Woltkamp v. L. Rios Classified Emp. Ass'n

539 F.Supp.3d 1058

Dawn WOLTKAMP, Plaintiff,

v.LOS RIOS CLASSIFIED EMP. ASS'N, et al., Defendants,Rob Bonta, in his official capacity as Attorney General of California, Real Party in Interest/Intervenor.

No. 2:20-cv-00457-KJM-DB

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed May 12, 2021

Filed May 13, 2021

Mariah Rose Gondeiro, Shella Sadovnik, Karin Moore Sweigart, Freedom Foundation, Olympia, WA, for Plaintiff.

Monique Alonso, Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant Los Rios Classified Employees Association.

Spencer Elgant Covert, Jr., Parker & Covert LLP, Tustin, CA, for Defendants Los Rios Community College District, John Knight.

ORDER

Kimberly Mueller, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Plaintiff Dawn Woltkamp ("Woltkamp") filed this § 1983 action requesting injunctive and declaratory relief for the allegedly unlawful deprivation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to refrain from subsidizing the speech of the defendant union, Los Rios Classified Employees Association ("LRCEA"). Xavier Becerra¹ in his official capacity as California Attorney General intervened, ECF No. 18, and filed a motion to dismiss, ECF No. 22. Woltkamp and defendant LRCEA filed cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, ECF Nos. 23 & 24, respectively. Having considered the arguments of counsel made at hearing on September 25, 2020, and the parties’ briefs including the supplemental briefing, the court grants the Attorney General's motion to dismiss. LRCEA's motion for judgment on the pleadings and plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings are denied as moot .

I. BACKGROUND

Woltkamp is a "public school employee" in the employee benefits division of defendant Los Rios Community College District. Compl. ¶¶ 12–14, ECF No. 1. On March 17, 2017, Woltkamp signed a document titled, "LRCEA Classified Employee Association Organizational Security Deduction Check-Off." Id. ¶ 20; Jt. Stip. of Counsel ("Jt. Stip."), ECF No. 25,² Ex. A ("Dues Deduction Check-Off Form"), ECF No. 25-1. This dues deduction authorization form expressly stated it is an "Agreement with Los Rios Classified Employee Association Contract, Article 2." It provided three distinct options, with a check-off box next to each option, as follows:

(1) Union membership deduction: $216 annually (or currently authorized dues rate), to be equally distributed over assigned work year.

(2) Non-Membership, Representational Service Fee: $216 per annually (or currently authorized dues rate), to be equally distributed over assigned work year.

(3) Application for any employee who is a member of a religious body whose traditional tenets and teachings include objections to joining or financially supporting employee organizations shall, in lieu of LRCEA membership dues or a fee, have an amount deducted monthly from his/her paycheck equivalent to the monthly LRCEA fees [$216 per annually (or currently authorized dues rate), to be equally distributed over assigned work year], with such deduction deposited to one of the following charitable organizations designated by the unit member ...

Dues Deduction Check-Off Form at 1 (parentheses and brackets in original).

Plaintiff checked off the first box labelled "Union membership deduction," signed and dated the Dues Deduction Check-Off Form. Id. On July 1, 2017, defendant school district entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with LRCEA as the exclusive representative for plaintiff's bargaining unit, effective July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2020. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17.

The CBA provides in pertinent part:

The organizational security provisions described in this article of the Agreement constitute an Agency Shop. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the effective date of this Agreement or the employee being employed into a position in the Bargaining Unit, whichever comes first, each employee shall either join LRCEA as a member and pay its membership dues ("dues"), remain a non-member of LRCEA and pay the fair share service fee ("fee") it charges, or, if qualified pursuant to Section 3546.3 of the [Educational Employment Relations Act] EERA, pay the charitable contribution required by this Agreement.

CBA § 3.1.1 at 13 (bracketed text added). California's EERA expressly authorizes the collection of agency fees. Specifically, it provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon receiving notice from the exclusive representative of a public school employee who is in a unit for which an exclusive representative has been selected pursuant to this chapter, the employer shall deduct the amount of the fair share service fee authorized by this section from the wages and salary of the employee and pay that amount to the employee organization ...

