Windhurst v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr.

107 Arizona Cases Digest 10

536 P.3d 764

Antoinette WINDHURST, a Single/Widowed Woman, on Behalf of Herself, and As a Personal Representative of the Estate of Her Deceased Husband, David Windhurst, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, a Governmental Entity; Ryan Thornell, in His Individual Capacity As The Director of Arizona Department of Corrections; State of Arizona, a Governmental Entity; Corizon Health, Inc., a Business Domiciled in Arizona, Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-21-0288-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed October 11, 2023

Rita J. Bustos (argued), Anthony J. Fernandez, Dustin A. Christner, Alyssa R. Illsley, Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Scottsdale, Attorneys for Corizon Health, Inc., Arizona Department of Corrections, Ryan Thornell, and the State of Arizona

Nathan S. Rothschild, Bernardo M. Velasco (argued), Mesch Clark Rothschild, Tucson; and Michael J. Crawford, Crawford Law, PLLC, Tucson, Attorneys for Antoinette Windhurst

Eileen Dennis GilBride, Jones, Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix, Attorney for Amici Curiae Banner Health, Dignity Health, HonorHealth, Mutual Insurance Company of Arizona, and Phoenix Children's Hospital

David L. Abney, Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix; and Daniel Rubinov, RAJ Law PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association for Justice/Arizona Trial Lawyers Association

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES BOLICK, and LOPEZ joined.^*

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 A plaintiff who brings a medical malpractice action must prove that a medical institution or individual provider fell below the applicable standard of care. See A.R.S. §§ 12-563, -561(1)(a); Seisinger v. Siebel , 220 Ariz. 85, 94 ¶ 32, 203 P.3d 483, 492 (2009). Expert medical testimony is necessary to establish the applicable standard of care, and experts testifying to the standard must satisfy the requirements of Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 and A.R.S. § 12-2604. Seisinger , 220 Ariz. at 94–95 ¶¶ 33, 39–40, 203 P.3d at 492–93.

¶2 In this case, we apply these legal principles to the following issues: (1) whether § 12-2604 applies to medical institutions, and under what circumstances; (2) whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the jury could infer causation; and (3) whether a registered nurse may testify regarding the cause of death in a medical malpractice case. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that § 12-2604 ’s requirements do not apply to claims against medical institutions not based on vicarious liability; Windhurst presented appropriate expert causation testimony and, therefore, the jury did not have to infer causation; and a registered nurse may testify about the cause of death in a medical malpractice case if Rule 702 ’s requirements are met.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In December 2015, David Windhurst ("David") was incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison in Florence. David was paraplegic and had various chronic medical issues, including diabetes mellitus, hypertension, obesity, kidney disease, and injuries to his back and buttocks. Because of his medical conditions, David was placed in the prison's infirmary, where Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC") provided his health care through its contractor Corizon Healthcare Inc. ("Corizon"). When Corizon began caring for David, his medical conditions were stable.

¶4 In February 2016, David went into septic shock and was transferred to a hospital where he remained for over a month. After his release from the hospital, David was taken to a state prison in Tucson where he was housed in the infirmary under Corizon's care. In November 2016, David was admitted again to the hospital in septic shock, and on December 25, he died due to infectious complications of diabetes mellitus.

¶5 David's widow, Antoinette Windhurst ("Windhurst") filed a wrongful death action against Corizon, ADOC and its director, and the State of Arizona, claiming, among other things, medical malpractice. Windhurst alleged both institutional negligence by Corizon and vicarious liability based on the negligence of its medical personnel. In support of her claims, Windhurst provided David's medical records, as well as deposition testimony and reports from three expert witnesses: Zachary Rosner, a medical doctor; Tara Hood, a nurse practitioner; and Denise Panosky, a registered nurse. At the time, Dr. Rosner was the chief of medical services for the New York City jail system; Hood had worked for over ten years as a nurse practitioner in a correctional facility; and Panosky had over fourteen years of experience as a professor, teaching students about nursing in a correctional facility setting.

