Wilson v. Dep't of Interior

1

MELAINE WILSON AND ALL ENROLLED OST MEMBERS, Plaintiffs v. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, ECHAGA CORPORATION, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE COUNCIL AND COMMITTEES AND FINANCE ACCOUNTABILITY -OFFICE, Defendants

No. 5:22-cv-5097

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Western Division

March 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LAWRENCE L. PIERSOL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) in connection with her Complaint against the Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Echaga Corporation, and Oglala Sioux Tribal Council along with tribal committees and a tribal office. (Doc. 1). The Complaint seeks release of financial documents, and alleges financial wrongdoing, conflicts of interest and abuse of power. Plaintiff further alleges she is entitled to 20 acres of land on Tract 2159 of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation that veterans are entitled to 20 acres of land on the same tract, and that veterans should receive the Cactus Flats land. (Id., PgID 3). Plaintiff signed the Complaint individually and indicated “and/for all enrolled OST Members.” (Id.). Plaintiff has moved for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 2).

I. Motion for Leave to Proceed In forma Pauperis

28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) directs the court to authorize the commencement of a civil action without prepayment of fees upon proof of plaintiffs inability to pay. A person may be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis if he or she “submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets” the person possesses, and also states “that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefore.” Id. The Eighth Circuit has established parameters for addressing in forma pauperis motions and has instructed that a petitioner's financial status should be evaluated first, and screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 should follow. Martin-Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 1982). The court has recognized that the applicant need not establish “absolute destitution.” Lee v. McDonald's Corp., 231 F.3d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Babino v. Janssen & Son, 2017 WL 6813137, at * 1 (D.S.D. 2017). The District Court's task is to determine whether the plaintiff's allegation of poverty is true, and that determination is within the court's discretion. Lee, 231 F.3d at 459.

Plaintiff has submitted sufficient documentation to establish that she should be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. In her declaration, Ms. Wilson indicates she currently has income in the form of military retirement and disability payments, minimal assets, and significant housing expenses. (Doc. 2). The Court finds Ms. Wilson is indigent within the meaning of § 1915(a)(1). The Court notes this is consistent with its determination of in forma pauperis status for Plaintiff in 5:22-cv-5091. This determination means her claims will be screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs Complaint alleges many instances of wrongdoing, financial mismanagement of 638 Funds (Public Law 93-638), conflict of interest, and nepotism by officials of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and others. Although the precise nature of all of the claims is not clear, Plaintiff has alleged fraud, waste and abuse, and an unspecified civil rights claim. (Doc. 1, PgID 5). Her lengthier Complaint invokes the “Whistleblower Protection Act” and alleges misuse of tribal funds by the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council and Echaga Corporation. (Doc. 1-1, PgID 10). She alleges financial information is “the intellectual property of the Oglala Sioux Tribe Members” and asks that financial documents be shared with tribal members. (Doc. 1, PgID 3). On November 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Interior-Inspector General and with the Bureau of Indian Affairs listing many of the allegations in her Complaint. (Doc. 1-1, PgID 40).

Subsequently she named both as Defendants in this action. Plaintiff also indicates she has filed lawsuits challenging election procedures, 5:22-cv-5095, and Indian Trust Patents, 5:22-cv-5094. (Id., PgID 38).

Apart from the allegations outlined above, Plaintiff asserts that she claims 20 acres of land in Tract 2159 on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. (Doc. 1, PgID 3). She states the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council agreed she should have this land, and adds that the decision did not appear in the tribal ordinance reflecting actions taken by the Council. Plaintiff also claims that Veterans on Pine Ridge are entitled to 20 acres of land in Tract 2159. (Id.). She requests “help” for veterans in obtaining Cactus Flats lands, although it is unclear whether the veterans have a legal claim to the land. Plaintiff is a veteran, (Doc. 1-2, PgID 48), and has an individual interest in claiming the land due to her status as a veteran.

B. Legal Standard

A proceeding in forma pauperis is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) which provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--.. .

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

This provision allows the court sua sponte to review a complaint filed with an in forma pauperis application to determine if the action warrants dismissal. In screening plaintiff s pro se complaint, the court must liberally construe it and assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Even with this construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A reviewing court has the duty to examine a pro se complaint “to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 588 (8th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675. If it does not contain these bare essentials, dismissal is appropriate. The court is not required to construct legal theories for the plaintiff to enable the case to proceed. Margion v City of Sioux Falls Police Dept., 2020 WL 906521, *2 (D.S.D. 2020) (citing Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)).

C. Legal Analysis

1. Plaintiff's standing to pursue claims to land individually and as a veteran

Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated rules that are pertinent in assessing whether a party has standing in an action. In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, the Court commented that, "At all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must maintain a personal interest in the dispute.... To demonstrate standing, the plaintiff must not only establish an injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct but must also seek a remedy that redresses that injury."__U.S.__, 141 S.Ct. 792, 796, 209 L.Ed.2d 94 (2021). See also Cross v. Fox, 23 F.4th 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2022).

The Supreme Court has set forth the requirements for Article III standing in numerous additional cases. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” is that a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning invasion of a legally protected interest; “there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of'; and the injury can be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (cleaned up). See also Department of Commerce v. New York, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2565, 204 L.Ed.2d 978 (2019) (in a dispute over a citizenship question on the 2020 census, states had standing, given the potential impact on their representation in Congress).

Standing requirements seek to ensure that a litigant has a “sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy” to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972). Beyond the constitutional limitation on standing, a “plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). The purpose of this prudential limitation on standing is to avoid the adjudication of the rights of third parties not before the court with the goal of ensuring “that the most effective advocate of the rights at issue is present to champion them.” Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1977).

The Eighth Circuit has established that a plaintiff must allege “a personal stake in the outcome of the case” that warrants “invocation of federal court jurisdiction” and justifies the court's exercise of remedial powers to vindicate the claim. Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transp. Development Dist., 792 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498). The court recently summarized the standing requirements in Huizenga v. Independent School District No. 11, as follows: the plaintiff...