Wilson v. Smith

1

JAVAN JERRELLE WILSON, SR., Plaintiff, v. NATHANAEL SMITH, BRIAN SHIPMAN, JEROME WARFIELD, SR., CRISSA BLACKENBURG, TIMOTHY FLANAGAN, and JOHN DOE, Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-11666

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

May 16, 2024

KIMBERLY G. ALTMAN, MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 40) AND DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 46) AND GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (ECF No 29) ^[1]

DAVID M. LAWSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

This is a prisoner civil rights case. Plaintiff Javan Wilson, Sr., (Wilson) has sued Michigan parole board members Crissa Blankenburg (Blankenburg), Timothy Flanagan (Flanagan), Brian Shipman (Shipman), and Nathanael Smith (Smith), alleging that after he began serving a prison sentence for non-sex crimes, he was improperly classified as a sex offender and then had his parole conditioned upon the completion of sex offender mental health treatment, in violation of his procedural due process rights under the United States Constitution.^[2] Wilson only seeks prospective equitable relief in the form of removal of his parole condition until a proper hearing is held in accordance with his right to due process. (ECF No. 46, PageID.460). All pretrial matters have been referred to the undersigned. (ECF No. 13).

Before the Court are Wilson's motion for preliminary injunction, (ECF No. 29); defendants' motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 40); and Wilson's motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 46). All of the motions are fully briefed and ready for consideration. For the reasons stated below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that defendants' motion be DENIED, Wilson's motion for summary judgment be DENIED, and Wilson's motion for preliminary injunction be GRANTED. With regard to the preliminary injunction, the undersigned recommends that Wilson's parole condition requiring sexual abuse prevention treatment be discontinued until he is afforded a hearing that follows the minimum requirements of due process, as outlined in this Report and Recommendation.

II. Procedural History

Wilson filed this suit on July 12, 2023. (ECF No. 1). That complaint, filed pro se, still governs. On August 14, 2023, Wilson filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 11). The undersigned recommended denial of this motion, as defendants did not receive notice of it, (ECF No. 16), and that recommendation was adopted on October 5, 2023, (ECF No. 24).

On November 8, 2023, after defendants appeared and a scheduling order was entered, Wilson filed a second motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 29). At this point, Wilson was still proceeding pro se. Defendants timely responded. (ECF No. 31). Then, on December 11, 2023, attorney Frank J. Lawrence moved to represent Wilson in a limited capacity, specifically for the purpose of filing a reply in support of the pending motion for preliminary injunction, and to allow defendants to file a surreply. (ECF No. 33). That motion was granted the following day. (ECF No. 34). The proposed reply brief, (ECF No. 33-2), was accepted as the reply, and defendants filed their surreply on January 4, 2024, (ECF No. 39).

Defendants moved to dismiss the case on February 13, 2024. (ECF No. 40). Shortly thereafter, attorney Frank J. Lawrence filed a general appearance on behalf of Wilson, (ECF No. 42), and then filed a motion for summary judgment on Wilson's behalf, (ECF No. 46). Defendants' motion to dismiss is now fully briefed, (ECF Nos. 52, 53), as is Wilson's motions for summary judgment, (ECF Nos. 54, 56), and for preliminary injunction, (ECF Nos. 31, 33-2, 39).

III. Pertinent Facts and Issues

The parties agree on many of the pertinent facts of the case. Wilson is currently serving a sentence for a violation of M.C.L. § 750.88 - Assault with intent to rob and steal; unarmed, and is on parole. (ECF No. 46, PageID.461). Wilson's Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) mentions that he had also been charged with two counts of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the first degree, but those charges were dismissed in a plea deal, and he has never been convicted of a sex crime. (Id.). Nevertheless, Wilson alleges that he was labeled as a “sex offender or possible sex offender” upon his incarceration in 2018. (Id., PageID.462). On or around April 5, 2018, Wilson objected to this classification in writing, but the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) refused to grant his request for an administrative hearing. (Id., PageID.463).

Wilson first went before the parole board on April 27, 2021, and the board deferred their decision on parole until Wilson completed a sexual offender risk assessment. (ECF No. 31, PageID.191). Wilson voluntarily underwent a sexual offender risk assessment performed by an MDOC psychologist on June 30, 2021. (Id.). As a result, it was recommended that Wilson complete sexual abuse prevention programming and he was transferred to a unit housing other prisoners recommended to complete the same programming. (Id., PageID.192). Wilson was denied parole on or about July 9, 2021. (ECF No. 46, PageID.463).

The next year, on May 4, 2022, Wilson was interviewed by Blankenburg, and his bid for parole was denied. About a month prior to the interview, on April 22, 2022, Wilson had begun participating in the “[Treatment Readiness for You (TRY)] Group”. (ECF No. 31, PageID.193). According to Wilson, the TRY group is the first step of MDOC's Michigan Sexual Abuse Prevention Program (MSAPP). (ECF No. 46, PageID.464). Wilson says that he was denied parole because he had not finished the TRY Group treatment nor the subsequent steps of MSAPP, and that Blankenburg told him to be patient because the subsequent steps did not have openings for inmates at that time. (Id.). He was eventually able to enter “Phase II” of MSAPP on November 17, 2022, and completed the course on May 16, 2023. (Id., PageID.465; ECF No. 31, PageID.195). Following his completion of MSAPP, Wilson was placed on parole on September 6, 2023. (ECF No. 31, PageID.196). One of the conditions of Wilson's parole, which is ongoing, is that he complete a sexual abuse prevention program while in the community. (Id.).

Wilson and defendants dispute whether he was denied parole on the two occasions above due to having not completed a sexual abuse prevention program. Defendants say Wilson's parole was denied due to his risk factors; Wilson says that board members told him directly that he needed to complete the program in order to get parole. The parties also dispute whether Wilson has committed any sexual misconduct. Defendants refer to MSAPP treatment notes in which Wilson admits to doing so, while Wilson says that he was coerced into lying about having committed a sex crime in order to complete the training and be placed on parole.

IV. Legal Standards

A. Motions to Dismiss

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (concluding that a plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

B. Motions for Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004).

“The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists....” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact,” the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.' ” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

V. Discussion

A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

1. Standing

a. Parties' Arguments

Defendants argue that Wilson lacks standing for his requested relief to avoid sexual abuse prevention treatment and for a parole board rehearing. They note that at this time, Wilson voluntarily completed the...