Winks v. Va. Dep't of Transp.

MEMORANDUM OPINION (GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

Henry E. Hudson Senior United States District Judge

Plaintiff Bridget Amanda Winks ("Plaintiff or "Winks") filed this suit against her employer, the Virginia Department of Transportation ("Defendant" or "VDOT") alleging that it violated the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), et seq., by paying her less than certain male employees. (3d Am. Compl., ECF No. 56.) The Court now turns to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion") (ECF No. 60) filed on October 15, 2021. The parties filed memoranda supporting their respective positions and the Court heard oral argument on November 17, 2021. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is "whether the evidence

presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine factual dispute exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86(1986).

"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of a party's case. Id. at 248; Hogan v. Beaumont, 779 Fed.Appx. 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2019). A genuine issue concerning a material fact only arises when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to return a verdict in the party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party as well as conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion. Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, to deny a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he disputed facts must be material to an issue necessary for the proper resolution of the case, and the quality and quantity of the evidence offered to create a question of fact must be adequate ...." Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat'l Cable Advert., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). "[T]here must be 'sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.'" Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50). When applying the summary judgment standard, courts must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Holland, 487 F.3d at 213.

I. BACKGROUND

As required at the summary judgment stage, the Court resolves all genuine disputes of material fact in favor of the nonmoving party and disregards those factual assertions that are immaterial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 255. Applying this standard, the Court concludes that the following narrative represents the facts for purposes of resolving Defendant's Motion.^[1]

VDOT is a state agency of Virginia primarily responsible for building and maintaining roadways across the state. (SUMF ¶ 1, Def.'s Mem. Supp., ECF No. 61.) VDOT maintains a headquarters (the "Central Office") in Richmond, Virginia. (Id. ¶ 2.) It also manages nine regional offices in districts across the state. (Id. ¶ 3.) The unique physical and operational features of each district impact the nature of its construction, maintenance, and oversight projects. (Id.)

VDOT administers the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") with respect to all of its transportation projects. (Id. ¶ 19.) NPDES requires VDOT to monitor stormwater systems to prevent the discharge of pollutants from road construction sites. (Id. ¶ 19.) In 2017, VDOT created the NPDES Coordinator position to expand its compliance efforts in each of its nine districts. (Id. ¶¶ 20-25.) The Central Office created a uniform job description for NPDES Coordinators. (Id; see NPDES Job Description, ECF No. 61-12.)

After creating the NPDES Coordinator position, VDOT hired Coordinators in each district. To a limited extent, the Central Office participated with district managers and Human Resources staff in the interview and hiring processes. (Swanson Dep. at 11:9-l2, ECF No. 62-5.) The Central Office also provided initial training for all new NPDES Coordinators. (Guercia Dep. at 43:25-44:1-3, ECF No. 62-12.) Otherwise, each district interviewed and hired NPDES Coordinators independently of each other and the Central Office.

Additionally, local districts choose salaries for NPDES Coordinators independently from the Central Office but were required to comply with two salary policies published by the Central Office. (SUMF ¶ 4.) First, the Salary Administration Plan enumerates thirteen "Pay Factors" that district managers can consider in making pay determinations. (Id. ¶ 7.) While managers need not consider all thirteen factors, they must consider those that are "applicable." (Id. ¶ 8.) Second, VDOT's Market Based Pay Program ("MBPP") uses local salary data to calculate a minimum, midpoint, and maximum salary for the specific position being evaluated. (Market Based Pay

Guidelines, ECF No. 61-5; Litchford Decl. ¶¶ 9-12, ECF No. 61-1.) District managers must set salaries within the minimum and maximum ranges of the MBPP.^[2] (SUMF ¶ 11.)

On a day-to-day basis, NPDES Coordinators travel to VDOT construction projects in their district, physically inspect the sites for environmental issues, and consult with VDOT contractors to ensure compliance at those sites. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 39, 40.) These duties may vary in scope between districts due to inherent differences in geography and topography, as well as the presence of large urban areas and major interstates. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 43, 45.) There is only one NPDES Coordinator per district and they only inspect facilities within their own district. (Winks Dep. at 54:13-15, 86:15-20, ECF No. 61-13.) NPDES Coordinators report to supervisors within their districts, not the Central Office. (See SUMF ¶ 65; Jackson Dep. at 9:4-6, ECF No. 62-23; Guercia Dep. 18:20-25.) There is no evidence in the record that the Central Office exercises any control over the day-today duties of the NPDES Coordinators.

On January 25, 2018, VDOT hired Winks as the NPDES Coordinator for the Lynchburg District. (Winks Personnel Action Worksheet ("PAW"), ECF No. 61-19.) Prior to accepting the NPDES Coordinator position, she worked for the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality as a stormwater compliance specialist with a salary of $50, 744. (SUMF ¶ 66.) The MBPP required Winks' starting salary to be between

$60, 113 to $105, 811. (Id. ¶ 71.) The Lynchburg District set her initial salary as an NPDES Coordinator at $6O, 893.^[3] (Id. ¶ 62.) After three years at VDOT, Plaintiffs salary is now $75, 846. (Id. ¶ 77.)

Plaintiff relies on two comparators to make her EPA claim: Derrick Dotson and Jason Hartman.^[4] (Id. ¶ 18.) VDOT hired Dotson as an NPDES Coordinator for the Bristol District on February 10, 2018 with a starting salary of $70, 246. (Id. ¶ 78; Dotson PAW, ECF No. 61-21.) Similarly, VDOT hired Hartman as an NPDES Coordinator on December 25, 2017. (SUMF ¶ 86; Hartman PAW, ECF No. 61-23.) Hartman's starting salary was $75, 807, the same as his previous salary as an engineer with VDOT. (SUMF ¶ 90.) Different managers in different districts made the decision to hire Winks, Dotson, and Hartman independently of each other. (See Id. ¶ 4; Winks PAW, Dotson PAW, Hartman...