Cal. Gov't Code § 3546(a) ; see also id. §§ 3540.1(i)(1), 3542(2), 3543(2).

In a separate section, the CBA provides that, "Each employee who is a member of LRCEA on the effective date of this Agreement or who subsequently becomes a member of LRCEA shall, from that date forward, remain as a member of LRCEA and pay its dues for the duration of this Agreement and in accordance with the EERA." CBA § 3.1.2 at 13.

On September 19, 2018, after learning of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. AFSCME , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), plaintiff sent LRCEA a written notice requesting that it end her union membership and revoke her previous authorization for dues deductions. Compl. ¶ 22; see Resignation Letter. LRCEA informed plaintiff she would have to remain a union member unless she resigned within the 30-day period after the expiration of the CBA in June 2020. Compl. ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges LRCEA relied on the EERA to compel plaintiff to remain a member and continued to deduct dues from plaintiff's paychecks each pay period, without her consent. Id. ¶¶ 36–38. After this suit was filed, LRCEA ultimately confirmed plaintiff was discharged from LRCEA membership, effective July 1, 2020. See LRCEA Mot. at 7, ECF No. 24-1.

Before LRCEA discharged her from membership, plaintiff filed this suit on February 28, 2020. She named LRCEA, Los Rios Community College District and the President of the District's Board of Trustees John Knight,³ alleging deprivation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to refrain from subsidizing the union's speech through dues, without adequate consent as provided in Janus . Compl. ¶¶ 43–46, 56. Plaintiff alleges defendants violated her First Amendment rights in three ways: (1) deducting union dues from plaintiff's paychecks; (2) claiming the authority to prevent plaintiff's resignation from the LRCEA at a time of her choosing; and (3) enforcing the LRCEA's revocation policy with respect to her dues deductions. See Id. ¶¶ 3, 64. In her complaint, plaintiff mounts facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of California Government Code sections 3540.1(i)(1), 3542(2), 3543(2) and 3546(a), see Compl. ¶¶ 48, 51, 60, and California Education Code section 88167, id. ¶¶ 63, 67, 71, alleging these statutes violate her right to free association, free speech, thought and conscience under the U.S. Constitution, id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that California Government Code sections 3540.1(i)(1), 3542(2) and 3546 violate plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as damages for the alleged violation of her First Amendment rights, and attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. ¶¶ 12–13.

Three motions are pending before the court: (1) the motion to dismiss filed by the California Attorney General, AG MTD, ECF No. 22; (2) a request for judgment on the pleadings by plaintiff, Woltkamp Mot., ECF No. 23; and (3) a request for judgment on the pleadings by defendant LRCEA, LRCEA Mot., ECF No. 24. In connection with these motions, there are two outstanding requests for judicial notice, ECF No. 22-3; ECF No. 38, the parties filed a joint stipulation, ECF No. 25; plaintiff filed a notice of errata, ECF No. 39; and defendant filed two statements of recent decisions, ECF Nos. 41 & 43.

On September 25, 2020, the court held a videoconference hearing on the motions. Shella Sadovnik appeared on behalf of plaintiff, Monique Alonso appeared for defendant LRCEA, and Anthony O'Brien appeared on behalf of the California Attorney General. The court granted the parties leave to file supplemental briefing addressing: (1) two cases decided since the motions were fully briefed, Belgau v. Inslee , 975 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2020) and Savas v. California State Law Enf't Agency , 485 F.Supp.3d 1233 (S.D. Cal. 2020), and (2) whether plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of association claim raises a question of first impression not addressed by these recent decisions. See Minutes, ECF No. 45. The court submitted the matter after receiving supplemental briefing by plaintiff, Woltkamp Suppl. Br., ECF No. 47; objections by defendant LRCEA, Obj., ECF No. 48, and a notice of intent not to file supplemental briefing by the Attorney General, Not., ECF No. 46. The court addresses all three pending motions here.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab. , 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes "them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco , 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019). If the complaint's allegations do not "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief," the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A complaint need contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),...