Willis v. Barry Graham Oil Serv.

636 F.Supp.3d 684

Jon WILLIS v. BARRY GRAHAM OIL SERVICE LLC

CASE NO. 2:19-CV-00165

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division

Signed October 20, 2022

Jonathan Kyle Findley, Adam D. Lewis, John Gregory Grinnan, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Kala F. Sellers, Arnold & Itkin, Houston, TX, William Gee, Law Office of William Gee, Lafayette, LA, Jennifer L. Thornton, Stanley Reuter et al., New Orleans, LA, Richard A. Spears, New Iberia, LA, for Jon Willis.

John Nickerson Chappuis, Beau Anthony LeBlanc, Voorhies & Labbe, Lafayette, LA, for Barry Graham Oil Service LLC.

MEMORANDUM RULING

Terry A. Doughty, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court is Wood Group's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 134] filed by Third-Party Defendant Wood Group PSN, Inc. ("Wood Group"). Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Barry Graham Oil Service, LLC ("BGOS") filed an opposition [Doc. No. 154], and Wood Group filed a reply [Doc. No. 180] to the opposition.

For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 8, 2019, Plaintiff Jon Willis ("Willis") filed suit in this Court on the basis of maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) and diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.¹ Willis claims he sustained personal injuries on February 10, 2018, on an offshore platform owned by BGOS.² On January 13, 2021, BGOS filed a Third-Party Complaint³ and on August 3, 2021, filed an Amended Third-Party Complaint.⁴ In the Amended Third-Party Complaint, BGOS named the following as Third-Party Defendants: (1) Wood Group, (2) Expeditors and Production Services Company ("EPS"), (3) Shamrock Management, LLC doing business as Shamrock Energy Solutions ("Shamrock"), and (4) Aspen Insurance LTD for and on behalf of Lloyd's Underwriter Syndicate No. 4711 ASP ("Aspen") as Third-Party Defendants.⁵

The events leading up to the suit are as follows. The incident occurred while Willis was working on deck of a supply vessel known as the M/V MS. TAMI ("the Tami"), owned by BGOS.⁶ Fieldwood Energy ("Fieldwood") was the owner and operator of the fixed platform in the Gulf of Mexico known as the VR-261A platform ("the platform"). Willis was injured when a tagline came off of a grocery box as it was being lowered to the platform on which he was working off of the coast of Louisiana.⁷ The facility was located in Block 261 of the Vermillion area on the Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"), due south of the Louisiana coast.⁸ At the time of the incident, the platform was manned by three people: Richard Broussard ("Broussard"), Patrick Cantrell ("Cantrell"), and Willis.⁹ Cantrell operated the crane involved in the incident and was an employee of Wood Group.¹⁰ Broussard was the designated person-in-charge ("PIC") on the facility and was employed by Fieldwood. Willis was a production operator and payroll employee of Shamrock.¹¹

Willis contends that during a cargo transfer, a grocery box was being lowered from the Tami to the platform by Cantrell.¹² Willis grabbed the tag line and began to use the line to guide the box to its landing spot on the platform.¹³ The tag line connected the grocery box to the crane, and the crane was located on the platform.¹⁴ While using the tag line to guide the grocery box, the line came loose, and Willis fell onto the platform.¹⁵ Willis contends that the fall resulted in personal injuries.

BGOS contends that Wood Group is liable for the occurrence of the alleged accident "inasmuch as an employee of Wood Group operated the crane that performed the lift of the subject grocery box[,]"¹⁶ and that Wood Group is thus "liable to BGOS for contribution and/or indemnity, to the extent BGOS is found liable to Plaintiff for any damages based on Plaintiff's claims against BGOS in the principal demand."¹⁷ Wood Group contends that BGOS has no claim for tort contribution or indemnity under Louisiana law and that there is no factual evidence of negligence.¹⁸ BGOS argues in response that maritime law applies and that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning Wood Group's liability for the alleged accident.¹⁹

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion."

"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1).

A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

"[A] party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence." Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). However, in evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the Court must accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "A non-conclusory affidavit can create genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment, even if the affidavit is self-serving and uncorroborated." Lester v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 805 F. App'x 288, 291 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).

Note that "a district court has somewhat greater discretion to consider what weight it will accord the evidence in a bench trial than in a jury trial." Matter of Placid Oil Co., 932 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1978) ("If decision is to be reached by the court, and there are no issues of witness credibility, the court may conclude on the basis of the affidavits, depositions, and stipulations before it, that there are no genuine issues of material fact, even though decision may depend on inferences to be drawn from what has been incontrovertibly proved . . . . The judge, as trier of fact, is in a position to and ought to draw his inferences without resort to the expense of trial.").

B. Analysis

Wood Group contends that the third-party demand against it must be dismissed for two chief reasons: (1) the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et. seq., governs Plaintiff's claims against BGOS and applies Louisiana law as surrogate federal law, and, as an alternative basis for summary judgment that, (2) because there is no testimony showing negligence on the part of Cantrell (the crane operator employed by Wood Group). At issue in Wood Group's first argument is whether the third-party claim against Wood Group arises under OCSLA, and, if it does, whether the choice of law provisions in OCSLA require application of Louisiana law or maritime law. Wood Group concedes that if maritime law applies, BGOS's claims against Wood Group in the third-party demand would not be barred as a matter of law. If Louisiana law applies, however, Wood Group contends that Louisiana's pure comparative fault regime bars BGOS's claims for indemnity or contribution. In its second argument, Wood Group contends that there is no factual evidence to support a finding of negligence or fault on the part of Cantrell.

The Court agrees with Wood Group that, as a matter of law, BGOS does not have claims for contribution and/or indemnity. However, because a question of fact still exists as to the comparative fault of Cantrell, BGOS may still be allowed to present evidence of Wood Group's comparative fault at trial even though Wood Group will no longer be a named third-party defendant. The Court will address each argument below.

1. Applicable Law

The choice of law question in the context of torts occurring on offshore platforms requires a multistep analysis. First, the court must determine whether the claims "arise under OCSLA." See Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 2013). If that threshold is met, the court must employ OCSLA's choice of law test to determine whether adjacent state law applies as "surrogate federal law," or whether maritime law "applies of its own force." See Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng'g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990). An adjacent issue to the analysis is whether the Admiralty Extension Act, U.S.C. § 30101(a), applies. If the Admiralty Extension Act does apply, then an injury on land caused by a vessel on navigable water will be governed by maritime law. See Delozier v. S2 Energy Operating, LLC, 498 F. Supp. 3d 884, 891-92 (E.D. La. 2020). If it does not, then such an injury would be covered by adjacent state law under OCSLA's choice of law provisions so long as the claim also involves traditional maritime activity. See Hicks v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 3d 878 (E.D. La. 2018). The distinction between state and maritime law is important in the instant case because of Louisiana's pure comparative fault regime.

a. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

OCSLA declares the OCS to be an area of "exclusive federal jurisdiction." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 479, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)). OCSLA extends...