Wolf v. Kalkaska Cnty. Rd. Comm'n

1

MICHAEL WOLF and ANDREA WOLF, as successors in interest of WAYNE ROBERTS and HELEN ROBERTS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. KALKASKA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 355746

Court of Appeals of Michigan

August 25, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Kalkaska Circuit Court LC No. 19-013121-CH

Before: RICK, P.J., and BOONSTRA and O'BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this quiet-title action, defendant, Kalkaska County Road Commission, appeals by leave granted^[1] the trial court's opinion and order granting partial summary disposition to plaintiffs, Michael Wolf and Andrea Wolf,^[2] under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and denying defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). At issue in this appeal is the ongoing viability of the doctrine of common-law abandonment as applied to roads under the jurisdiction of county road commissions. Defendant argues that the Legislature abrogated the common-law doctrine as applied to county road commissions in either or both MCL 600.5821 and MCL 224.18. We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. In 2017, Wayne Roberts and Helen Roberts bought property in Oliver Township, which is part of Kalkaska County. A public roadway known as Old Railroad 16 runs through the property. Old Railroad 16 was originally owned by Oliver Township, who transferred it to defendant in 1936 pursuant to the McNitt Act, MCL 247.651 et seq. Defendant decertified the road in 1970, and has since never maintained or repaired the road. At some point before the Roberts bought the property, a previous owner erected a fence and gate across Old Railroad 16.

After a dispute around Old Railroad 16 arose between the Roberts and defendant, plaintiffs filed this action for quiet title to the portion of Old Railroad 16 running through the subject property under a theory of common-law abandonment. As relevant to this appeal, defendant answered that plaintiffs were statutorily barred from acquiring title to part of Old Railroad 16 through commonlaw abandonment under MCL 600.5821 and MCL 224.18.

Thereafter, plaintiffs moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9), asking the court to issue a declaratory judgment on whether common-law abandonment remained "a viable legal theory" in light of defendant's arguments that "it had been abrogated by either or both" MCL 600.5821 and MCL 224.18. Plaintiffs argued in their brief that neither statute abrogated the doctrine of common-law abandonment, and defendant argued in response that they did. According to defendant, MCL 600.5821 abrogated the doctrine of common-law abandonment because the clear intent of the Legislature in that statute was "to prohibit claims asserting forfeiture of the public's interest in a public road under a county road commission's jurisdiction ...." Defendant also argued that the Legislature abrogated the doctrine of common-law abandonment in MCL 224.18 by making that statute the exclusive means by which a county road commission could abandon a public road.

Defendant also filed its own motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), in which, as relevant to this appeal, defendant reiterated its argument that common-law abandonment was abrogated by MCL 600.5821 and MCL 224.118. Plaintiffs responded by reciting their arguments that those statutes did not abrogate the common-law doctrine.

In a written opinion and order, the trial court ruled that common-law abandonment remained a viable legal theory, reasoning that neither statute relied on by defendant had language to suggest that the Legislature intended to abrogate the doctrine of common-law abandonment. For MCL 600.5821, the trial court noted that the Legislature in that statute barred certain claims against county road commissions but did not include common-law abandonment in the list of barred claims, suggesting that it was not the Legislature's intent to bar such a claim. For MCL 224.18, the trial court pointed out that this Court in Ambs v Kalamazoo Cnty Rd Comm, 255 Mich.App. 637; 662 N.W.2d 424 (2003), had previously held that MCL 224.18 was not the exclusive means by which a county road commission could abandon a public road. The trial court recognized that the version of MCL 224.18 analyzed in Ambs had since been amended, but concluded that the statute still did not bar claims of common-law abandonment because "[w]hat was missing from the version of the statute applied by the Ambs court is still missing from the language of the statute before this [c]ourt"-that "MCL 224.18 expressly provide[] that adherence to the statutory procedures was the only means of abandonment ...." Accordingly, the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary disposition and denied defendant's opposing motion.

