Witt v. Kijakazi

1

JERMAINE WITT, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 1:21CV881

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

January 4, 2023

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Joe L Webster United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Jermaine Witt brought this action to obtain review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for social security disability insurance benefits and a period of disability. The Court has before it the certified administrative record and cross-motions for judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2019, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits and a period of disability alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2015, later amended to May 5, 2016. (Tr. 13, 38, 349-52.) The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 13, 230-234, 244-53.) After a hearing, the ALJ concluded in his July 29, 2021, decision that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 13-27, 32-71.) On September 14, 2021, the Appeals Council denied a request for review, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of review. (Tr. 2-4.)

II. STANDARD FOR REVIEW

The scope of judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is specific and narrow. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). Review is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453,1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). The issue before the Court, therefore, is not whether Plaintiff is disabled but whether the Commissioner's finding that he is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. Id.

III. THE ALJ'S DECISION

The ALJ followed the relevant sequential analysis to ascertain whether the claimant is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. See Albright v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).^[1] The ALJ determined at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the amended alleged onset date of May 5, 2016, through his date last insured of December 31, 2018. (Tr. 15.) He next found the following severe impairments at step two: degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, migraine headache disorder, and pes planus. (Tr. 15.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in, Appendix 1. (Tr. 19.)

The ALJ next set forth Plaintiffs Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"), concluding that Plaintiff could perform light work

with lifting and carrying up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequendy; sitting for up to 4 hours; standing and walking for up to 4 hours; using a cane for ambulation; frequent reaching, handling, fingering and feeling bilaterally; occasional use of ramps and stairs; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching; no exposure to unprotected heights, dangerous machinery, or ladders, ropes or scaffolds; no concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as chemical odors, smoke, fumes, or gases; performance of only simple routine repetitive tasks and simple work-related decisions not at a production pace; occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers; occasional interaction with the public; and ability to adapt to occasional changes in the workplace.

(Tr. 21.)

At step four, the ALJ concluded that the claimant was unable to perform his past relevant work. (Tr. 25.) At step five, the ALJ concluded that there were other jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 26.)

IV. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises four objections. First, Plaintiff contends that "[t]he ALJ failed to adequately account for the vocationally limiting effects of [his] migraine headaches in the RFC." (Docket Entry 12 at 4.) Second, he contends that "[t]he ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the medical opinion of Dr. [Kenneth] Detrick." (Id. at 10.) Third, he contends that "[t]he structure of the SSA is constitutionally invalid." (Id. at 13.) Fourth, Plaintiff contends that "[t]he ALJ's appointment violates the Appointments Clause." (Id. at 14.) As explained in greater detail below, none of these objections warrants relief.

A. Migraines

First, Plaintiff contends that "[t]he ALJ failed to adequately account for the vocationally limiting effects of [his] migraine headaches in the RFC." (Docket Entry 12 at 4.) As explained below, this argument is without merit.

The RFC measures the most a claimant can do in a work setting despite the physical and mental limitations of his impairments and any related symptoms (e.g., pain). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 Fed.Appx. 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2015) (claimant's RFC is "[a] medical assessment of what an individual can do in a work setting in spite of the functional limitations and environmental restrictions imposed by all of his or her medically determinable impairment(s).") (internal citation omitted); Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006). The RFC includes both a "physical exertional or strength limitation" that assesses the claimant's "ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work," as well as "nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory or skin impairments)." Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981).

"Social Security Ruling 96-8p explains that the RFC 'assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).'" Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). An ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in making an RFC determination. See Reid v. Comm. of Soc. Sec, 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014). However, the ALJ "must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion." Brown v. Commissioner, 873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017), As to the role of the function-by-function analysis, "[t]he RFC assessment must first identify the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis .... Only after that may RFC be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy." SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1.

Recently, the Fourth Circuit has held that "meaningful review is frustrated when an ALJ goes straight from listing the evidence to stating a conclusion." Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that "a proper RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical explanation, and (3) conclusion"). Instead, the ALJ "must both identify evidence that supports his conclusion and 'build an accurate and logical bridge from [that] evidence to his conclusion.'" Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). In particular, the ALJ "must build a logical bridge between the limitations he finds and the [vocational expert] evidence relied upon to carry the Commissioner's burden at step five in finding that there are a significant number of jobs available to a claimant." Brent v. Astrue, 879 F.Supp.2d 941, 953 (N.D. 111. 2012). An ALJ's failure to do so constitutes reversible error. See Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868 (4^th Cir. 2017).

Where an ALJ's "analysis is incomplete and precludes meaningful review," remand is appropriate. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 191.

Here, the ALJ carefully considered the entire record and formulated an RFC supported by medical examinations, opinions, reports, testimony, and additional evidence in the record. (Tr. 21-25.) In considering the evidence regarding Plaintiffs migraines, the ALJ cited Plaintiffs testimony of experiencing up to eleven headaches and nine migraines monthly, and his reports of three to four migraines weekly accompanied by photophobia, phonophobia, vomiting, vertigo, and shoulder and neck pain. (Tr. 21-22, 42-43, 47-48.) The ALJ noted that, when formulating the RFC, he "took into consideration the claimant's statements made during the hearing, especially his description of symptoms related to . . . migraines," but found that a more restrictive RFC was not warranted in light of the evidence. (Tr. 22.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiffs statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of symptoms were not entirely consistent with other evidence in the record, noting for example that objective medical findings and Plaintiffs reported daily activities reflected an ability to perform work-related activities within the extensive limitations set forth in the RFC. (Tr. 25.)

More specifically, with respect to objective medical findings medical records from the relevant period contain few if any diagnostic findings relating to Plaintiffs migraines. (See generally Tr. 700-1076.) As noted by the ALJ, medical examinations from Plaintiffs neurologists, primary care physicians, and physical and psychological consultive examiners produced normal results, including normal mental status reports. (Tr. 16-17, 20, 22-23, 515-16, 538, 547-48, 570, 626, 630-32, 639-40,...