Winans v. Cox Auto., Inc.

669 F.Supp.3d 394

Michael WINANS v. COX AUTOMOTIVE, INC.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-3826

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Signed April 17, 2023

Lexis Anderson, Robert E. Barnes, Pro Hac Vice, Law Office of Robert Barnes, Los Angeles, CA, Bradford L. Geyer, FormerFedsGroup.Com LLC, Cinnaminson, NJ, for Michael Winans.

Paul C. Lantis, Tanner McCarron, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Cox Automotive, Inc.

MEMORANDUM

Padova, District Judge

Plaintiff Michael Winans brings this action against Defendant Cox Automotive, Inc., his former employer, alleging that Defendant's COVID-19 vaccine mandate violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the "PHRA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), and the Nuremberg Code. Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We held oral argument on Defendant's Motion on April 10, 2023. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Complaint alleges the following facts. On August 2, 2021, Defendant announced a company-wide COVID-19 vaccine mandate for its employees whereby all employees were required to receive the vaccination by October 18, 2021 or risk termination. Shortly after Defendant announced the mandate, Plaintiff, who was then employed by Defendant as an implementation specialist, requested an exemption from the mandate with human resources on personal and religious grounds. Human resources did not respond to Plaintiff's request. In mid-September 2021, however, Defendant announced that employees could formally apply for an exemption from the vaccine mandate by either (1) requesting a medical exemption with a note from a physician, or (2) requesting a religious exemption with a note from a religious figure at the employee's religious institution. Defendant stated that it would not entertain exemption requests based on personal beliefs.

Plaintiff refused to comply with the vaccine mandate because he believes that (1) the vaccine is ineffective at preventing the transmission of COVID-19 (Compl. at 6 ¶ 36), (2) the vaccine would offer him and those around him little benefit because he "may have had natural immunity" (id. at 11 ¶ 52), (3) the vaccine would "subject him to an elevated risk of adverse side effects, including death" (id. at 11 ¶ 52), (4) the vaccine trials "were riddled with massive fraud, falsified data, and negligent and intentional error" (id. at 11 ¶ 1), and (5) the vaccine was developed and produced with the use of fetal cell lines derived from aborted fetuses, which violates his religious beliefs (id. at 14 ¶¶ 15-16). Plaintiff, however, did not apply for either a medical exemption or a religious exemption from the mandate because (1) he had no basis to request a medical exemption, and (2) he could not formally apply for a religious exemption because he is not a member of a religious institution and therefore could not obtain a note from a religious figure at such an institution. Plaintiff attempted to speak with his managers about his concerns with the vaccine mandate, and his willingness to take a penalty on his health care benefits, but he did not speak with them. Rather, on September 20, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an ethics complaint to Defendant's ethics hotline regarding the vaccine mandate. Three days later, the ethics hotline dismissed his complaint.

Plaintiff's managers criticized him when they learned that he had refused to comply with the mandate and had failed to apply for either a medical or religious exemption. On October 20, 2021, Defendant terminated Plaintiff from his position, effective October 29, 2021. Following his termination, Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"). On June 28, 2022, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter.

The Complaint contains four Counts. Count I and Count II assert claims for religious discrimination, pursuant to Title VII and the PHRA, respectively, alleging that Plaintiff's objections to the COVID-19 vaccine are protected religious beliefs and Defendant terminated him based on those beliefs. Count III asserts a claim for disability discrimination, pursuant to the ADA, on the grounds that Defendant perceived Plaintiff's unvaccinated status as a disability and terminated him based on that perceived disability. Count IV asserts a claim for a violation of the Nuremberg Code, in which Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendant attempted to coerce him to involuntarily receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)). "We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 371 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)). However, we "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5, 134 S.Ct. 2056, 188 L.Ed.2d 1039 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).

A plaintiff's pleading obligation is to set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim," which "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (first quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); then quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (second alteration in original)). The complaint must allege " 'sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible,' thus enabling 'the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for [the] misconduct alleged.' " Warren Gen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 84 (quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In the end, we will grant a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the factual allegations in the complaint are not sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pa. Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Religious Discrimination

Defendant moves to dismiss Count I and Count II of the Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for religious discrimination under either Title VII or the PHRA. "Both parties [appear to] agree that the PHRA and Title VII claims should be analyzed under the same legal standard . . . ." Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 318-19 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002)). "Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to 'discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to h[is] compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of . . . religion.' " Id. at 319 (first and third alteration in original) (quoting Shelton v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 224 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000)). "In addition, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), an employer must make reasonable accommodations for its employees' religious beliefs and practices unless doing so would create an 'undue hardship' for the employer." Id. (citing Shelton, 223 F.3d at 224).

In Counts I and II, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has violated Title VII and the PHRA by (1) failing to accommodate his religious objections to the COVID-19 vaccine mandate, and (2) terminating his employment either based on, or in retaliation for, his religious objections to the vaccine. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for religious discrimination under any theory of liability because he has not sufficiently alleged that his objections to the COVID-19 vaccine are sincerely held religious beliefs. Title VII protects against discrimination based on beliefs, but only where those beliefs are sincerely held and religious in nature. Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 200 F. Supp. 3d 553, 563 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("[B]eliefs are not protected merely because they are strongly held. Rather, religion typically concerns ultimate ideas about life, purpose, and death. Social, political, or economic philosophies, as well as mere personal preferences, are not religious beliefs protected by Title VII." (quotations omitted)), aff'd, 877 F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 2017). Thus, in order to state a claim for religious discrimination under any theory of liability, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that his opposition to the COVID-19 vaccine arises from a sincerely held religious belief. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Civ. A. No. 22-3360, 2023 WL 362392, at *9 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2023) (concluding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for religious discrimination based on a failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, or retaliation, because the complaint failed "to plead that her . . . termination was due to a sincerely held religious belief" (citations omitted)). Defendant argues...