This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case comes before this Court following the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition, and such decisions are reviewed de novo. Michigan Assn of Home Builders v City of Troy, 504 Mich. 204, 211; 934 N.W.2d 713 (2019). The central question raised on appeal concerns whether the Legislature abrogated the doctrine of common-law abandonment in either MCL 600.5821 or MCL 224.18, which is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Dept of Agric v Appletree Mktg, LLC, 485 Mich. 1, 7; 779 N.W.2d 237 (2010).

III. ANALYSIS

At issue in this case is the ongoing viability of the doctrine of common-law abandonment as applied to public roads under the jurisdiction of county road commissions. It is well established in Michigan common law that "[a] highway may cease to be such by voluntary abandonment and non-use[.]" Gardens of Rest v Upper Mich. Power &Light Co, 322 Mich. 153, 156; 33 N.W.2d 741 (1948). See also Meyer v Meldrum, 237 Mich. 318, 322; 211 N.W. 658 (1927). "To prove such abandonment, both an intent to relinquish the property and external acts putting that intention into effect must be shown by the party asserting abandonment." Ambs, 255 Mich.App. at 652.

On appeal, defendant argues that the Legislature has abrogated this common-law doctrine by barring claims for common-law abandonment in either MCL 600.5821 or MCL 224.18. To make this determination, this Court must interpret the statutes. Our Supreme Court recently reiterated the principles that are to guide courts in this state when interpreting statutes:

The role of this Court in interpreting statutory language is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute. The focus of our analysis must be the statute's express language, which offers the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is limited to enforcement of the statute as written. [Sanford v State, 506 Mich. 10, 14-15; 954 N.W.2d 82 (2020) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Our Supreme Court has also recently repeated the standard courts in this state should utilize when ascertaining whether the Legislature abrogated a common-law doctrine:

"The common law remains in force until 'changed, amended or repealed.'" The Legislature may alter or abrogate the common law through its legislative authority. Yet the mere existence of a statute does not necessarily mean that the Legislature has exercised this authority. We presume that the Legislature "know[s] of the existence of the common law when it acts." Therefore, we have stated that "[w]e will not lightly presume that the Legislature has abrogated the common law" and that "the Legislature should speak in no uncertain terms when it exercises its authority to modify the common law." As with other issues of statutory interpretation, the overriding question is whether the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law. [Murphy v Inman, Mich,; N.W.2d (2022) (Docket No. 161454); slip op at 16-17 (footnotes and citations omitted).]

A. MCL 600.5821

First addressing defendant's argument related to MCL 600.5821 that statute provides in relevant part:

(2) In an action involving the recovery or the possession of land, including a public highway, street, alley, easement, or other public ground, a municipal corporation, political subdivision of this state, or county road commission is not subject to any of the following:

(a) The periods of limitations under this act.

(b) Laches.

(c) A claim for adverse possession, acquiescence for the statutory period, or a prescriptive easement.

1. MCL 600.5821(2)(C)

Defendant first argues that the Legislature barred claims for common-law abandonment against governmental entities in MCL 600.5821(2)(c) by stating that those entities are not subject to claims for adverse possession, acquiescence for the statutory period, or prescriptive easement. However, the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 600.5821(2)(c) lists only claims for "adverse possession, acquiescence for the statutory period, or a prescriptive easement," not common-law abandonment. This plainly suggests that the Legislature did not intend to include claims for common-law abandonment in the list of claims barred by MCL 600.5821(2)(c). See Dawley v Hall, 501 Mich. 166 170; 905 N.W.2d 863 (2018) (applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another).

Moreover, as explained, "the Legislature should speak in no uncertain terms when it exercises its authority to modify the common law." Murphy, Mich. at; slip op at 17 (quotation marks and citation omitted). By barring certain claims in actions against county road commissions and omitting common-law abandonment from the list of barred claims, it cannot be said that the Legislature clearly intended to abrogate that common-law doctrine.

This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this...