Wimbley v. Doyon Sec. Servs., LLC

JOSEPH WIMBLEY, Plaintiff, v. DOYON SECURITY SERVICES, LLC d/b/a DOYON-AKAL JV DETENTION CENTER SERVICES, Defendant.

Case No. 14-CIV-20935-BLOOM/Valle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

September 3, 2014

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Doyon Security Services, LLC's ("Defendant" or "Doyon") Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion", ECF No. [23]) Plaintiff Joseph Wimbley's ("Plaintiff" or "Wimbley") Amended Complaint, ECF No. [21]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, all supporting and opposing filings, and the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised as to the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on January 15, 2014 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, captioned Wimbley v. Doyon Security Servs., LLC d/b/a/ Doyon-Akal JV Center Servs., Case No. 14-1146 CA, asserting claims against Defendant for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), defamation, conversion and a demand for a preliminary and permanentinjunction. See ECF No [1-2]. Defendant removed the action to this Court based on original federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in respect of Plaintiff's Title VII claim, federal labor law preemption of Plaintiff's common law tort claims pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and the Court's supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 20, 2014, ECF No. [21], which removed all but Plaintiff's Title VII claim. Thereafter, Defendant filed the instant Motion, Plaintiff timely responded, ECF No. [25] (the "Response"), and Defendant timely replied, ECF No. [26] (the "Reply").

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

A pleading in a civil action must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To satisfy the Rule 8 pleading requirements, a complaint must provide the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, (2002). While a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). Nor can a complaint rest on "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). The Supreme Court has emphasized that "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state aclaim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Am. Dental Assoc. v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288-90 (11th Cir. 2010).

"On a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all facts alleged by the non-moving party are accepted as true." AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). A court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits, including documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009); Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[A] document outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity.") (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002)). While the court is required to accept as true all allegations contained in the complaint, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, Plaintiff's employer, retaliated against Plaintiff. This included demoting Plaintiff, defaming and falsely accusing Plaintiff in an internal personnel report, and confiscating Plaintiff's flash drives containing Plaintiff's personal documents and intellectual property. All acts were due to Plaintiff's connection with an Equal EmploymentOpportunity Commission ("EEOC") complaint filed by Plaintiff's co-employee against Defendant, in violation of Title VII's "opposition clause," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Defendant, in the instant Motion, asserts that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts indicating that Plaintiff opposed Defendant's alleged unlawful employment practice by communicating or disclosing that opposition to Defendant, and has failed to causally connect Plaintiff's protected opposition with his demotion so as to constitute prohibited retaliation under Title VII.

A. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations

Defendant is the managing partner of the Doyon/Akal JV, a joint venture with Akal Security, Inc. ("Doyon JV"). ECF No. [1-1] ¶ 2. Doyon JV contracts with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, to provide care, custody and control of the immigration detainees in federal custody at the Krome Service Processing Center in Homestead, Florida. Id. ¶ 3. Defendant, at all relevant times, was an employer of more than two hundred employees. Am. Compl. ¶ 5.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant beginning in October 2008, initially as a Detention Officer, and was eventually promoted by Defendant to the position of Training Manager. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.¹

At some point prior to October 2012, Defendant, according to the Amended Complaint, was determined to discipline and ultimately discharge a co-employee of Plaintiff ("Co-Employee") for permitting students to leave early, presumably from a training program affiliatedwith Defendant's custodial services. Id. ¶ 19, pp. 12-13.² Co-Employee filed an EEOC complaint against Defendant on the basis that, since the offending practice was commonly allowed, the reasons given for his termination were pretextual, and the real reasons for his termination violated his civil rights. Id. ¶ 19. On October 5, 2012, "an email was sent out in which [Plaintiff's] name was listed along with other witnesses on behalf of [Co-Employee's] discrimination complaint." Id. p. 9, ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff "could support [Co-Employee's] claim that [Co-Employee's] common practice allegations were correct, and this fact was known by the Defendant at least as early as the time that [Plaintiff's] was listed as a witness by [Co-Employee]" in support of Co-Employee's EEOC complaint. Id. ¶ 19. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that a Project Manager and Deputy Project Manager at Defendant were "aware of [Co-Employee's] complaint and that [Plaintiff's] name was listed with other witnesses." Id. p. 9.

Prior to being named as a witness in Co-Employee's discrimination complaint, Plaintiff claims never to have received any written or verbal disciplinary actions or complaints during his employment with Defendant. Id. ¶ 11.

In a Personnel Action Report completed by Defendant on October 30, 2012, Defendant accused Plaintiff of having violated Defendant's employment policies on October 8, 2012 by selling items to other employees which resulted in "personal gain from company and business opportunities, without prior approval." Id. p. 11. The report was completed and signed by the same Project Manager and Deputy Project Manager that Plaintiff contends were aware of his rolein Co-Employee's complaint. Id. The accusation resulted in a five day suspension and Plaintiff's demotion, on October 9, 2012, from Training Manager to Detention Officer. Id. at pp. 9, 11, ¶ 12. This demotion included a reduction in Plaintiff's hourly wage from $29.45 per hour to $25.08 per hour. Id. p. 9. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant confiscated flash drives containing Plaintiff's personal documents and intellectual property without Plaintiff's knowledge or permission, and returned those flash drives having rendered them unusable. Id. ¶ 15. On October 11, 2012, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant's attorney. Id. p. 9. Plaintiff's suspension was meted out on October 30, 2012. Id.

Plaintiff contends not only that Defendant's accusation that Plaintiff violated company policy was false and inaccurate, but that Defendant's accusation and Plaintiff's demotion were intended by Defendant as retaliation for Plaintiff's role in Co-Employee's discrimination complaint. Id. ¶¶ 12, 21, 27.

B. Plaintiff's Title VII Claim

Under Title VII's opposition clause, an employer may not retaliate against an employee because the employee has opposed an unlawful employment practice. EEOC v. Total Sys. Serv., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The opposition clause provides, in relevant part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in

...