Wilson v. Parker

227 A.3d 343

Alison WILSON and David Wilson, Appellants

v.Chad PARKER and Jessi Parker

No. 657 WDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 4, 2019

Filed January 24, 2020

Stephen D. Wicks, Altoona, for appellants.

Daniel L. Stants, Altoona, for Parker, C., appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.^*

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs, Alison and David Wilson, appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Defendants, Chad and Jessi Parker, in this dispute over a tract of land located in Bedford County, Pennsylvania. The trial court decreed that (1) the statute of frauds¹ barred it from enforcing an oral contract in which the Wilsons allegedly purchased that land from the Parkers; (2) the Wilsons' alternative claim for unjust enrichment would not lie, because no enforceable contract existed; and (3) the Wilsons were evicted from the property. The Wilsons do not appeal the trial court's first and third decrees. However, they assert that the second decree is a misapplication of the law of unjust enrichment. We agree and reverse that portion of the decree which erroneously denied the Wilsons monetary relief.

II. Factual Background

This lawsuit stems from the alleged sale of property between family members. David Wilson and Jessi Parker are brother and sister. David's wife Alison Wilson and Jessi's ex-husband Chad Parker are also parties to this action.²

In 2008, the Wilsons moved from West Virginia to Bedford County and began leasing the Parkers' trailer. The Wilsons orally agreed to pay rent to the Parkers in the amount of $400 per month. In 2009 or early 2010, after learning that Jessi Wilson had an inheritance coming to her, the parties talked about having the Wilsons purchase the property for $10,000. A few months later, the Parkers proposed the Wilsons purchase the trailer for $1,000.

Although the Wilsons paid the $1,000 in cash, the parties never took the title for the trailer to a notary for transfer, and Mr. Parker could not recall signing the title over to his in-laws. Thereafter, the Wilsons continued to pay lot rent in the amount of $100 for a few months, until they paid the additional $10,000 in July of 2011 for the land on which the trailer set. The Wilsons paid no additional rent thereafter.

Over the next seven years, the parties had many interactions regarding the possible sale of the property, but all parties agree that no deed or any other writing ever changed hands. Shortly after Ms. Parker accepted the Wilsons' $10,000 check and deposited it into the Parkers' joint account, Mr. Parker asked the water company to change the water bill for the trailer to the Wilsons' names, because they had purchased the property. The Wilsons made improvements to the property, including building a new roof over top the trailer, putting in concrete footers to anchor the roof, a deck, a new bedroom, and flooring. They claim the cost of the improvements was $11,228.19. They also allege that Mr. Parker assisted them in building the roof and deck and provided his excavation equipment for digging. Mr. Parker claimed he paid for the concrete.

In November 2013, the Wilsons paid to survey the property after Ms. Parker indicated that her mortgage company needed it to release the property to be deeded to them. The survey indicated that the acreage for the parcel encroached beyond Mr. Parker's cow fence and into his pasture. Ms. Parker, testifying for the Wilsons, stated that this encroachment prompted Mr. Parker to refuse to give the Wilsons a deed to the land.

On November 15, 2015, Mr. Parker placed an eviction notice on the door to the trailer, and litigation ensued. After a non-jury trial, the trial court entered a decree of equity and judgment for the Parkers on all claims and on the Parkers' counter-claim. The court denied the Wilsons' post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, and this timely appeal followed.

III. Analysis

The Wilsons raise one question for our review:

Whether the lower court erred in denying [their] claim for unjust enrichment for the purchase price and cost of repairs and improvements after their oral contract to purchase the land was deemed unenforceable?

Wilsons' Brief at 4. Before discussing that issue, however, we address Mr. Parker's assertion that the Wilsons did not properly pray for damages in their Complaint. See Mr. Parkers' Brief at 1. He asserts this as an alternative basis for affirming the trial court's denial of monetary relief.³

A. The Wilsons' Prayer for Equitable Relief

The Wilsons' Complaint alleged three counts – specific performance, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. See Wilsons' Complaint at 4, 6, 7. The only count at issue here is the unjust-enrichment claim.

