Williams v. Woodhull Med. & Mental Health Ctr.

891 F.Supp.2d 301

Valerie E. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,

v.WOODHULL MEDICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CENTER; New York University Langone Medical Center Millhauser Labs; City of New York; Michael R. Bloomberg, as mayor, New York City Health and Hospital Corporation; Edward Fishkin, M.D., Network Medical Director, Woodhull Medical & Mental Health Center; Leonel Urcuyo, M.D., Chair, Executive Committee of the Medical Staff, Woodhull Medical & Mental Health Center; and Paul H. Kastell, M.D., Chairman, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Woodhull Medical & Mental Health Center, Defendants.

No. 10–CV–1429 (NGG)(LB).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Aug. 27, 2012.

Anthony L. Pendergrass, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff.

Daniel Sergio Gomez-Sanchez, NYC Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Valerie E. Williams (“Williams”), brings this action against defendants Woodhull Medical and Mental Health Center (“Woodhull”), New York University Langone Medical Center Millhauser Labs (“NYU”), the City of New York, the New York City Health and Hospital Corporation (“NYCHHC”), Dr. Edward Fishkin, Dr. Leonel Urcuyo, and Dr. Paul Kastell, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”), and New York state law. ( See Compl. (Docket Entry # 1).) All of the defendants (collectively “Defendants”) moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ( See Defs. Mot. for Sum. J. (Docket Entry # 45).) On February 10, 2012, the court referred Defendants' Motion to Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom for a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). (Feb. 10, 2012, Order.) On June 11, 2012, Judge Bloom recommended that the court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismiss Williams's action. (R & R (Docket Entry # 62) at 30.) On June 26, 2012, Judge Bloom granted Williams an extension of time to file objections to the R & R, setting a deadline of July 30, 2012. (Docket Entry # 65.)

On July 30, 2012, Williams filed two objections to the R & R: one was filed by her attorney (“Pendergrass Objection”) (Docket Entry # 68); the other was filed pro se (“Pro Se Objection”) (Docket Entry # 67). Defendants have a memorandum in opposition to the objections. (Defs. Opp'n Mem. (Docket Entry # 69).) As set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. The court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Williams commenced this action pro se on March 30, 2010. ( See Compl.) She later acquired an attorney. ( See Notice of Appearance of Anthony L. Pendergrass (Docket Entry # 24).) After doing so, Williams filed an Amended Complaint on consent. (Docket Entry # 26.) The parties engaged in discovery ( see, e.g., Stipulation and Protective Order (Docket Entry # 30)), and Defendants then sought leave to move for summary judgment ( see Pre–Motion Conference Request (Docket Entry # 32)). The court referred that request to Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom for decision and for a settlement conference. (May 10, 2011 Order (Docket Entry # 33).) Judge Bloom attempted to mediate a settlement; however, when those efforts did not succeed, Judge Bloom set a schedule for Defendants to move for summary judgment and for Williams to move to further amend her complaint. (Aug. 8, 2011 Order.)

On August 19, 2011, Williams sought leave to amend her Complaint to add a new retaliation claim under Title VII and to drop her breach of contract claim. ( See Pl. Mot. to Am Compl. (Docket Entry # 35.)) The court referred this motion to Judge Bloom (Oct. 28, 2011 Order), who recommended that the motion be denied and that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim be dismissed (R & R (Docket Entry # 44).) After the period to object lapsed without any objections, the court denied Williams' motion to amend and dismissed her breach of contract claim pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ( See Feb. 16, 2012 Order (Docket Entry # 61).)

Defendants served Williams with their Motion for Summary Judgment on September 19, 2011. ( See Defs. Mot. for Sum. J.) The court referred this motion to Judge Bloom. (Feb. 10, 2012 Order.) Williams sought two extensions of time to oppose Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ( See Oct. 24, 2011 Pl. Mot. (Docket Entry # 38); Nov. 29, 2011 Pl. Mot. (Docket Entry # 39).) Both were granted. (Oct. 24, 2011 Order; Nov. 30, 2011 Order.) On December 27, 2011, Williams's attorney moved for leave to withdraw from the case ( See Mot. to Withdraw as Att'y (Docket Entry # 40).) Judge Bloom denied that motion ( see Dec. 27, 2011 Order (Docket Entry # 42)), and Williams's attorney has continued to represent her following Judge Bloom's Order ( see, e.g., Pendergrass Objection).

On January 17, 2012, Williams opposed Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Pl. Opp'n Mem. (Docket Entry # 58–2).) Defendants replied on February 10, 2012. (Defs. Reply Mem. (Docket Entry # 60).) On June 11, 2012, Judge Bloom issued her R & R on this motion, recommending that the court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismiss Williams's action. ( See R & R at 334.) On June 20, 2012, Williams filed a pro se request for an extension of time to file objections to the R & R. (Pl. Mot. (Docket Entry # 63).) On June 25, 2012, Williams's attorney also filed a motion for extension of time to file objections to the R & R on her behalf. (Docket Entry # 64.) On June 26, 2012, Judge Bloom granted the motions for extension of time to file objections. (Docket Entry # 65.)

On July 30, 2012, Williams filed two Objections to the June 11, 2012 R & R: one was filed by her attorney (Pendergrass Objection); the other was filed pro se (Pro Se Objection).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEWA. Review of Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations

In reviewing the report and recommendation of a dispositive matter from a magistrate judge, the district court “may adopt those portions of the Report to which no objections have been made and which are not facially erroneous.” La Torres v. Walker, 216 F.Supp.2d 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y.2000); see also Gesualdi v. Mack Excavation & Trailer Serv., Inc., No. 09–CV–2502 (KAM)(JO), 2010 WL 985294, at *1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23620, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010) (“Where no objection to the Report and Recommendation has been filed, the district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The district court reviews de novo “those portions of the report ... to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, to obtain this de novo review of a magistrate judge's R & R, an objecting party “must point out the specific portions of the report and recommendation to which [he or she] object[s].” U.S. Flour Corp. v. Certified Bakery, Inc., No. 10–cv–2522 (JS)(WDW), 2012 WL 728227, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2) (“[A] party may serve and file specific written objections to the [R & R].” (emphasis added)). If a party “makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.” Pall Corp. v. Entegris, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 48, 51 (E.D.N.Y.2008); see also Mario v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiffs objection to an R & R was “not specific enough” to “constitute an adequate objection under [ ] Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)”).

“The objections of parties appearing pro se are ‘generally accorded leniency’ and should be construed ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’ ” DiPilato v. 7–Eleven, Inc., 662 F.Supp.2d 333, 340 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting Milano v. Astrue, 05–CV–6527, 2008 WL 4410131, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2008)). However, even where an objection has been filed pro se, “[a]n objection to a report and recommendation in its entirety does not constitute a specific written objection within the meaning of Rule 72(b).” Healing Power, Inc. v. Ace Cont'l Exports, Ltd., No. 07–cv–4175 (NGG)(RLM), 2008 WL 4693246, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2008)

B. Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a motion for summary judgment must be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The burden of showing the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests on the movant. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). A fact is material if its existence or non-existence “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and an issue of fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A grant of summary judgment is proper “[w]hen no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight.” Gallo v. Prudential Res. Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). The nonmoving party may not rest on “mere allegations or denials” of the moving party's pleadings to survive summary judgment, but must demonstrate by affidavit or other admissible evidence “that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A “genuine issue [is not] created merely by the presentation of assertions that are conclusory.” Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir.2004). Likewis...