Windsor Skyline Care Ctr., LLC v. Superior Court of Monterey Cnty.

WINDSOR SKYLINE CARE CENTER, LLC et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MONTEREY COUNTY, Respondent;ELIDA KING et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. H041257

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

October 13, 2015

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Monterey County Super. Ct. No. M123420)

Petitioners Windsor Skyline Care Center, LLC, Laurie Behrend, and Raquel Arcon (collectively, Windsor) seek a writ of mandate and/or prohibition compelling the respondent superior court to set aside its order granting the motion of real parties Elida King and Patricia Beltran to compel further responses to document requests propounded to Windsor and to issue a new order denying the motion. We conclude that the superior court abused its discretion, and we grant the requested relief.

I. Background

Windsor operates a skilled nursing facility in Monterey County. King was a patient there from March 21 until September 12, 2011 while she recuperated from head surgery. King was 81 years old and suffered from mild to moderate dementia. At Windsor, she developed urinary tract infections, dehydration, bedsores, and weight loss because of allegedly inadequate care.

Beltran is King's daughter. In 2013, Beltran and King (collectively, plaintiffs) filed suit against Windsor. The operative second amended complaint alleges causes of action for elder abuse and/or neglect (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657 et seq.), negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and unfair and fraudulent business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200).

Plaintiffs propounded special interrogatories asking Windsor to identify (by "name, middle name, and last name, telephone number(s), addresses, email address, and job title, if any") the "responsible party" and "resident representatives" for each person who was a resident of Windsor between March 1 and September 30, 2011. Windsor served objections on grounds, among others, that the interrogatories were burdensome and oppressive and sought to invade the privacy rights of nonparties to the litigation. Plaintiffs moved to compel further responses. The trial court denied the motion as untimely.

Plaintiffs then served a request for production of documents seeking essentially the same information. Request No. 39 sought "ALL DOCUMENTS which IDENTIFY the RESPONSIBLE PARTY for each person who was a resident of WINDSOR between March 1, 2011 and September 30, 2011 . . . ." Request No. 40 sought "ALL DOCUMENTS which IDENTIFY the RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES for each person who was a resident of WINDSOR between March 1, 2011 and September 30, 2011 . . . ." A parenthetical after each request stated that "this request does not seek any health care information."

Windsor served objections on grounds, among others, that the document requests were burdensome and oppressive and sought to invade the privacy rights of nonparties to the litigation. In a supplemental response served several weeks later, Windsor reiterated its earlier objections and stated that it could not comply with the requests because the only responsive documents in its possession were third-party medical records subject to medical privacy rights and other protections under California and federal law.

Plaintiffs moved to compel further responses to the document requests, arguing that a different trial judge in an unrelated matter had "already decided" the issue, that the identities of persons who may have knowledge of discoverable matter is subject to discovery, and that the responsible parties and resident representatives of other patients at Windsor "may have evidence regarding the conditions of the facility, understaffing, incompetent staff, failure to treat bedsores, failure to follow policies, excessive staff workloads, and failure to provide proper nutrition and hydration." Plaintiffs asserted that such evidence "would prove that [Windsor] had notice and knowledge of such problems and yet failed to address them."

Windsor argued in opposition that the requests sought private medical and financial records of third parties, that federal privacy regulations, state regulations, and California's right to privacy required that the information be kept confidential, and that there was absolutely no evidence that any of the targeted individuals witnessed any events relevant to plaintiffs' claims. Windsor also argued that the request was overbroad and burdensome because the facility housed up to 80 residents at a time with potentially hundreds of thousands of pages of medical and financial documents that would have to be reviewed and redacted. It argued that the targeted individuals had not been given the opportunity to object to the disclosure of their identities and contact information. Windsor also argued that the denial of plaintiff's untimely motion to compel further interrogatory responses barred plaintiffs from seeking the exact same information by adifferent form of discovery, that plaintiffs' separate statement was inadequate, and that their reliance on a trial court ruling in an unrelated case was improper.

The court heard argument on July 11, 2014. The court granted the motion. The court explained that "the resident representative, the families, the people that visit in the facility, may have seen information that is relevant to the case" and that "the balance here I think is with the Plaintiff and at least trying to determine if there's any information that [a] witness is available." The court limited the response to one document per resident and ruled that Windsor could redact health-related or financial information.

Windsor petitioned for writ relief. Plaintiffs filed a preliminary opposition. On July 30, 2014, we stayed the trial court's July 21, 2014 order granting the motion.

Windsor filed a reply to plaintiff's preliminary opposition. On November 6, 2014, we issued an order to show cause why a peremptory writ should not issue as requested in Windsor's petition. Plaintiffs filed a reply in opposition and Windsor filed a return.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review discovery orders for abuse of discretion. (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378-381.) Although writ review of discovery rulings is generally disfavored, such review is appropriate when the petitioner seeks extraordinary relief from a discovery order that may undermine a privilege or violate a privacy interest. (E.g., Babcock v. Superior Court (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 721, 725-726; Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 683, 686.) "Writ review is particularly appropriate . . . to protect the confidential records of third persons who are not parties to the underlying litigation . . . , who have had no notice of the ordered disclosure, and who, as a result, have had no opportunity to object." (Ombudsman Services of Northern California v. Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241 (Ombudsman Services).)

B. Claimed Repetitious Discovery After Denial of Untimely Motion to Compel

Windsor contends that the trial court abused its discretion by compelling it to produce documents disclosing "the exact same information" that plaintiffs were precluded from obtaining by special interrogatories. We disagree.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300¹ provides that "[u]nless notice of [a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories] is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response to the interrogatories." (§ 2030.300, subd. (c), italics added.) Thus, section 2030.300 precludes a party who fails to meet the statute's time limits from "reset[ting] the clock through the stratagem of asking the same question again" in its next set of interrogatories. (Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490, 493-494 (Professional Career Colleges).)

But nothing in section 2030.300 precludes a party who misses the deadline for compelling further responses to one form of discovery from attempting to obtain the same information by a different form of discovery. (See Carter v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997 (Carter).) The petitioners in Carter moved to compel further responses to requests for production of documents. (Id. at p. 996.) The motion was denied as untimely. "Petitioners then tried to secure the requested documents by another demand for inspection and by a motion to reconsider the first ruling." (Ibid.) That motion was also denied. "Next, petitioners noticed the deposition of the custodian of records for [the defendant], requesting that the deponent bring the previously withheld documents." (Ibid.) Relying on Professional Career Colleges, the trial court granted thedefendant's motion for a protective order barring the petitioners from obtaining the documents. (Carter, at p. 996.) Petitioners sought writ relief. (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate. The court noted that former section 2031, subdivision (I) "prescribes a waiver of 'any right to compel a further response to the inspection demand . . . .' It does not prescribe a waiver of the party's right to use other discovery methods for obtaining the same documents or information." (Carter, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 997.) "Nothing in either [former] section 2025 or [former] section 2031 suggests that seeking documents under one statutory procedure bars a litigant from seeking the same documents under the other." (Ibid.)

Carter is on point here, and ...