Wimberly v. Transcraft

BILL WIMBERLY, PLAINTIFF v. TRANSCRAFT, et al., DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:19-CV-180-TBR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PADUCAH DIVISION

June 29, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Metro Staffing and Barbie Johnson's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. [DN 12]. Pro se Plaintiff Bill Wimberly did not respond and the deadline to do so has passed. This matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, [DN 12], is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

On May 9, 2019, Plaintiff Bill Wimberly was employed by Metro Staffing, a temporary employment agency. [DN 1-1 at 10]. Plaintiff was assigned to work at Transcraft Corporation as a Human Resources assistant when he claims the following events occurred:

Kim [Sumner, Plaintiff's supervisor,] had returned from her morning meeting, and asked if I would take some pictures of her with her cell phone. She stood in front of the file cabinet and asked that I take pictures of the lower half of her body as she posed. Then she stated that she needed to put pants on underneath her skirt. I froze facing my computer and facing the opposite direction. Kim then had me to take more pictures with the skirt and pants. Afterwards, Kim went to her desk to remove the pants. I felt very uncomfortable in this process. After much thought and prayer, I felt I needed to report this incident to protect myself.

Id. The next day, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Sumner went through the papers on his desk and began changing processes without following any formal procedure. Id. On May 13, Plaintiff reported the photography incident to Jason Hite, a member of Transcraft management, and Barbie Johnson, a regional manager at Metro Staffing. Id. On May 16, Plaintiff contacted Ms. Johnson again to report that Ms. Sumner had "begun subtle retaliation by making comments such as 'I am the HR manager and I can take action.'" Id. Plaintiff claims he felt as though Ms. Sumner "was trying to find fault in all the tasks that [he] would complete." Id.

On May 20, Plaintiff spoke with Craig Arnet, the plant manager at Transcraft, and provided a written statement regarding the photography incident and subsequent retaliation by Ms. Sumner. Id. On May 22, Ms. Sumner removed Plaintiff from his office and assigned him to a cubicle and requested his computer password and login information. Id. Plaintiff responded that if Ms. Sumner had his log-in information, "she would be responsible for all the entries and changes" that would be made on his computer. Id. Ms. Sumner replied that Plaintiff "would not be at [his] desk too long." Id. On May 24, Mr. Arnet informed Ms. Johnson that Plaintiff could no longer work at Transcraft. Id. On May 27, Ms. Johnson notified Plaintiff that he had been terminated from Transcraft effective immediately. Id.

On November 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed the current action against Transcraft, Ms. Sumner, Mr. Arnet, Metro Staffing, and Ms. Johnson pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [DN 1]. The Court interprets Plaintiff's pro se complaint as alleging race-based discrimination and retaliation for filing a hostile work environment complaint due to sexual harassment. [DN 1-1 at 11]. On March 27, 2020, Defendants Metro Staffing and Barbie Johnson filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. [DN 12].

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must "plead enough 'factual matter' to raise a 'plausible' inference of wrongdoing." 16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir.2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim becomes plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must presume all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc., 552 F.3d at 434 (citing Great Lakes Steel, 716 F.2d at 1105). "The court need not, however, accept unwarranted factual inferences." Id. (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)). Should the well-pleaded facts support no "more than the mere possibility of misconduct," then dismissal is warranted. Iqbal, 556 U.S at 679. The Court may grant a motion to dismiss "only if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, the complaint still fails to allege a plausible theory of relief." Garceau v. City of Flint, 572 F. App'x 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-79).

DISCUSSION

I. Individual Liability

As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against Barbie Johnson because Title VII only imposes liability on employers, not individuals. [DN 21-1 at 52]. "Title VII provides that 'it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer' to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. A person aggrieved by such discrimination may bring a civil action against the 'employer.'" Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-5(b)) (emphasis added). Thus, "an individual employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an 'employer,' may not be held personally liable under Title VII." Id.None of the facts alleged in the Complaint, even liberally construed, suggest that Ms. Johnson is an "employer" as contemplated under Title VII. Therefore, Plaintiff's Title VII claims against Ms. Johnson must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

II. Race-Based Discrimination

Next, the Court will analyze Plaintiff's race-based discrimination claim. In cases such as this where the plaintiff does not present direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff "must first allege a prima facie case under the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), by pleading facts supporting the following elements: that '(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.'" Brown v. Accenture Fed. Servs., No. 15-24-GFVT, 2016 WL 3298543, at *6 (E.D. Ky. June 13, 2016) (quoting Lewis v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 590 F. App'x 467, 469 (6th Cir. 2014)). At this stage of the litigation, the Court need only consider whether Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case. Id. "The subsequent stages of burden-shifting under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, such as whether the employer had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him, or whether such a reason is pretextual, are not at issue at this juncture." Id.

First, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is African American, and thus, a member of a protected class. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that he was ultimately terminated from his position at Transcraft. [DN 1-1 at 10]. Given that "[t]ermination is the quintessential adverse employment action," Harris v. Burger King Corp., 993 F.Supp.2d 677, 686 (W.D. Ky. 2014), Plaintiff has pled facts demonstrating an adverse employment decision.

Next, the Court will consider Plaintiff's job qualifications. In the context of making a prima facie case, "a court should focus on a plaintiff's objective qualifications to determine whether he or she is qualified for the relevant job." Brown, 2016 WL 3298543, at *6 (quoting Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 575 (6th Cir. 2003)). To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff "simply needs to allege that his qualifications 'are at least equivalent to the minimum objective criteria required for employment in the relevant field,' an inquiry that 'should focus on criteria such as the plaintiff's education, experience in the relevant industry, and demonstrated possession of the required general skills.'" Id. (quoting Wexler, 317 F.3d at 575-76). Here, Plaintiff claims he was employed by Metro Staffing as an HR assistant for $18.00 per hour. [DN 1-1 at 10]. He was assigned by Metro Staffing to work for Transcraft from June 19, 2018 until May 27, 2019. Id. He does not provide specific information regarding his education, experience, or possession of requisite skills. However, the fact that Plaintiff held this position for nearly a year before his termination suggests that he was qualified for the position. See Brown, 2016 WL 3298543, at *6 (finding plaintiff qualified after he was offered the position, hired, and held the position for several months before termination; and plaintiff's supervisor said he was happy with his performance).

Finally, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to support the allegation that he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees. "[T]o be deemed 'similarly-situated,' the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it." Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that...