Witasick v. Hambrecht

KEVIN JOHN WITASICK, SR., Plaintiff, v. RONALD and LINDA HAMBRECHT as husband and wife, and Defendants THE PATCH & PRINCESS FAMILY TRUST, Third Party Defendant.

Civil No. 12-3755 (NLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: March 25, 2013

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

DONALD L. KINGLETT, ESQUIRE

RABIL & KINGETT LLC

215 FRIES MILL ROAD

TURNERSVILLE, NEW JERSEY 08012

Attorney for Plaintiff Kevin John Witasick, Sr. and Third Party Defendant The Patch and Princess Family Trust,

MICHAEL DOLICH, ESQUIRE

BENNETT, BRICKLIN & SALTZBERG

1601 MARKET STREET

16TH FLOOR

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19103

Attorney for Defendants Ronald and Lisa Hambrecht.

Hillman, District J.:

Currently pending before the Court is the Motion for Remand of Plaintiff Kevin John Witasick, Sr. In the alternative, Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery andFor an Evidentiary Hearing. For the reasons set forth below, both Motions will be denied.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter stems from a personal injury dispute between Plaintiff Witasick, a New Jersey citizen, and Defendants Ronald and Lisa Hambrecht, a married couple residing in Florida. The Hambrechts own a house in Marlton, New Jersey, which they lease to third-party Defendant The Patch and Princess Family Trust, Witasick's family trust. (Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff Witasick lives in the house.

On November 19, 2009, a portion of a staircase gave way under Witasick's feet, causing him to fall and injure himself. (Id. ¶ 5.) According to Plaintiff, he subsequently discovered that the Hambrechts did not have the steps properly installed, and that this defect created the hazard leading to his injury. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) Witasick avers that, as a result of the fall, he sustained contusions and severe bruising to his legs, buttocks, back and arms, significant pain throughout his body, numbness, and "nerve stingers" in his legs. (Id. ¶ 6.) Following the injury, he was bedridden and unable to function for approximately four days. (Id. ¶ 7.) He claims that he still suffers from pain, numbness, and "stingers" to this day, and continues to seek medical and chiropractic treatment for these injuries. (Id. ¶ 8.)

Witasick filed a common law negligence suit against Defendants on November 18, 2011 in New Jersey state court. Defendants removed to federal court on June 20, 2012 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.¹ [Docket No. 1.] Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand back to state court on July 20, 2012. [Docket No. 12.] On the same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery and An Evidentiary Hearing in the event that the Court declined to grant the remand motion. [Id.] Defendants responded in opposition on August 6, 2012, [Docket No. 13], thereby making this matter ripe for judicial consideration.

II. STANDARD OF LAW

The removability of a legal matter is determined from the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal. See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951). It is well established that a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state courtto federal court if the latter would have had original jurisdiction to hear the matter in the first instance. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1991). The removing party bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction and compliance with all pertinent procedural requirements. Id. Once the case has been removed, however, the court may nonetheless remand it to state court if the removal was procedurally defective or subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Any doubts should be resolved in favor of remand. Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that this matter should be remanded back to state court because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleges that the exercise of diversity jurisdiction is not proper under these circumstances and that Defendants' removal did not abide by proper statutory procedure. As a catchall argument, Plaintiff also asserts that the equities in this case favor remand.

In the event that the Court declines to remand this matter, Plaintiff requests permission to engage in jurisdictional discovery so as to determine the identities of the contractors that built the allegedly defective steps. Plaintiff avers that this discovery is necessary because he plans to add the contractors as defendants, and diversity of citizenship will bedestroyed if they are New Jersey citizens. The Court considers each request separately below.

A. Remand

Defendants removed this case to federal court pursuant to the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which provides that: "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Thus, in order for a matter which only involves state law claims to be heard in federal court on account of diversity jurisdiction: (1) there must be complete diversity of citizenship amongst the parties; and (2) the disputed amount must be greater than $75,000. Moreover, removal to federal court is only permissible if proper statutory procedure is followed. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Here, Witasick avers that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because complete diversity between the parties is lacking and the amount in controversy will not exceed the requisite $75,000. Plaintiff likewise avers that this matter should be remanded back to state court because Defendants failed to comply with the proper procedural requirements for removal. Witasick further argues that the "equities" in this case favor remand.

For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a natural person is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled. See Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2008)(citing Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 569 (1915)). One's domicile is legally defined as the person's state of residence plus the intent to remain there indefinitely. Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1972). Importantly, an individual may only have one domicile, and thus may only be a citizen of one state for diversity jurisdiction purposes. See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 604, 614 (1914). Residence and domicile are not the same for legal purposes, as residency alone does not establish citizenship. See Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1300 ("[W]here one lives is prima facie evidence of domicile, but mere residency in a state is insufficient for purposes of diversity.").

Here, the Hambrechts indicate in their Notice of Removal that they are citizens of the State of the Florida,² and that their citizenship is therefore diverse from Witasick, a NewJersey citizen.³ (Notice of Rem. ¶ 7.) Witasick presently argues, however, that the Hambrechts may nonetheless be considered New Jersey citizens for purposes of this lawsuit because: (1) they continue to own the New Jersey property that was the site of his injury, and (2) they are engaged in separate and independent litigation in New Jersey state court. (Pl.'s Mot. Rem. at 4.)

In Williams Field Services Co., LLC v. Kalmanowicz, the plaintiff sought to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on the grounds that the defendants owned property within that District. No.Civ.A.11-1634, 2011 WL 3876411, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011). The court, however, held that the invocation of jurisdiction was improper because an individual's mere ownership of property in a state does not automatically make him a citizen of that state. Id. The same logic applies here. Merely because the Hambrechts continue to own the property leased by Witasick's family trust in New Jersey does not automatically transform them into citizens of this state. Thus, Plaintiff's argument on this ground, without more, is without merit.

Plaintiff also argues that the Hambrechts's participation in another lawsuit in New Jersey makes them citizens for diversity jurisdiction purposes. According to the record, the Hambrechts and the Patch and Princess Family Trust are litigating an eviction claim in New Jersey state court premised upon the lease agreement between them. This legal action is unrelated to the instant matter before the Court. While an individual's involvement in prior litigation in a state may be a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in federal court, the same is not true for subject matter jurisdictionpurposes.⁴ As discussed above, in order to be considered a state's citizen for diversity jurisdiction purposes, an individual must be a domiciliary of the state. Merely because an individual is involved in litigation in that state does not mean that he is likewise a citizen of that state. Plaintiff's claim on this ground, without more, therefore also fails. Accordingly, the Court finds that complete diversity exists amongst the parties, and the first element of diversity jurisdiction is thus satisfied.

Plaintiff also objects on the basis of the second element of diversity jurisdiction — the amount in controversy requirement — arguing that jurisdiction is improper here because Defendants have not established that this amount will exceed $75,000. Plaintiff bases his argument on letter communications between counsel in which the Hambrechts requested Witasick to stipulate that his damages would not exceed $75,000. When Witasick refused to do so, Defendants removed this matter tofederal court. (Pl.'s Mot. Rem., Ex. 1.) Plaintiff claims that these letters show that Defendants believe damages to be less than $75,000, and it is their burden to prove that invocation of federal jurisdiction is proper.⁵

The Court finds, however, that there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish that the amount in controversy requirement has been met under these circumstances. First, Defendants have affirmatively set forth...