Winegardner v. Hughes

RONALD WINEGARDNER, APPELLANT v. MISTY HUGHES, APPELLEE

IN THE ESTATE OF KRISTIN EILEEN VINER AKA KRISTIN E.

VINER FKA KRISTIN E. WINKELMAN, DECEASED

No. 07-18-00434-CV

No. 07-19-00283-CV

Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

April 23, 2020

On Appeal from the County Court at Law Moore County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 4739 and 4298-A, Honorable Curt Brancheau, Presiding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ.

Central to these two appeals is a question of informal or common law marriage.¹ Appellant in both cases is Ronald Winegardner, appearing pro se in the trial court and on appeal. Appellee in both cases is Misty Hughes, appearing in her representative capacity as independent executor of the estate of her mother, Kristen Eileen Viner. Case number 07-18-00434-CV is the appeal of an order of possession rendered in favor of Hughes in a forcible detainer action. Case number 07-19-00283-CV is the appeal of an order dismissing for lack of standing Winegardner's contest of Viner's will. We overrule Winegardner's issues and affirm both orders of the trial court.

Background

On July 28, 2018, Viner died testate. Her will was admitted to probate in Moore County on Hughes's application and Hughes was appointed independent executor of her mother's probate estate. At the time of Viner's death, she and Winegardner occupied Viner's mobile home in Sunray, Texas. Viner's will made no dispositive provision for Winegardner.

Following admission of Viner's will to probate, Winegardner filed a document in the proceeding entitled "Declaration of the Surviving Common law Spouse of Kristin E. Viner, Ronald Winegardner, Contesting the Will and Requesting a Hearing."² The pleading consisted chiefly of Winegardner's narrative of his relationship with Viner and alleged theterms of an oral agreement from 2008. Winegardner claimed Viner agreed that if he "would promise to stay with [Viner] so she would not let [her former husband] move back in, [Winegardner] could live there forever." The document contained no express allegation of jurisdictional facts, although it did include Winegardner's representation that he sent correspondence to various parties including the county clerk, county judge, and Hughes's attorney under the subject line, "I am a surviving common law spouse with a life estate." Hughes responded to Winegardner's contest with a motion to dismiss alleging Viner and Winegardner were not married and Winegardner was not a person interested in Viner's estate. The parties and trial court appear to have treated the motion as a plea to the jurisdiction based on Winegardner's alleged lack of standing to contest Viner's will.

Meanwhile, in an effort to evict Winegardner from the mobile home he and Viner occupied, Hughes filed a forcible detainer action in the justice court. On November 7, 2018, a judgment was signed by that court granting Hughes possession of the mobile home. Winegardner appealed the ruling to the county court at law. After a recusal by the original judge, the case was assigned to the Honorable Curt W. Brancheau, judge of the 84th Judicial District. Trial de novo to the bench was conducted on December 7 with an order of possession rendered in favor of Hughes.³

The contested probate case was also eventually assigned to Judge Brancheau. The hearing of Hughes's motion to dismiss was set for December 7, 2018. Winegardner filed a motion for continuance and to transfer the case to an unspecified county in the 84th Judicial District; those motions were denied. Hughes's motion to dismiss was decided after an evidentiary hearing conducted apart from the trial de novo of the forcible detainer suit. Following the close of evidence, Judge Brancheau found that Winegardner and Viner were not married and Winegardner, therefore, lacked standing to contest the will. The case was accordingly dismissed.

Winegardner now appeals the orders granting Hughes's right of possession and dismissing the will contest.⁴

Analysis

We turn first to Hughes's argument that Winegardner waived all claims of error on appeal because of inartful briefing. We are to liberally construe the briefing rules and find Winegardner's brief sufficient to acquaint us with his issues. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9. To the degree we are able, we will address each of Winegardner's issues. To the extent Hughes requests dismissal of Winegardner's appeals due to inartful briefing, it is denied.

First Issue

Winegardner argues the trial court erred in dismissing his case for lack of standing because he was Viner's common law spouse and as such possessed a survivor'shomestead right to occupy Viner's mobile home for the remainder of his life.⁵ A party is interested in a decedent's estate if he is an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other person with a property right in, or claim against, the estate. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 22.018(1) (West 2014). In a probate proceeding a party whose standing is challenged must prove he has an interest in the estate. In re Estate of Daniels, 575 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. denied) (citing In re Estate of Forister, 421 S.W.3d 175, 177 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)).

A trial court's order dismissing a case for lack of standing is considered on appeal in the same manner as a plea to the jurisdiction. In re Estate of Daniels, 575 S.W.3d at 844. A plea to the jurisdiction may be used to challenge whether the plaintiff met its pleading burden of alleging sufficient jurisdictional facts or it may challenge the existence of jurisdictional facts. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. v. Owens, No. 01-18-00464-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7965, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226-27 (Tex. 2004)).

When a defendant's jurisdictional plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts with supporting evidence, and the jurisdictional inquiry is, as here, intertwined with or implicates the merits, the standard of review mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 771 (Tex. 2018);Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012). In other words, the movant initially possesses the burden to meet its standard of proof. Tarrant County v. Green, No. 02-19-00159-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 9376, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 24, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). If that burden is met, in order to avoid dismissal, Winegardner must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 544 S.W.3d at 771.

In assessing the evidence at this stage of the standing challenge, we take as true all evidence favorable to Winegardner as the non-movant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in his favor. See City of Canadian v. Klein, No. 07-15-00452-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4632, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 22, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009)). The jurisdictional challenge will be upheld if the movant presents undisputed evidence that negates the existence of the court's jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012).

When the evidence is undisputed or does not raise a fact question, the appellate court reviews the trial court's ruling on the jurisdictional challenge de novo. Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 267 (Tex. 2018) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). If the evidence reveals a fact question that affects jurisdiction and goes to the merits of the claim, the appellate court cannot uphold the dismissal; the fact dispute must be resolved by the finder of fact. Id.

Winegardner's standing to contest the will depends on his alleged status as Viner's spouse at the time of her death. Viner's will never mentions Winegardner. Winegardner admits that he and Viner were never ceremonially married, nor did they join in a statutory declaration of informal marriage. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(1) (West 2006) (statutory declaration of marriage one means of proving informal marriage); § 2.402(b) (contents of statutory declaration form) (West 2006). Accordingly, the evidence required Winegardner to present evidence that (1) he and Viner agreed to be married; (2) after agreeing to be married they lived together in Texas as husband and wife; and (3) they represented to others they were married. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a)(2). An informal marriage does not exist until the concurrence of all three elements. Eris v. Phares, 39 S.W.3d 708, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet denied).

Winegardner failed to present any evidence supporting these elements. There is no evidence that Winegardner and Viner ever agreed to be married or that they lived together as husband and wife. See Van Hooff, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 466, at *10. The agreement-to-be-married element requires proof the man and woman intended to create an immediate and permanent marital relationship and they did in fact agree to be husband and wife. Id. at *7; Burden v. Burden, 420 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.); Eris, 39 S.W.3d at 714. During the hearing of Hughes's motion to dismiss, Winegardner testified that he and Viner agreed they would marry as soon as sufficient funds for a honeymoon existed. This evidence of future plans negates an essential element of Winegardner's informal marriage claim as it demonstrates the lack of a present intent to be married. See Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. 2019) (holding that when responding to a properly-filed and supported challenge tojurisdiction that implicates the merits, "the plaintiff will be required to present sufficient evidence on the merits of her claims to create a genuine issue of material fact").

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