Womack v. Hous. Auth. of Chester Cnty.

MELLISSA WOMACK et al., Plaintiffs v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CHESTER COUNTY, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION No. 19-4962

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JUNE 23, 2020

MEMORANDUM

PRATTER, J.

Mellissa Womack and her two children are disabled former participants in the Housing Authority of Chester County's ("HACC") Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. The Womacks allege that throughout their time in the program, HACC violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"). HACC moves to dismiss the complaint.

For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Womack moved to Pennsylvania in September 2016 and received a voucher for participation in HACC's Section 8 program, at which time she informed HACC of her family members' various disabilities. These disabilities include, but are not limited to, emotional and developmental disorders, hypersensitivity to chemicals, asthma, allergies, and anxiety. After HACC responded to her application, Ms. Womack accepted a rental in Parkesburg, Pennsylvania. The rental unit passed an inspection on September 2, 2016, and the Womacks moved in on September 3, 2016. During the Womacks' tenancy, however, the unit was re-inspected three times and failed "for a variety of reasons." Compl. ¶ 38.

The failed inspections required the Womacks to relocate but "HACC did not assist [them] in finding a unit to meet their disabilities." Id. at ¶ 39. Without HACC's assistance, Ms. Womack located a townhouse community ("TC") in Chester County. The TC agreed to participate in HACC's Section 8 program and entered into the necessary agreements, and Ms. Womack entered into a lease with the TC in November 2017. Ms. Womack requested that a number of modifications be made to the unit to accommodate her family members' disabilities, including, among other things, installing a special sanitizing washer and dryer, a second refrigerator, grab bars in the shower, and a second handrail on the stairs. The TC permitted the installation of a second washer and dryer and refrigerator but never completed the other requests.

The Womacks claim that they began to experience adverse medical symptoms after they moved into the TC due to the poor air quality in the unit. The family made HACC aware of the issue and moved into a series of hotels for several weeks, from February 20, 2018 until March 4, 2018, at which time they moved back into the TC due to a lack of funds for the hotels. The TC was later inspected on March 20, 2018. The inspection uncovered a faulty stove and tub stopper, but HACC did not inspect the windows and failed to discover that they did not open. HACC also did not evaluate the unit's air quality.

The unit was inspected again on April 17, 2018 and failed because the TC had not completed any of the repairs required after the first inspection. HACC began withholding rent from the TC and issued Ms. Womack a move voucher on April 25, 2018. HACC later granted her a 60-day extension, but Ms. Womack failed to find new housing before the extension expired. The unit failed an annual inspection on August 28, 2018 and again on September 25, 2018. On October 9, 2018, HACC sent Ms. Womack a letter informing her that the unit had been in abatement and HACC needed to end the contract with the landlord. HACC also informed Ms. Womack that it would issue her a final move voucher on October 10, 2018, which would expire on December 9, 2018.

Ms. Womack claims that the TC failed to assist her in finding an apartment that would accommodate her family members' disabilities. She states that she was offered a realtor who provided her with a list of all available apartments, but the list was not limited to those accepting Section 8. She also claims that she was given an electronic list of apartments, but she could not view the list because she was homeless and had no access to a computer. The Womacks claim that they were homeless for roughly 15 days and stayed in hotels.

HACC allegedly sent Ms. Womack another letter extending the voucher to February 1, 2019, but HACC did not offer any assistance to her to find a new apartment. When Ms. Womack failed to find a new apartment, HACC terminated her enrollment in the Section 8 program.

Ms. Womack requested a hearing regarding the termination of her voucher and HACC's failure to assist her in finding an accessible unit, but she alleges that the hearing did not occur in a reasonably expeditious manner. Ms. Womack also claims that HACC failed to accommodate her request for an exception due to her family members' disabilities, increase her payment standard based on reasonable accommodations, increase her utility allowance, properly inspect the unit in the TC, provide her with a full copy of her records, and publish or promulgate an administrative plan that included rules regarding extensions of vouchers or identified the needs of disabled individuals.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The question is not whether the claimant "will ultimately prevail . . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold." Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court may consider "only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record." Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Also, the Court must accept as true all reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations and view those facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Revell v. Port Auth., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010).

That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount reality. The Court "need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences." Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that a court need not accept a plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions") (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

The Womacks have sued HACC for (I) violations of the FHA; (II) violations of procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (III) violations of the UTPCPL.¹ HACC moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

I. Violations of the FHA

The Womacks allege that HACC violated the FHA by failing to provide reasonable modifications and accommodations to their TC apartment, failing to adequately inspect the Womacks' units, failing to increase the Womacks' utility allowances, and failing to extend the Womacks' voucher term.

The FHA prohibits "discriminat[ion] against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). A plaintiff may bring three types of claims under the FHA: "(1) intentional discrimination claims (also called disparate treatment claims) and (2) disparate impact claims, both of which arise under § 3604(f)(2), and (3) claims that a defendant refused to make 'reasonable accommodations,' which arise under § 3604(f)(3)(B)." Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 448 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002)).

At the outset, the Court notes that whether a public housing authority can be sued under the FHA appears to be an open question in this circuit. See Spieth v. Bucks Cty. Hous. Auth., 594 F. Supp. 2d 584, 592 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("Third Circuit dicta suggests that the [FHA] does not apply to suits against [public housing authorities] who provide disabled persons with vouchers for housing assistance."). In Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1283 (3d Cir. 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:

Nothing in the text or legislative history of § 3604(f)(1) suggests to us that Congress intended to regulate and thereby subject to judicial review the decision-making of public agencies which sponsor housing for the handicapped. This is not to say that the decision of such agencies cannot be tainted by bias against the handicapped. But that problem, if it exists, is far different from and presumably less serious than the problem of biased sellers and lessors Congress here addressed.

"However, Growth Horizons only addressed Section 3604(f)(1), concerning the sale or rental of a dwelling . . . ." Antonelli v. Gloucester Cty. Hous. Auth., No. 19-16962, 2019 WL 5485449, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2019). In contrast, the Womacks' allegations align with a failure to accommodate claim, which arises under Section 3604(f)(3).² As such, the Court finds that Growth Horizons does not directly control the claims in this matter and the Womacks may pursue a claim against HACC under the...