Wilson v. Dep't of Interior

1

MELAINE R. WILSON, Plaintiff v. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS-WASHINGTON, D.C., BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS-PINE RIDGE AGENCY, OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE COUNCIL, Defendants

No. 5:23-cv-5043

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Western Division

November 29, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge.

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Complaint, (Doc. 1) motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 2), and motion for appointment of counsel, (Doc. 5). A miscellaneous document may be an attempt to substitute the tribal employment office for the Cannabis Commission, although the latter is not named in the caption. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff filed an intermediate appeal, (Doc. 8), before the Court was assigned the case and had the opportunity to rule on it. Plaintiff has sent a letter to this Court, (Doc. 17), which appears to be a request to the Eighth Circuit to consolidate this case with three of the others Plaintiff has filed 5:22-cv-5094 (COA 23-3204); 5:22-cv-5097 (COA 23-3206); and 5:23-cv-5027 (COA 23-3205).

The Court denied Plaintiff's motion for in forma pauperis status on appeal, (Doc. 14). Plaintiff had not complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(1), in that she did not identify any issues she was appealing, or any order or judgment as grounds for appeal because none had been entered.

Plaintiff's current complaint is against the Department of Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs-Washington, D.C., Bureau of Indian Affairs-Pine Ridge Agency, and Oglala Sioux Tribe Council. The complaint alleges that employees of the tribe “are held in forced poverty by the use of illegal Non-Disclosure Agreements and NonDisparaging Agreements (NDA's) to keep them from reporting Fraud, Waste and Abuse.” (Doc. 1, PgID 3). Plaintiff requests substantial damages for “each Oglala Sioux Tribe member” and for herself personally. (Id.). Plaintiff does not include with her complaint any of the documents she challenges or quotations from them, and therefore, the Court lacks any information about what the alleged nondisparagement and non-disclosure agreements provide. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not allege that she is or has been an employee who would have been bound by any such agreement.

I. Motion for Leave to Proceed In forma Pauperis

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) directs the court to authorize the commencement of a civil action without prepayment of fees upon proof of plaintiffs inability to pay. A person may be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis if he or she “submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets” the person possesses, and also states “that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefore.” Id. The Eighth Circuit has established parameters for addressing in forma pauperis motions and has instructed that a petitioner's financial status should be evaluated first, and screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 should follow. Martin-Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 1982). The court has recognized that the applicant need not establish “absolute destitution.” Lee v. McDonald's Corp., 231 F.3d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Babino v. Janssen & Son, 2017 WL 6813137, at * 1 (D.S.D. 2017). The District Court's task is to determine whether the plaintiff's allegation of poverty is true, and that determination is within the court's discretion. Lee, 231 F.3d at 459.

Plaintiff has submitted sufficient documentation to establish that she should be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. In her declaration, Ms. Wilson indicates she currently has income in the form of military retirement and disability payments, minimal assets, and significant housing expenses. (Doc. 2). The Court finds Ms. Wilson is indigent within the meaning of §1915(a)(1). The Court notes this is consistent with its determination of in forma pauperis status for Plaintiff in 5:22-cv-5091, 5:22-cv-5097, and 5:23-cv-5027. This determination means her claims will be screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff's complaint includes a letter of November 15, 2022, (Doc. 1-1, PgID 9), and a letter to President Biden, (Doc. 1-1, PgID 13), which she has filed with several of her other lawsuits. These documents recount her claims of fraud particularly with respect to the land included within the boundaries of the Pine Ridge Reservation. These claims have previously been addressed by the Court, and their dismissal is the subject of part of Plaintiff's appeals to the Eighth Circuit.

As noted above, Plaintiff's current complaint is against the Department of Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs at the national and local level, and Oglala Sioux Tribe Council. (Doc. 1, PgID 1). Plaintiff's allegations concerning nondisclosure and non-disparagement agreements are at Doc. 1-1, PgID 15. This document lists additional defendants who do not appear in the document filed at Doc. 1, including the tribal Workforce Employer Office, accountability officer, treasurer, Economic Development Committee, tribal attorneys, and BIA superintendent and comptroller. (Id.). She lists as victims herself, all enrolled Oglala Sioux Tribe members, and “all enrolled Natives on Federally Recognized Tribes Reservations.” (Doc. 1-1, PgID 16). She asserts wrongdoing during 19342023 in the form of “collusion of about 30ish enrolled Oglala Sioux Members” who have held “prime positions” and that attorneys were directed to draw up the agreements she challenges. (Id.). She connects the group that is allegedly colluding to alleged illegal land transactions on the reservation. (Id.). She further alleges that repercussions to employees who speak about illegality include suspensions, firing, eviction, and banishment from Pine Ridge. (Id.).

As a remedy Plaintiff seeks dissolution of “NDAs that have illegal holds over Oglala Sioux Tribe Enrolled Members.” (Id., PgID 18). She seeks financial compensation to tribal members amounting to $215,100,000 and personal compensation of $300,000, along with a lifetime toll-free number for tribal members to make complaints to the Department of Interior Inspector General's Office. (Id.).

B. Legal Standard

A proceeding in forma pauperis is governed by 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) which provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee ... the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that- ...

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

This provision allows the court sua sponte to review a complaint filed with an in forma pauperis application to determine if the action warrants dismissal.

In screening plaintiff's pro se complaint, the court must liberally construe it and assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Even with this construction, “a pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A reviewing court has the duty to examine a pro se complaint “to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 588 (8th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675. If it does not contain these bare essentials, dismissal is appropriate. The court is not required to construct legal theories for the plaintiff to enable the case to proceed. Margion v City of Sioux Falls Police Dept., 2020 WL 906521, *2 (D.S.D. 2020) (citing Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)).

C. Legal Analysis

1. Plaintiff's standing to assert challenge to employee non-disclosure and non-disparagement agreements

In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, the Supreme Court commented that, "At all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must maintain a personal interest in the dispute.... To demonstrate standing, the plaintiff must not only establish an injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct but must also seek a remedy that redresses that injury."U.S., 141 S.Ct. 792, 796, 209 L.Ed.2d 94 (2021). See also Cross v. Fox, 23 F.4th 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2022).

The Supreme Court has set forth the requirements for Article III standing in numerous cases. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” is that a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning invasion of a legally protected interest; “there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of'; and the injury can be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (cleaned up). See also California v. Texas, 593 U.S., 141 S.Ct. 2104, 2113 (2021) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006)). See generally Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 292-94 (2023).

Standing requirements seek to ensure that a litigant has a “sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy” to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 731-32 (1972). Beyond the constitutional limitation on standing, a “plaintiff generally must...