Wilton v. Board of Selectmen of The Town of Wilton

Sensible Wilton v. Board of Selectmen of the Town of Wilton

No. FSTCV156025460S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Stamford

November 13, 2015

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (# 107.00)

Kenneth B. Povodator, J.

Nature of the Proceeding

This is a proceeding in which the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendants, officials of the Town of Wilton, to schedule a Special Town Meeting (as that term is used in the Town Charter), through the mechanism of an order in the nature of mandamus. The purpose for the meeting is to submit for consideration a proposed ordinance which, pursuant to the procedure set forth in the Town Charter, had been submitted to the Board of Selectmen (the first step in the process). The Board of Selectman has refused to take any further steps to schedule or conduct such a Special Town Meeting, which would have resulted in the proposed ordinance being submitted to the electorate for a vote.

Before any hearing on the merits of the application for a temporary order of mandamus, defendants filed a motion to dismiss challenging/questioning the standing of plaintiff to pursue this action. The challenge to standing is multifaceted, but all aspects center on the fact that the plaintiff is, for purposes of Connecticut law, a political committee or political action committee, within the meaning of General Statutes § 9-601(3).

Among the bases for the challenge, the defendants claim that plaintiff should have ceased its existence months earlier since the election/referendum for which it initially had been formed had long since taken place, and the time limits for all avenues of review directly relating to that vote have long since expired. The defendants also claim that the plaintiff is not asserting a claim in its own right but rather in a representational capacity, but that the facts of this case do not allow it to assert a representational claim. The defendants also claim that there is a mismatch between the party (parties) circulating the petition for the special meeting and the party (parties) behind this legal proceeding.

In general terms, the plaintiff's response is that the committee was formed as an ongoing committee rather than one with a specific duration; that it is proper for the committee to be the plaintiff, as it satisfies representational requirements in varying respects; and that it otherwise is a proper party to pursue this matter. One of the reasons stated for continued utilization of the committee is that the individuals who formed the committee and control it claim that there had been " threats" of personal financial responsibility if they had pursued this avenue as individuals, rather than through the already-existing committee.

The dispute focuses on the manner in which the town will or should proceed with respect to the Miller-Driscoll School located at 217 Wolfpit Road, Wilton, Connecticut, which is a combined structure--formerly 2 separate schools, the Miller School and the Driscoll School, each originally constructed in the mid-60s. A proposed renovation, at a cost of over $50 million, was submitted to the electorate for approval by way of a Special Town Meeting (nominally to approve financing of the project), held in September of 2014--effectively, a referendum in the sense that it was a proceeding conducted via machine voting and governed by election laws, rather than an actual town meeting conducted with all participating/voting town residents in attendance.

The plaintiff initially was formed in order to oppose the funding for the project, i.e. to support a rejection of the project in the referendum. Although the two individuals behind plaintiff have contended that certain irregularities took place leading up to the election, no formal challenge to the election itself was taken (but complaints were filed with the State elections enforcement commission (SEEC) relating to certain conduct by individuals associated with the Town or its board of education).^[1] The result of the vote was to approve the project, by a relatively slim majority--approximately 50.7% voting in favor of funding the project.

According to P3 of the complaint,

SENSIBLE WILTON . . . is a duly formed political committee under the laws of the State of Connecticut. Its stated purpose is to oppose a proposed renovation of the Miller-Driscoll School . . . in the Town of Wilton . . . at a cost of over $50, 000, 000, on the grounds that the project is fiscally wasteful and unjustified based on the Town's projected needs, and because the project will not address the immediate repairs that must be performed at the School within a reasonable timetable. Sensible Wilton's supporters include over 1, 000 electors in the Town of Wilton, and Sensible Wilton is the sponsor and organizer of the subject Petition.

Alex Ruskewich and Curtis Noel are founders and officers of Sensible Wilton, and both are electors within the Town of Wilton. (They also claim, at times, to be members, although there have been and were more credible statements to the effect that Sensible Wilton does not have members as that term ordinarily is understood.) Paragraph 6 of the complaint asserts that

Sensible Wilton has standing to bring this lawsuit, because its members, including non-parties Ruskewich and Noel, would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; the interests that Sensible Wilton seeks to protect, including a vote to repeal the September 2014 bond authorization described herein, are germane to Sensible Wilton's purposes, which include opposing the $50, 022, 000 renovation of the Miller-Driscoll School; and, neither the claim asserted herein nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.

There is no question about the conduct of Sensible Wilton up to and including the September 2014 approval of funding. The dispute--on the merits and as to standing--relate to subsequent events.

After the initial approval of financing and the claimed discovery of new information, Sensible Wilton sought a revote, which request was rejected under the circumstances (P61 et seq. of complaint); no direct action was taken in response to that rejection. Then, the key events underlying this dispute are recited in PP64 and 66:

Following the Board of Selectmen's rejection of Sensible Wilton's January 2015 petition [for a revote] on February 17, 2015 . . . on April 1, 2015, Sensible Wilton filed the subject Petition . . . containing the signatures of more than 2% of the Town's electors, and stating as follows:

SUBJECT: We, the undersigned electors and those of us qualified to vote in Town Meetings of the Town of Wilton hereby Petition that a Special Town Meeting be held to consider and vote the following ordinance, without amendment, in full compliance with State Election Law:

The resolution appropriating and authorizing bonds in the amount of $50, 022, 000 for planning, design, construction, renovation, equipping and furnishing of the Miller-Driscoll School and related costs is hereby repealed; provided, however, that the Town will pay all legal obligations to third parties, lawfully incurred, including any arising from bonds or contracts already made and entered into by the Town prior to such repeal .

(Bold in original.)

66. However, at a meeting on May 18, 2015, the Board of Selectmen voted 4-0 to take no action on the April 2015 Petition.

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the Board of Selectmen had no discretion under the Town Charter--that upon submission of the petition with the requisite number of signatures, there was a duty to follow through and schedule a Special Town Meeting. It is the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff is incorrect on the merits but as a threshold matter, Sensible Wilton lacks standing. More particularly, the defendants claim that Sensible Wilton has no right to exist, and should have terminated months ago; as a referendum committee, it has no authority to petition for ordinances or bring lawsuits; it does not have members, and therefore cannot prosecute this lawsuit on the theory that it is representing its " members"; and a lawsuit to compel the Board of Selectmen to vote on an ordinance is not germane to the purpose for which the Plaintiff was formed, i.e., to raise and expend money to oppose a referendum held more than eight months prior to the commencement of this proceeding.

Legal Standards

" Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. Nevertheless, [s]tanding is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. Standing [however] requires no more than a colorable claim of injury . . .

Citibank v. Lindland, 310 Conn. 147, 161-62, 75 A.3d 651 (2013) (Internal quotation marks and citations, omitted.)

" It is well

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