Wilson v. Department of Transportation

209 A.3d 1143

John Z. WILSON, Jr., Appellant

v.Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Bureau of Driver Licensing

No. 709 C.D. 2018

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs November 30, 2018

Decided May 20, 2019

Robert J. Perkins, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Terrance M. Edwards, Sr. Counsel, Harrisburg, for appellee.

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge, HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON

Appellant John Z. Wilson, Jr. (Licensee) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County (trial court), dated April 26, 2018. The trial court dismissed Licensee's statutory appeal of the suspension of his operating privilege by the Department of Transportation (Department), Bureau of Driver Licensing (Bureau), which the Bureau imposed pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i), commonly referred to as the Implied Consent Law, after Licensee refused chemical breath testing. We will affirm the trial court's order.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 25, 2017, Licensee was driving on Washington Road in North Strabane Township. As he did so, Officer Patrick Lee, a North Strabane Township police officer (Officer Lee), while in his parked squad car monitoring traffic, observed Licensee's vehicle approach and cross two speed lines marked on the pavement. To monitor Licensee's speed, Officer Lee manually started and stopped a stopwatch-based speed calculation device, commonly known as an Accutrak watch (the Accutrak). Officer Lee had programmed the distance between the two speed lines into the Accutrak. When the Accutrak displayed a speed of 60.7 miles per hour (roughly 15 miles per hour above the posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour), Officer Lee pursued Licensee down Washington Road and across a municipal boundary into Peters Township. Officer Lee ultimately found Licensee leaving his vehicle in a shopping center parking lot. He approached and told Licensee that he was stopping him for speeding on Washington Road. Based on the ensuing encounter, Officer Lee arrested Licensee for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and, invoking the Implied Consent Law, asked Licensee to take a chemical breath test. Licensee refused, and the Bureau suspended his operating privilege pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Implied Consent Law.

Licensee appealed the suspension to the trial court, which held a hearing on April 14, 2018. During the hearing, the Bureau introduced the testimony of Officer Lee. Officer Lee testified that he pursued Licensee as soon as he saw the Accutrak return a speed of 60.7 miles per hour. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 7.) He also testified that, to his knowledge, the speeding lines he used to measure Licensee's speed with the Accutrak were 0.0331 miles (or 175 feet) apart. On cross-examination, Officer Lee admitted that he had not personally measured the distance between the lines. (Id. at 44.) On being asked about the speed calculation, Officer Lee stated that the Accutrak registered a total transit time between the two lines of 1.96 seconds. (Id. at 43.) He explained that his usual practice is to start timing when the vehicle's front tires cross the first line and stop the time when the rear tires cross the second line, but he admitted he could not recall when he started and stopped the Accutrak in this particular instance. (Id. at 44-45.) Officer Lee also said that he observed no violations in North Strabane Township other than speeding. (Id. at 7, 34.)

The Bureau also presented Officer Lee's testimony about his encounter with Licensee following the stop. Officer Lee explained that, as he stood several feet away from Licensee, he smelled alcohol and noticed that Licensee's eyes were red and glassy. (Id. at 13.) Based on those observations, Officer Lee asked Licensee to perform a field sobriety test known as the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN). Licensee performed the test and Officer Lee noticed sustained and distinct nystagmus, possibly indicating intoxication. (Id. at 14-17.) He then asked Licensee to perform two other field sobriety tests. Licensee refused and claimed that a medical condition in his leg prevented him from performing the tests, though he did not specify what that condition was. (Id. at 17.) Officer Lee then asked Licensee to perform a preliminary breath test, which licensee refused without explanation.

Following that interaction, Officer Lee arrested Licensee on suspicion of DUI, read him the statutory warnings from the Department's Form DL-26A, and, when Licensee still refused to comply, took Licensee to the North Strabane Township police station. (Id. at 18-20.) At the station, Officer Lee read Form DL-26A to Licensee a second time, allowed Licensee to read the form himself and sign it, and requested that Licensee perform a chemical breath test. Licensee again refused. The Bureau introduced the signed Form DL-26A into evidence at the hearing. (Id. at 22.)

On cross-examination, Officer Lee answered questions about his use of the DUI investigative process. In particular, he admitted that he did not observe any objective indicators of intoxication other than the odor of alcohol, Licensee's glassy eyes, and the results of the HGN test. (Id. at 29-36.) Regarding the HGN test, Officer Lee confirmed that the test can yield up to three "clues" or indications of intoxication per eye, for a total of six clues. He testified that he observed only two clues, which, he acknowledged, is consistent with a level of intoxication below the legal limit. (Id. at 37-39.)

Licensee also testified at the hearing. He stated that, based upon his own calculations, an error of 0.25 seconds in Officer Lee's timing could have resulted in Licensee's speed being calculated at 6.8 miles per hour faster than his actual speed. Such an error, Licensee testified, could have caused the Accutrak to return a speed of 60.7 miles per hour when Licensee was in fact travelling at only 53.9 miles per hour—a speed at which he could not be stopped for speeding under Pennsylvania law. (Id. at 73-74.) He admitted that, of course, such an error could also mean he was travelling faster than the calculated speed. (Id. ) Licensee also testified about a leg injury that, he contended, prevented his performance of two of the requested field sobriety tests. (Id. at 74-75.) Finally, he acknowledged signing Form DL-26A, but he testified that he had trouble hearing Officer Lee's reading of the form and did not hear Officer Lee tell him that his license would be suspended if he refused the chemical breath test. (Id. at 78-82.)

The trial court ultimately dismissed Licensee's appeal. In rendering its subsequent Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court relied upon Section 8953 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8953, and Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547. Section 8953 of the Judicial Code, pertaining to statewide municipal police jurisdiction, provides, in part:

(a) General rule. --Any duly employed municipal police officer who is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or performing those functions within the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction in the following cases:

....

(2) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any offense which was committed, or which he has probable cause to believe was committed, within his primary jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the offense.

(Emphasis added.) Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, pertaining to chemical testing to determine the presence of alcohol or a controlled substance in a person's body, provides, in part:

(a) General rule. --Any person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to [chemical testing] if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in violation of ... [Section] 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) ....

(b) Civil penalties for refusal. --

(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of [S]ection 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so ... the [D]epartment shall suspend the operating privilege of the person ....

(Emphasis added.)

In its opinion, the trial court found Officer Lee's testimony credible and concluded that the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (MPJA)¹ authorized Officer Lee to invoke the Implied Consent Law in Peters Township. To support this, the trial court determined that Officer Lee's measurement of Licensee's speed in North Strabane Township gave Officer Lee probable cause to believe that Licensee was speeding. The trial court went on to conclude that Officer Lee's interactions with Licensee following the traffic stop were sufficient to give him reasonable grounds to suspect Licensee of DUI and thus invoke the Implied Consent Law. Finally, the trial court concluded that Officer Lee properly warned Licensee of the license suspension that would follow his refusal to submit to chemical breath testing.

II. AUTHORITY UNDER THE MPJA

On appeal,² Licensee first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Officer Lee properly invoked the Implied Consent Law in Peters Township, outside his own jurisdiction. Licensee claims that the Bureau did not demonstrate that Officer Lee possessed the probable cause required by the MPJA in order to exercise police authority in Peters Township. Licensee essentially argues that the Bureau failed to demonstrate the reliability of the speed measurement on which Officer Lee relied. Licensee sets forth four...