That count specifies the various amounts of money the Wilsons believe they invested in the Parkers' property over the time they resided there. They claim to have paid "$11,000 as the purchase price for the property, as well as $800 for the survey of the property and $575 for an appraisal of the property, and have expended over $15,000 making capital improvements to the property." Id. at 8. Moreover, the Wilsons alleged that, if the court does not order the Parkers to transfer title to them, the Parkers "will be unjustly enriched, not only by the sum of $11,000, but also by the capital improvements made to the property, and the value of the survey and the appraisal of the property." Id.

However, in drafting the Complaint, the Wilsons' former lawyer placed the same prayer for relief after each of the three counts. In each of these wherefore clauses, the Wilsons asked the court to order the Parkers to produce a deed granting them title to "the property ... consisting of 0.869 acres ... together with the improvements, and such other remedies as this Court deems appropriate." Id. at 6-8.

According to Mr. Parker, "Because the [Wilsons] did not include a demand for monetary relief in the Complaint, and their claim for equitable relief is legally insufficient to imply such a demand, the trial court did not err when it declined" to award damages on the unjust-enrichment count. Mr. Parker's Brief at 10-11. He says that the Wilsons "appear to believe that including the phrase ‘[and] such other remedies as this court deems appropriate’ is sufficient to meet the dictates of [ Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021(a) ]." Id. at 14. Mr. Parker does not think the Wilsons' prayer for general relief encompasses monetary damages for unjust enrichment. He relies upon Martindale Lumber Co. v. Trusch , 452 Pa.Super. 250, 681 A.2d 803 (1996), to support his contention.

Mr. Parker's brief suggests that he properly preserved this issue for our review, because he objected to counsel's questioning of Mrs. Wilson on the value of the improvements she and Mr. Wilson made to the land. See Parkers' Brief at 13; see also N.T., 10/3/18, at 31-33. The trial court overruled that objection, based upon the inclusion of language in the Complaint seeking all other relief the court deemed appropriate. Mr. Parker also renewed his objection to the lack of a specific request for monetary damages in the Complaint at the conclusion of trial. Critically, however, Mr. Parker filed no preliminary objections and no motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Whether a party has properly raised an issue below to preserve it for our review and whether the trial court properly applied the Rules of Civil Procedure in finding the Complaint to be legally sufficient "present questions of law, [for which] our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary." Anderson v. McAfoos , 618 Pa. 478, 57 A.3d 1141, 1148 (2012).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028 governs the basis, manner, and timing for objecting to the contents of a pleading, including a complaint. Such preliminary objections may include the "failure of a pleading to conform to law or rule of court" and any "insufficient specificity in a pleading." Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(2),(3).

Rather than file a preliminary objection to the Complaint's wherefore-clause to Count 3, Mr. Parker waited until the middle of the non-jury trial to attack the Wilsons' pleading. He contended that their prayer for relief failed to conform to the specificity required in Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021(a). He should have made that objection during the pleading phase of the action under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(2),(3).

Indeed, Mr. Parker cannot claim prejudicial surprise by Ms. Wilsons' testimony regarding the costs of the improvements, because the Wilsons' fully and specifically pleaded their third count of unjust enrichment in the Complaint. They enumerated the upper limits of the monetary amounts they felt that the then-married Parkers had unjust received from them. Mr. Parker erroneously asserts that "there [was] nothing pled which suggest[ed] the [Wilsons] were seeking monetary damages." Parkers' Brief at 17. Clearly there was. If the Wilsons' failure to total the sums in their third count and place that figure in the prayer for relief was of great concern to Mr. Parker, he was on notice of the clerical error the moment he first read the Complaint. Hence, Mr. Parker could have easily filed a preliminary objection on those grounds when he received the Complaint. He did not.

Moreover, the case upon which he relies – Martindale Lumber , supra – had a procedural posture quite different from this case. There, the lumber company filed a complaint solely and specifically within the jurisdiction of the equity court. The lumber company sought specific performance of a contract for the sale and harvesting of timber.

The Uniform Commercial Code⁴ foreclosed specific performance and would only allow damages on a breach-of-contract theory, because the UCC dictates that timber is a fungible good. The lumber company, however, had neither pleaded breach of contract nor enumerated any monetary damages in its complaint. The defendants argued that equity could not grant the only type of...