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Quinton Ramon WILLIAMSON, Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
October 27, 2021
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2018CR0283 Honorable Maria Teresa (Tessa) Herr, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Irene Rios, Justice, Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Appellant Quinton Ramon Williamson appeals his convictions of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of assault by choking or strangulation of a person with whom he has or has had a dating relationship. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01, 22.02. We affirm.
Background
On September 21, 2017, police responded to a 911 call reporting a disturbance and a female screaming for help at an apartment. According to Jeanette Lytle, Williamson's girlfriend at the
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time, the disturbance was an argument between her and Williamson which escalated when Williamson threw a gun case at her. Lytle testified that Williamson shoved her into the wall, choked her, kicked her, and punched her. She testified that she was screaming and pleading for help, doing "[a]nything to get somebody's attention." The struggle left her on her knees. According to Lytle, Williamson held a gun to her temple, repeatedly hit her with the gun, and threatened that he was going to end her life.
The altercation ended when a neighbor, Luis Duran, came to the residence after he heard cries for help. Duran explained that he found Williamson holding a pistol in one hand and a child in the other. Officer Matthew Anz arrived at the apartment soon after but did not encounter Williamson there. He observed a gun case, bullet casings on the living room floor, and a hole in the drywall. Officer Anz also observed visible injuries on Lytle and a white powdery substance on the shoulder of her shirt consistent with drywall from the hole in wall. Williamson was arrested the next day at the same apartment.
On January 10, 2018, Williamson was indicted on two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of assault by choking or strangulation of a person with whom he has or has had a dating relationship. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01, 22.02. On May 5, 2018, Williamson filed a motion for discovery of the arrest and conviction records of the State's witnesses and requested records regarding "[a]ny [a]rrests for assaults which could show the [c]omplaining witness Jeannette Lytle['s] propensity for violence." With new counsel, Williamson later filed a motion for the production and inspection of evidence and information, including "[c]riminal records, acts of misconduct and psychiatric history, if any, of all witnesses testifying [o]n behalf of the State during this trial." Williamson also filed a motion for discovery and inspection of evidence which requested the prior criminal record of all the State's witnesses.
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The State did not file responses to any of the three motions, and the trial court did not rule on the motions.
On May 30, 2018, the State disclosed in a filing with the trial court a statement from Lytle that she lied to the police about what happened the night of the incident and that she intended to recant her statement. Five months later, the State spoke with Lytle and she stated that she wanted to cooperate in the prosecution of Williamson and was telling the truth on the night of the incident. She stated she was afraid of Williamson because he was threatening her and her mother.
The State filed a notice of intent to introduce 404(b) evidence of Williamson's extraneous offenses, noticing eighteen offenses, including various assaults, trespassing, and harassment claims against Lytle and her mother. Trial began on October 15, 2019. Williamson objected to the admission of extraneous evidence, but the trial court allowed the previously disclosed 404(b) evidence and issued a 404(b) limiting instruction in the jury charge based on Williamson's objections. At trial, Williamson's son, a neighbor, and officers at the scene testified on behalf of the State and corroborated Lytle's story. The 911 call from the night of the incident, a jailhouse phone call that Williamson made, and photographs of the scene and injuries on Lytle were admitted as State's evidence. Additionally, corroborating text messages were introduced into evidence showing Williamson's threats to Lytle and her mother the morning after the incident.
After the State rested its case, and outside of the presence of the jury, Williamson asked the State about Lytle's criminal history and, for the first time, the State disclosed a police report for a 2009 assault arrest of Lytle. Upon receiving this assault record, Williamson informed the trial court that a discovery violation occurred and that he was not able to properly prepare the case or cross-examine Lytle. The State explained that the arrest record was in their file and that they informed Williamson's counsel that he could review the file at any time, but he never did. The State further argued it had informed Williamson's counsel multiple times that there was evidence
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in its file that needed to be reviewed, and that it did not upload the arrest record to the VeriPic discovery program, which Williamson's counsel could access online, because it is against federal law to upload Texas and National Crime Information Center data onto the VeriPic program.
The trial court ruled that Lytle's assault arrest was not admissible under any legal theory and that the State's actions did not constitute a discovery violation. The trial court then gave Williamson the opportunity to interview Lytle outside of the presence of the jury about the 2009 assault arrest and to recall her to the stand as a witness. However, the record shows that Williamson did not do either. Williamson moved for a mistrial based on the alleged discovery violation and exclusion of the arrest evidence, arguing he was not able to prepare a proper defense and was adversely affected by the alleged discovery violation. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial.
The jury found Williamson guilty of two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of assault by choking or strangulation of a person with whom he has or has had a dating relationship. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01, 22.02. Williamson was sentenced to 30 years confinement on counts one and two and 20 years confinement on count three. Williamson filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court overruled by operation of law. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(c). Williamson timely appealed.
Exclusion of Lytle's 2009 Arrest Record
In his first issue, Williamson argues that the State's failure to disclose evidence of Lytle's 2009 arrest record until trial constituted violations of article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and of the United States Constitution under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).[1]
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The State responds that Lytle's arrest and conviction records were available for Williamson's inspection in their file and that the trial court properly excluded the evidence. The State further argues that even if the trial court erred by excluding Lytle's 2009 arrest record, such error was harmless. We assume without deciding that the State's failure to disclose Lytle's 2009 arrest record until trial constituted a discovery violation and that the trial court erred in excluding such evidence. However, we hold that any alleged error was harmless.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its ruling lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.. If a trial court's ruling is correct under any theory of applicable law and is reasonably supported by the record, it should be upheld. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
B. Applicable Law
When the Legislature passed the Michael Morton Act in 2013, it "revamped" article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to expand the availability and scope of discovery that must be produced by the State. Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see id. at 274 (observing that "under earlier versions of [article 39.14] . . . there was no general right of discovery in Texas"). Article 39.14 now creates a general, continuous duty of the State to disclose "before, during, or after trial" any discovery evidence "tend[ing] to negate the guilt of the defendant" or reduce the punishment the defendant could receive. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(h), (k); Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d 681, 702 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2018, pet. ref'd).
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The prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence under article 39.14 is now "much broader" than the prosecutor's duty to disclose as a matter of due process under Brady. Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 274; Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 702.
ii. Harm
If an alleged error is not of federal constitutional origin, it must be subjected to a harm analysis. Tex.R.App.P. 44.2(b). "Generally, the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is non constitutional error . . . ." Melgar v. State, 236 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007 pet. ref'd); see Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). "Erroneous exclusion of evidence can rise to the level of constitutional error . . . when the excluded evidence 'forms such a vital portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense.'" Wilson v. State, 451 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd) (quoting Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex....
