Williamson v. Waldman

Page 232

150 N.J. 232

696 A.2d 14

Karen WILLIAMSON and James Williamson, her husband Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Leonard WALDMAN, M.D., Jeffrey Feldman, M.D. and Jacques Losman, M.D., Defendants-Appellants and John Doe, M.D. (a fictitious name), Richard Roe (a fictitious name), Sue Soe (a fictitious name) and ABC-XYZ Corp. (a series of fictitious names), Defendants.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 29, 1997.

Decided July 21, 1997.

Hugh Francis, Morristown, for defendant-appellant Jacques Losman, M.D. (Francis & Berry, attorneys; Mr. Francis and Joan B. Lorio, of counsel; Peter A. Olsen, on the brief).

Stephen O. Mortenson, Springfield, for defendant-appellant Leonard Waldman, M.D. (Mortenson & Pomeroy, attorneys; Robert J. Mormile, on the brief).

John Zen Jackson, Princeton, for defendant-appellant Jeffrey Feldman, M.D. (Jackson & Buckley, attorneys; Sean P. Buckley, of counsel; Daniel R. Esposito, on the brief).

David M. Fried, Newark, for plaintiffs-respondents (Blume, Goldfaden, Berkowitz, Donnelly, Fried & Forte, attorneys).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

HANDLER, J.

This case is based on plaintiff's complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from her fear of contracting AIDS. Plaintiff, a cleaning person, was pricked by a sharp medical instrument that had been discarded improperly in a general trash receptacle at an office shared by several medical doctors. Fearing that she had contracted AIDS from the prick, plaintiff instituted this suit against the doctors to recover damages for her emotional distress.

The case requires the Court to consider the standard for establishing causation for emotional distress attributable to the fear of contracting AIDS through infection from the HIV virus. More specifically, the issue posed is whether the standard of causation is based on objective factors, such as the actual exposure to HIV and/or the exposure to a viable means or channel of transmission of HIV; or, in the alternative, whether it is sufficient to demonstrate the reasonableness of the claimant's emotional distress over the fear of contracting AIDS.

I

Plaintiff, Karen Williamson, worked for her husband's cleaning business. On June 6, 1991, plaintiff was pricked by a lancet while cleaning a common-trash receptacle in the examining room of offices occupied by defendant doctors, Leonard Waldman, Jeffrey Feldman, and Jacques Losman. A lancet or "short sharp" is "a surgical knife with a small, sharp-pointed, two-edged blade" that is used to prick fingers to acquire blood samples. Stedman's Concise Medical Dictionary 551 (2d ed.1994).

After being pricked, plaintiff finished up, washed her hands, and went home for the night. On the way home from work, plaintiff went to her sister-in-law's home and, while there, discussed the incident with an acquaintance who was a nurse. As a result of that discussion plaintiff became alarmed, particularly over the potential of contracting hepatitis and AIDS. The nurse informed plaintiff that she should go to the emergency room immediately. Instead, plaintiff made an appointment to see her family physician, Jerome DeMasi.

On June 10, 1991, four days after the incident, plaintiff visited Dr. DeMasi, who recommended that she be tested for the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") annually for seven to ten years. (Although Dr. DeMasi subsequently modified the time period for testing to a "year or two," plaintiff was not informed of that until November 1994.) Whether an HIV test was administered during that initial visit is unclear. According to Dr. DeMasi, he did not conduct an HIV test because he believed it was too soon following the incident to obtain a meaningful result. Plaintiff avers, however, that she was tested. Dr. DeMasi informed plaintiff that a test taken a year from the date of the incident would be most decisive in determining whether she was infected.

Eight months later, in February 1992, plaintiff returned to Dr. DeMasi complaining of fatigue. During that visit, blood work was ordered, without an HIV test, and plaintiff was prescribed anti-depressant medication.

Since the incident, plaintiff has been tested for HIV several times, each test showing her to be HIV-negative. According to plaintiff, she underwent blood tests for HIV and hepatitis in July 1992, both of which proved negative. Moreover, she was tested in July 1993, and July 1994; again, both tests were negative. After the second negative test result, Dr. DeMasi informed plaintiff that her chances of having contracted HIV from the incident were "slim or remote."

Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the lancet-stick incident, she has become depressed and suffered "lifestyle changes." For example, at the time of the incident, the Williamsons were contemplating having another child. Because plaintiff's husband carries a rare blood disorder, known as neutropenia, which was passed along to their daughter, the Williamsons originally postponed having more children. According to plaintiffs, neutropenia prevents a person from properly fighting infections. Prior to the incident, however, plaintiff's husband had been taking a drug to control the effects of the disorder, which gave them hope of having another child. Since the incident, however, plaintiff has refused to have another baby, because she fears that the child will be born HIV-positive. Plaintiff also asserts that she and her husband have engaged only in protected sexual relations since the incident.

On May 19, 1993, the Williamsons filed a complaint in the Law Division against defendants Drs. Waldman, Losman, and Feldman. The complaint alleged that defendants breached their duty "to use reasonable care to inspect and [to] make the premises reasonably safe," ¹ and that because of defendants' actions, plaintiff suffered "severe personal injuries, ... great physical and mental pain ... [and] loss of enjoyment of life." Ibid. Moreover, defendants' breach allegedly led to a loss of earning capacity and resulted in the need for "future medical treatments and/or hospitalizations." Regarding plaintiff's husband, James, the complaint alleged that, as a result of defendants' actions, James was deprived of "the support, society, ... consortium, [and] services ..." of his wife. Subsequently, during a deposition, Dr. DeMasi described plaintiff as a "nervous person" who had had several bouts of depression prior to the incident. Moreover, prior to the incident, Dr. DeMasi had referred her to other medical professionals for treatment for depression.

After discovery was completed, defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the Law Division granted, dismissing without prejudice plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court found that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that she was exposed to HIV. Moreover, the Law Division found that, given her negative test results, her continued fear was "idiosyncratic" and that, as a result, defendants' acts were not the proximate cause of her emotional distress. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding that plaintiff was not required to demonstrate actual exposure to HIV but could recover based on the reasonableness of her fears, which created a jury question. 291 N.J.Super. 600, 677 A.2d 1179 (1996). Defendants each filed petitions for certification, which we granted. 147 N.J. 259, 686 A.2d 761 (1996).

II

A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress involves traditional concepts of duty, breach, and causation. Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 74-75, 222 A.2d 513 (1966). To establish liability for this tort, "a plaintiff must prove that defendant's conduct was negligent and proximately caused plaintiff's injuries." Decker v. Princeton Packet, 116 N.J. 418, 429, 561 A.2d 1122 (1989). Determining defendant's negligence "depends on whether defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, which is analyzed in terms of foreseeability." Ibid.; see Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (allowing emotional-distress damages for unmarried cohabitant who witnessed death of fiance after being struck by car); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 533, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) (recognizing emotional distress of parents attributable to hospital's delay in releasing body of their dead son); see also Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 561, 568-69, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (upholding plaintiff's claim for damages based on the foreseeability of the defendant's coming "so close to [her] as to put her in fear for her safety," without actual physical harm). Similarly, to establish that the alleged negligence constitutes the proximate cause of the emotional injury, the emotional distress must be reasonably foreseeable. Compare Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 59, 622 A.2d 1279 (1993) (permitting mother's claim for emotional distress based on doctor's misdiagnosis of fetus because "the physical and emotional ties between mother and fetus so unite them that a physician should anticipate that any malpractice that adversely affects the fetus will cause emotional distress to the mother") and Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J.Super. 556, 561, 495 A.2d 495 (Law Div.1985) (recognizing claim for serious emotional distress over fear of cancer, based on exposure to asbestos, because plaintiff's reaction was not unexpected in "normally constituted people") with Decker, supra, 116 N.J. at 431, 561 A.2d 1122 (denying claim for emotional distress based on plaintiff's reading erroneous obituary announcement on ground that serious lasting emotional distress would not be foreseeable); Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Society, 111 N.J. 355, 368-69, 544 A.2d 857 [696 A.2d 18] (1988) (denying claim for emotional distress based on bank's wrongful dishonor of plaintiff's check to former wife); and Caputzal, supra, 48 N.J. at 76-77, 222 A.2d 513 (disallowing claim for emotional distress because heart attack from...