Wilson v. Beneficial Consumer Disc. Co.

245 A.3d 1057 (Table)

Carla WILSON, Appellant v. BENEFICIAL CONSUMER DISCOUNT COMPANY d/b/a Beneficial Mortgage Co. of Pennsylvania previously identified as Beneficial Mortgage Co., HSBC and HSBC Finance Company

No. 2845 EDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed December 9, 2020

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:

Appellant, Carla Wilson, appeals from the August 21, 2019 order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Beneficial Consumer Discount Company D/B/A/ Beneficial Mortgage Company of Pennsylvania previously identified as Beneficial Mortgage Company, HSBC and HSBC Finance Company (collectively "Appellees"). After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual recitation:

[Appellees] filed a motion for summary judgment in this action brought by [Appellant]. [Appellant] entered into a mortgage dated July 18, 2007 with Appellee Beneficial Consumer Discount Company (Beneficial) in the amount of $176,737.71, secured by real property at 2512 Forest Drive East, Pocono Lake Pennsylvania. The mortgage terms called for the principal to be repaid over thirty years at an initial interest rate of 11.49%. A rewards program provided that for every twelve consecutive months of timely payments, the rate was to be reduced .3% for the following year, with gradual reductions in the interest rate to 8.49% over ten years if [Appellant] made timely payments.

[Appellant] requested and received temporary loan modifications in 2009, 2010, and 2012, but contends these modifications were accompanied by large, unexplained costs labelled ‘ancillary fees’ which had the effect of increasing rather than reducing her mortgage payments.

[Appellant] filed a Complaint on January 15, 2016[,] seeking rescission of her loan and money damages for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consume Protection Law (UTPCPL), claims for breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The case was removed to federal court on February 8, 2016. On February 10, 2017, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed [Appellant's] claims under federal law and remanded the state law claims to this court.

[Appellant] filed an Amended Complaint on March 30, 2017[,] that alleges breach of the 2007 mortgage and of the subsequent mortgage modifications, violation of the Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, violation of the UTPCPL, fraud, and defamation of credit. [Appellees] filed an Answer with New Matter and a notice to plead on May 22, 2017. No response was filed. On May 31, 2019, [Appellees] filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Appellant] did not file a timely response to [Appellees'] Motion, but filed a Fact Statement in opposition to the motion on July 5, 2019 and an "Amended Response to Summary Judgment Motion under Pa.R.C.P. 1305.3" on July 5, 2019. [Appellant] also filed a Response to New Matter on July 5, 2019. The parties have filed briefs; [Appellant's] brief was filed on June 27, 2019, before she filed her Fact Statement, Amended Response to Summary Judgment Motion and Response to New Matter on July 5, 2019.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/19, at 1-2. The trial court entered its order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment on August 21, 2019. Appellant filed her timely notice of appeal on September 18, 2019. The trial court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement.

Appellant presents the following three questions for our review:

I. Whether the lower court erred in its August [21], 2019 order for summary judgment in determining that the summary judgment response was untimely filed[?]

II. Whether the lower court erred in its August [21], 2019 order granting summary judgment based upon its holding that [Appellees'] new matter was deemed admitted[?]

III. Whether the lower court erred in its August [21], 2019 order granting summary judgment when the record before it established a genuine issue of material fact[?]

Appellant's Brief at 5 (capitalization omitted).

"On review, an appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion." Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc. , 926 A.2d 899, 902 (Pa. Super. 2007). Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is well established.

Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. We apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. We review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no issue as to any material facts and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be granted.

Kirwan v. Sussman Automotive , 149 A.3d 333, 336 (Pa. Super. 2016). Moreover,

[w]here the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not rely on his pleadings in answers in order to survive summary judgment. Further, failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof established the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.

Truax v. Roulhac , 126 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and quotations omitted).

In support of her first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it found that Appellant's response to Appellees' motion for summary judgment was late. Appellant's Brief at 11. Although Appellant acknowledges this issue is moot because the trial court reached the merits of her response, she sought to address it out of an abundance of caution. Id . Preliminarily, we note that Appellant's supplemental response was patently untimely. Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment on May 31, 2019, and their brief in support on June 17, 2019. On June 4, 2019, the trial court entered an order stating that Appellant's response was due within thirty days of the filing of Appellees' motion. Order, 6/4/19. Thus, Appellant's response was due on or before June 30, 2019. Although the trial court stated in its opinion that Appellant did not file a timely response to Appellees' motion for summary judgment, Appellant timely filed her initial Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 27, 2019. Appellant filed a supplemental response on July 5, 2019. In addition to her supplemental response to the motion for summary judgment, Appellant also filed a fact statement in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on July 5, 2019, along with her answer to the new matter Appellees set forth in their answer to Appellant's original complaint.

Despite the untimeliness of Appellant's supplemental response, it appears the trial court considered the information contained therein. Indeed, the trial court discussed the impact Appellant's response to the new matter had on summary judgment. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/19, at 5-6. Given the above, it is unclear what error Appellant posits the trial court made and what relief Appellant seeks based on that error. We cannot conclude that the trial court granted summary judgment based on the untimely nature of the supplemental response. Appellant is due no relief.

In support of her second question, Appellant avers that the trial court erred or abused its discretion when it found that Appellant's Answer to New Matter was untimely and resulted in the court finding that Appellees' Answer and New Matter constituted binding admissions. Appellant's Brief at 12. Appellant posits that the trial court erred when it failed to consider the denials set forth in her Answer to New Matter, which she alleges "conclusively dispute the allegations set forth in [Appellees'] New Matter." Id . Appellant admits that her answer was filed beyond the twenty-day period set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 1026(a), ¹ but argues that refusal to consider the answer was improper as Appellees did not move for default nor did they allege any prejudice from the late filing. Id . at 12-13. Appellant further points to the various discovery filings and argues that Appellees neglected to raise the issue of Appellant's failure to respond to the new matter. Id .at 13. Appellant posits that the lower court essentially struck her answer sua sponte and that this action ignores the general rule that "the late filing of an answer will be ignored where the plaintiff has not acted to take a judgment by default." Id . at 14 (citing Allison v. Merris , 493 A.2d 738, 739 (Pa. Super. 1985) ). Appellant ultimately claims that the action of the trial court was essentially the entry of a default judgment against Appellant without the required procedural protections found in Pa.R.C.P. 237.1 (relating, inter alia , to entry of default judgment). Appellant's Brief at 16. Thus, Appellant contends this resulted in an "inequitable application of the rules of civil procedure, and reward[ed] covert litigation tactics." Appellant's Brief at 16.

In their brief, Appellees argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it held that Appellant admitted the statements in its new matter because Appellant failed to respond for over two years and did not do so until after Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment. Appellees' Brief at 12. Appellees also aver that they did not need to move for default or allege they were prejudiced by Appellant's failure to respond timely to their Answer and New Matter. Id . at 13. Appellees argue that given Appellant's "abject indifference" evidenced by the fact that she waited years to file her answer, the general rule does not apply. Id . (citing Joyce v. Safeguard...