Wine v. Mulligan

213 Conn.App. 298

277 A.3d 912

Daniel WINE

v.William MULLIGAN et al.

AC 44261

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 15, 2022

Officially released June 14, 2022

Daniel Wine, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Jacob McChesney, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellees (defendants).

Alexander, Suarez and Sheldon, Js.

PER CURIAM.

The self-represented plaintiff, Daniel Wine, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after it granted the defendants’¹ motion to strike his complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court erred in granting this motion because the stricken complaint adequately stated a claim that the defendants had violated his constitutional right of access to the courts. We disagree, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. At all times relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff was incarcerated at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution (MacDougall). In July, 2019, the plaintiff initiated the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.² The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that, on January 25, 2019, the defendants improperly confiscated materials in his outgoing mail,³ and that such improper confiscation violated his constitutional rights of access to the courts and to equal protection of the law. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Rollin Cook, the then Commissioner of Correction, was responsible for the overall operation of the Department of Correction's correctional facilities, which included MacDougall. The plaintiff alleged that he had written to Correction Lieutenant Roy Weldon requesting an informal resolution regarding the confiscation of his mail. In his claim against William Mulligan, the warden of MacDougall, the plaintiff alleged that Mulligan was "legally responsible for the operation of [MacDougall] and for the welfare of all the inmates in that prison." The plaintiff alleged that he also had written to Mulligan requesting an informal resolution regarding the confiscation of his mail. The plaintiff claimed that he had a conversation with Peter Sacuta, a correction officer, regarding the confiscated materials. The plaintiff alleged that Sacuta told him that "any material containing [Uniform Commercial Code] material will be confiscated as unauthorized information by him at the time he is making copies or doing notary."⁴ The plaintiff further alleged that he handed a manila envelope containing his materials to Shaila Tucker, a counselor, and asked her to seal the envelope but she declined to do so, stating that "the mailroom may want to check it." Finally, the plaintiff alleged that Weldon seized his outgoing mail on January 25, 2019. The plaintiff sought an injunction and compensatory and punitive damages.

On August 22, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint for failure to plead a valid cause of action and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In the memorandum in support of their motion to strike, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's complaint was legally deficient because the conduct alleged did not constitute a violation of his constitutional rights, and that the plaintiff failed to allege the specific personal involvement of four of the defendants in the conduct claimed to constitute a constitutional violation. The defendants argued that "only [Weldon] was alleged to have confiscated the plaintiff's outgoing mail" and, therefore, the plaintiff had failed to adequately allege a § 1983 claim against Cook, Mulligan, Sacuta, and Tucker. As to the plaintiff's claim that the defendants had violated his right of access to the courts, the defendants first argued that the materials confiscated from the plaintiff did not relate to a challenge of any of the plaintiff's criminal convictions or resulting sentences, or to any alleged violation of his constitutional rights, as required to establish a viable access to the courts claim. The defendants further argued that the plaintiff's allegations were legally insufficient because he failed to set forth any claim that he suffered any injury in fact as a result of the defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct. As to his equal protection claim, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's complaint was legally deficient because it failed to allege any disparate treatment by them of similarly situated individuals or that the confiscation of his outgoing mail was not rationally related to the Department of Corrections’ "security protocol or some other legitimate penological interest."

On January 29, 2020, the court granted the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint "[f]or the reasons stated in the defendants’ memorandum."⁵ On February 26, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for judgment, which the court granted on March 9, 2020. This appeal followed. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to strike because he sufficiently alleged a violation of his right of access to the courts in his complaint.⁶

We begin our analysis with the standard of review. "Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court's ruling on the [defendants’ motion] is plenary. ... We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. ... Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a [defendants’] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Piccolo v. American Auto Sales, LLC , 195 Conn. App. 486, 489–90, 225 A.3d 961 (2020).

We next set forth the legal principles relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. To state a viable claim for denial of access to the courts against an individual defendant pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the personal involvement in the alleged denial of access of that particular defendant. See Tangreti v. Bachmann , 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (plaintiff "must plead and prove that each [g]overnment-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the [c]onstitution" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis v. Goord , 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) ("a plaintiff must allege that the defendant took or was responsible for actions that hindered [a plaintiff's] efforts to pursue a legal claim" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wright v. Smith , 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Upon our thorough review of the pleadings, we conclude that the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege the specific personal involvement of the defendants Cook, Mulligan, Sacuta, and Tucker in the actual confiscation of his mail. Therefore, as the defendants advanced in their motion to strike and accompanying memorandum in support of their motion, the plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim pursuant to § 1983 against these four defendants because he failed to assert that they personally were involved in the alleged violation. See, e.g., Tangreti v. Bachmann , supra, 983 F.3d at 618.

We next address the plaintiff's allegations against Weldon. It is well established that all incarcerated individuals have a constitutional right of access to the courts that is "adequate, effective, and meaningful." Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977) ; see also Washington v. Meachum , 238 Conn. 692, 735, 680 A.2d 262 (1996). A review of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence consistently establishes that states are required to "shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful access to the courts." Bounds v. Smith , supra, at 824, 97 S.Ct. 1491. In Bounds , the United States Supreme Court held that "prison authorities [are required] to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id., at 828, 97 S. Ct. 1491. The Supreme Court explained, however, that "while adequate law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision ... does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal." Id., at 830, 97 S. Ct. 1491. The required assistance "may take many forms and Bounds ... guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability—the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cooke v. Commissioner of Correction , 194 Conn. App. 807, 829, 222 A.3d 1000 (2019), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 911, 228 A.3d 1041 (2020).

Additionally, to state a viable claim that his right of access to the courts has been violated, the plaintiff must allege that, as a result of a specific defendant's conduct, he suffered an actual injury. "Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone ... and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings ... hindered his...