¶6 Corizon moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence that it violated the standard of care or caused David's death. Specifically, Corizon asserted that Windhurst failed to provide standard-of-care opinions regarding specific providers. It also claimed that Dr. Rosner only alleged that "clinicians" fell below the standard of care and did not specify which particular clinician fell below the standard of care or how such clinician's care caused David's death. Corizon also argued that, as a nurse, Panosky was not qualified to establish causation based on her professional position.

¶7 The trial court granted Corizon's motion on the medical negligence claim because it did not "see the medical expert testimony that links everything up." The court invited Windhurst to file a motion for reconsideration that "tied together ... either a specific doctor or doctors, a specific nurse or nurses; what standard of care applied and that that particular provider or category of providers breached; how they breached it; [and] what corresponding expert says that."

¶8 Windhurst filed a motion for reconsideration. In her motion, Windhurst pointed to evidence that Corizon failed to treat David's wounds and properly care for his catheter, failed to follow specialist recommendations, and failed to diagnose and treat David's sepsis. She also cited testimony from the record where Dr. Rosner, Hood, and Panosky gave causation testimony. The trial court denied the motion, however, finding that Windhurst still did not "connect the dots." Windhurst appealed.

¶9 The court of appeals vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the medical negligence claim. Windhurst v. Ariz. Dep't of Corrs. , 252 Ariz. 240, 249 ¶ 40, 501 P.3d 752, 761 (App. 2021). After reviewing the expert opinions of Dr. Rosner, Hood, and Panosky, the court concluded that these witnesses gave sufficient testimony about the institutional and individual standards of care for Corizon and its personnel, respectively. Id. at 245 ¶ 19, 246 ¶¶ 23–27, 501 P.3d at 757, 758. Additionally, the court of appeals held that Windhurst's experts gave sufficient causation testimony. Id. at 246 ¶ 27, 247 ¶ 30, 249 ¶ 37, 501 P.3d at 758, 759, 761. Finally, relying on Rasor v. Northwest Hospital LLC (Rasor I ), 244 Ariz. 423, 419 P.3d 956 (App. 2018), the court concluded that Panosky met the expert qualification standards of Rule 702 and could testify regarding the cause of death. Windhurst , 252 Ariz. at 248–49 ¶ 36, 501 P.3d at 760–61.

¶10 We granted review because this case presents recurring issues of statewide concern. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶11 We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Windhurst as the nonmoving party. See S. Point Energy Ctr. LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 253 Ariz. 30, 33 ¶ 10, 508 P.3d 246, 249 (2022). Similarly, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents , 253 Ariz. 6, 12 ¶ 22, 507 P.3d 500, 506 (2022).

I.

¶12 Windhurst's wrongful death action alleged both institutional negligence by Corizon and vicarious liability based on the negligence of Corizon's medical personnel.¹ Here, we must determine whether § 12-2604 ’s standard of care requirements for an expert witness in a medical malpractice case apply to an institutional liability claim. Answering this question requires us to interpret § 12-2604.

¶13 "Our task in statutory construction is to effectuate the text if it is clear and unambiguous." BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp. , 244 Ariz. 17, 19 ¶ 9, 417 P.3d 782, 784 (2018). "In doing so, we interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering the context and related statutes on the same subject," Molera v. Hobbs , 250 Ariz. 13, 24 ¶ 34, 474 P.3d 667, 676 (2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Ariz. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Phoenix. , 247 Ariz. 45, 47 ¶ 7, 445 P.3d 2, 4 (2019) ), giving the words "their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended." State ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd. , 243 Ariz. 539, 541 ¶ 7, 416 P.3d 803, 805 (2018) (citation omitted).

¶14 In all negligence actions, including medical malpractice, "the plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages." Seisinger , 220 Ariz. at 94 ¶ 32, 203 P.3d at 492. For medical malpractice specifically, a plaintiff must prove that (1) "[t]he health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and learning expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which he belongs within the state acting in the same or similar circumstances," and (2) "[s]uch failure was a proximate cause of the injury." A.R.S. § 12-563 ; see also Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare , 231 Ariz. 379, 384 ¶ 12, 296 P.3d 42, 47 (2013) ("In medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs must show that a health care provider breached the appropriate standard of care and the breach resulted in injury."). "Unless malpractice is grossly apparent, the standard of care must be established...