Wolfram Alpha LLC v. Cuccinelli

490 F.Supp.3d 324

WOLFRAM ALPHA LLC, Plaintiff,

v.Kenneth T. CUCCINELLI, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-3361 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed February 21, 2020

Diana Bauerle, Wolfram Research, Inc., Champaign, IL, for Plaintiff.

Brian J. Field, U.S. Attorney'S Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Wolfram Alpha LLC ("Plaintiff") brings a civil action under 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") against Kenneth Cuccinelli as Acting Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service ("USCIS"), Kevin McAleenan as Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), and Kathy Baran as Director of the California Service Center ("CSC") (collectively, "Defendants") for the September 18, 2019 denial of Plaintiff's nonimmigrant petition to obtain an H-1B visa for the benefit of non-party Suguru Tokuda. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ denial of the petition "constitutes final agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with law" and "[n]o rational connection exists between the conclusions asserted by USCIS in its denial and the facts in the record." Compl. ¶¶ 38–39.

Plaintiff filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on November 7, 2019. On January 6, 2020, Defendants moved to transfer venue to either the Central District of California or the Central District of Illinois (together, "Transferee Districts") and for an extension of time to respond to the Complaint. Plaintiff claims that venue is proper in the District of Columbia where the action was filed. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court will grant the motion to the extent Defendants seek to transfer venue to the Central District of Illinois and grant the requested extension of time.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, part of the Wolfram group of multinational companies, is a technology company headquartered in Champaign, Illinois. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 9. Mr. Tokuda has worked for Plaintiff since August 2018 as a Quality Assurance Engineer after earning a Master of Science degree in Information Systems from Illinois State University in May 2018. Compl. ¶¶ 20–21. In this role, Mr. Tokuda develops and executes test plans to identify software problems. Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff and Mr. Tokuda are located within the Central District of Illinois.¹ USCIS and DHS are located in the District of Columbia. CSC is located in the Central District of California.²

On April 11, 2019, USCIS accepted Plaintiff's H-1B nonimmigrant petition filed on behalf of Mr. Tokuda. Compl. ¶ 19. On July 16, 2019, USCIS issued a Request for Evidence, requesting additional information to show Mr. Tokuda's position meets the requirements for a specialty occupation. Compl. ¶ 23. On August 19, 2019, Plaintiff submitted its response, including a letter from Plaintiff's General Counsel providing explanations of the position's duties and minimum requirements as evidence of the nature of the position as a specialty occupation. Compl. ¶ 24. USCIS denied Plaintiff's Petition on September 18, 2019, claiming that the position did not meet the definition of a specialty occupation under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4). Compl. ¶ 28. As a result of the denial, Mr. Tokuda is at risk of losing his work authorization and Plaintiff is at risk of losing an employee upon the expiration of Mr. Tokuda's current Employment Authorization Card on June 4, 2021. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 35–36.

Defendants moved to transfer venue to the Central District of California or the Central District of Illinois and to extend the time to respond to Plaintiff's Complaint until 21 days after this Court resolves the transfer motion. See Defs.’ Combined Mot. to Transfer Venue and Extend Time 1, ECF No. 5; Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer ("Mot. to Transfer") 3, ECF No. 5-1.³ Defendants argue that while the District of Columbia is not an improper venue, this action has little connection to the District because none of the activities at issue occurred in this District nor is Plaintiff located in this District. Mot. to Transfer 3. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that granting Defendants’ motion would delay the case, create unnecessary burdens on Plaintiff, and disregard Plaintiff's choice of forum. Pl.’s Opp'n to Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer Venue ("Opp'n to Transfer") 1–2, ECF No. 7-1. The combined motions to transfer venue and for extension of time are now ripe for decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The federal change of venue statute provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Even if a plaintiff has brought a case in a proper venue, a district court may transfer it to another district. Ngonga v. Sessions , 318 F. Supp. 3d 270, 274 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ). In making the decision to transfer, the court must make an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Abusadeh v. Chertoff , No. 06-cv-2014, 2007 WL 2111036, at *3 (D.D.C. July 23, 2007) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack , 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) ).

The moving party has the burden to establish that transfer is proper. Chauhan v. Napolitano , 746 F. Supp. 2d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2010). To establish transfer of venue is proper, Defendant must first show that Plaintiff could have sued in the proposed transferee district. Id. Once this threshold is satisfied, Defendant must show that, on balance, private and public interests weigh in favor of transfer. Id. In deciding a motion to transfer, a court may consider materials outside the pleadings. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Where the Action Could Have Been Brought

The Parties do not disagree that the action could have been filed in the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia, the Central District of California, or the Central District of Illinois. See Mot. to Transfer 3; Opp'n to Transfer 4. "In an action brought against an officer or employee of the United States or any of its agencies, venue is proper in any district where (1) a defendant resides; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or (3) plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action." Al-Ahmed v. Chertoff , 564 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) ).

Venue is proper in the Central District of California because that is where the challenged federal action – CSC's denial of Petition – occurred and where one defendant resides. Because CSC's denial of Petition gives rise to Plaintiff's cause of action, the Central District of California is a proper venue for this action. See Al-Ahmed , 564 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (finding venue in the Eastern District of Virginia proper where defendant, acting District Director of USCIS's Washington field office, resided in that district and plaintiff's applications for travel document and employment authorization were processed in that office). Kathy Baran, Director of CSC, performs her official duties within the Central District of California and therefore resides in that district. See McAfee, LLC v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services , No. 19-cv-2981, 2019 WL 6051559, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2019) (finding that an action could have been brought in the Central District of California because Kathy Baran resides in the district because she performs her official duties at the CSC in Laguna Niguel, California, which is within the Central District); see also Lamont v. Haig , 590 F.2d 1124, 1128 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("What controls is the official residence of the federal defendant where the official duties are performed and not the personal residence of an individual who is a defendant.").

Venue is also proper in the Central District of Illinois because Plaintiff is located in that district (in Champaign, Illinois) and Mr. Tokuda is employed in that district. See Ngonga , 318 F. Supp. 3d at 274 (finding that because plaintiffs resided in Lovettsville, Virginia, which is within the jurisdiction of the Eastern District of Virginia, that district was a proper venue).

Accordingly, this action properly could have been brought in the U.S. District Courts for either the Central District of California or the Central District of Illinois.

B. The Balance of Private and Public Interests

Because the threshold has been satisfied, Defendant must now "demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interests of justice weigh in favor of a transfer." Chauhan , 746 F. Supp. 2d at 102. The Court has broad discretion to "balance case-specific factors related to the public interest of justice and the private interests of the parties and witnesses." Al-Ahmed , 564 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (quoting Montgomery v. STG Int'l, Inc. , 532 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2008) ).

1. Private Interests

To determine whether transfer of venue is in the private interest, the Court must weigh six factors including: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) the defendant's choice of forum, (3) where the claim arose, (4) the convenience of the parties, (5) the convenience of the witnesses, and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. Aftab v. Gonzalez , 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2009). The Court will weigh each of these factors in turn, although in slightly different order.

a. Location of Activities That Gave Rise to the Action

The location of activities giving rise to the action weighs heavily in favor of transfer. Defendants argue that no activity in the District of Columbia gave rise to this action regarding an allegedly erroneous decision made by CSC in California...