurally defaulted, and that petitioner has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

While the motion to dismiss was pending, the court appointed counsel for petitioner pursuant to Standing Order 20-SO-2 which governs motions for post-conviction relief premised on Rehaif. The court also granted respondent's motion to stay the instant § 2255 proceedings pending resolution of United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2020), rev'd sub nom. Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090 (2021). Notwithstanding...