Wilson-Davis v. SSP Am., Inc.

434 F.Supp.3d 806

Tramon WILSON-DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.SSP AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:19-cv-04375-ODW(RAOx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed January 21, 2020

Jessica L. Campbell, Simon Kwak, Samuel A. Wong, Kashif Haque, Aegis Law Firm PC, Irvine, CA, for Plaintiff.

Denise M. Visconti, Christina H. Hayes, Littler Mendelson PC, San Diego, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [14] AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT [16]

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Action to State Court (ECF No. 14), and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 16). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ Motion.¹

II. BACKGROUND

Defendants SSP America, Inc. and SSP America LAX, LLC staff and operate restaurants in airports throughout California. (Decl. of Denise Visconti, Ex. A ("Compl.") ¶ 2, ECF No. 3-1.) Plaintiff Tramon Wilson-Davis worked for Defendants in Los Angeles, California. (Compl. ¶ 10.) On March 13, 2019, Wilson-Davis filed a putative class action against SSP America, Inc., SSP America LAX, LLC, and other unnamed Defendants in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. (See generally Compl.) Wilson-Davis alleges eight causes of action under California law, including: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to permit rest breaks; (5) failure to reimburse business expenses; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to pay all wages due upon separation from employment; and (8) violations of Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. (See Compl. ¶¶ 37–101.) Wilson-Davis seeks to represent a class of "[a]ll California citizens currently or formerly employed by Defendants as non-exempt employees in the State of California within four years prior to the filing of this action to the date the class is certified" and who "were affected by Defendants’ Labor Code, Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, and IWC Wage Order violations." (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 20.)

On May 20, 2019, Defendants removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446. (Notice of Removal ("Removal"), ECF No. 1.) Defendants claim that federal question jurisdiction exist under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, due to the necessary interpretation of the Parties’ collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). (Removal 5–10.) Wilson-Davis now moves to remand. (See Mot.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may exercise removal jurisdiction over a case only if jurisdiction existed over the suit as originally brought by the plaintiffs. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The removing party bears the burden to establish that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co. , 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). The right to remove a case to federal court is entirely a creature of statute. See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co. , 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows defendants to remove a case originally filed in state court if it presents a federal question or is between citizens of different states and involves an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a), 1441(a) – (b). A case presents a "federal question" if a claim "aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc. , 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ).

Whether removal jurisdiction exists must be determined by reference to the "well-pleaded complaint." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986).

The well-pleaded complaint rule makes plaintiff the "master of the claim." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Thus, where the plaintiff can state claims under both federal and state law, he can prevent removal by ignoring the federal claim and alleging only state law claims. Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc. , 80 F.3d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 1996).

There is, however, an exception to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Under the "artful pleading" doctrine, a plaintiff cannot defeat removal of a federal claim by disguising or pleading it artfully as a state law cause of action. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie , 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981). If the claim arises under federal law, the federal court will re-characterize it and uphold removal. Id. The "artful pleading" doctrine applies to state claims that are completely preempted by federal law. See Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 ("Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.").

To support a finding of complete preemption, the preemptive force of the federal statute at issue must be "extraordinary." See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor , 481 U.S. 58, 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). For this reason, the complete preemption doctrine is narrowly construed. See Holman v. Laulo–Rowe Agency , 994 F.2d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The [complete preemption] doctrine does not have wide applicability; it is a narrow exception to the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule’ ...."). "[O]nly three areas have been deemed areas of complete preemption by the United States Supreme Court: (1) claims under the Labor Management Relations Act; (2) claims under the Employment Retirement and Insurance Security Act (ERISA); and (3) certain Indian land grant rights." Gatton v. T–Mobile USA, Inc. , No. CV 03-130-DOC, 2003 WL 21530185, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (citations omitted); see also Robinson v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co. , 918 F.2d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 1990).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves to remand this action back to state court on the grounds that "the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and that no federal-question jurisdiction exists." (Mot. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the LMRA does not preempt his state law claims. (Mot. 1)

The LMRA gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). "[T]he preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.’ "² Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal. , 463 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) ("Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301."); see also Caterpillar , 482 U.S. at 394, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (quoting Elec. Workers v. Hechler , 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987) ) ("Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.’ "). Despite the broad preemptive effect of section 301, however, a claim that seeks to vindicate "nonnegotiable state-law rights ... independent of any right established by contract" is not within its scope. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) ; see also Livadas v. Bradshaw , 512 U.S. 107, 123–24, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994) ("[Section] 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law, ... it is the legal character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement ... that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward." (citations omitted)).

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a two-part test to determine whether a cause of action is preempted by the LMRA. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp. , 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the Court must determine if the "asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law," independent of a CBA. Id. If the right exists solely because of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and analysis ends. Id. Second, if the right exists independently of the CBA, the Court must then consider whether resolving the dispute is nevertheless "substantially dependent on [the] analysis of a [CBA]." Id. "If such dependence exists, then the claim is preempted by section 301; if not, then the claim" is left to state courts to handle in accordance with state law. Id. at 1059–60.

Here, Defendants argue that the LMRA preempts Plaintiff's claims under both steps of the Burnside analysis. The Court will consider Defendants’ arguments under each step in turn.

A. BURNSIDE STEP ONE

Defendants’ only argument under step one of the Burnside analysis is that the CBA, not state law, creates Plaintiff's right to overtime compensation. (Opp'n to Mot. ("Opp'n") 6, ECF No. 17.) For support, Defendants rely on California Labor Code section 514, which provides that:

Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.

See also Wage Order No. 5-2001(3)(L) (same). Section 514 is an affirmative defense that must be raised by Defendants. Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l...