Won v. Amazon.com

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CAONAISSA WON, individually and on behalf of other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM, INC., AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, AND AMAZON.COM SALES, INC., Defendants.

No. 21-CV-2867 (NGG) (RER)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

August 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case arises under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), which was enacted to fortify and expand employment protections for veterans and uniformed military service members.

Plaintiff Caonaissa Won, a former employee in an Amazon warehouse and an Army reservist, alleges that Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com Services LLC, and Amazon.com Sales, Inc. (collectively “Amazon”) violated 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b) by adopting employment policies disfavoring servicemembers taking shortterm leaves of absence for military training. Amazon moves to dismiss Won's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of standing, and Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. Amazon also moves to dismiss on the grounds that Won's suit is duplicative of an earlier suit she brought against the company. Finally, Amazon seeks to dismiss two entities as improperly named defendants.

For the following reasons, Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon.com Sales Inc. are each DISMISSED from the case without prejudice, and Won's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Won worked at an Amazon warehouse in New York from July 1, 2019, until about September 6, 2019, earning $17.50 an hour.^[1](Am. Compl. (Dkt. 18) ¶ 49.) At the same time, she was an activeduty member of the United States Army Reserve, which required periodic and mandatory trainings. (Id. ¶ 51.) To complete those trainings, she took two short-term leaves of absence while employed by Amazon. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) The first was from August 11 to August 21, 2019, and the second from August 22 to September 6, 2019. (Id. ¶ 52.)

Around the time of these absences, Amazon informed Won that she was not entitled to her full pay while on military leave, but that she would be eligible for differential pay - i.e., her normal Amazon wages deducted by the amount of pay she received from the Army during the period of leave. (Id. ¶ 56.) Though Amazon initially failed to pay Won anything at all while she was away, it eventually corrected what it describes as an administrative error, mailing her a check for the differential pay the company's benefits policy provided. (Id. ¶ 57; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Mot.”) (Dkt. 22-1) at 1, 4, 6.)

Won argues that 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b) entitles her and other similarly situated employees to full pay while on military leave, rather than the differential pay Amazon provided. She claims that Amazon continues to violate USERRA by failing to pay employees who take short-term military leaves of 30 days or fewer (“military leave”) to the same extent it pays employees taking other kinds of leaves, like jury duty or bereavement leave, because the benefits provided to employees on those comparable, non-military leaves include full pay. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-7, 57-77.)

She brings this action on behalf of herself and a putative class comprised of current and former Amazon employees throughout the United States who took short-term military leaves from October 10, 2004, to the present. (Id. ¶¶ 39-47.) Won seeks damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief mandating modification of the allegedly discriminatory policies. (Id. at 14.)

Amazon moves to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See Defs.' Mot. at 5-24.) The company argues that (1) Won does not have standing because she does not allege a live case or controversy; (2) USERRA does not reach military leave as a “benefit”; (3) the non-military leave benefits Amazon provides are not comparable to military leave; (4) Won has impermissibly split her claims across two lawsuits; and (5) two of the corporate entities named should be dismissed as defendants. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, including for lack of Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021).^[2] A plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate standing, a standard that escalates depending on the stage of the litigation. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. On a motion to dismiss, standing may be established by making “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct.” Id. Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). A plaintiff need not provide “detailed factual allegations” at the pleading stage, but the facts alleged must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. The pleadings must therefore at least “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” needed to prove the legal elements of the claim. Id.

In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim, the court must “accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint.” Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998). It “constru[es] the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The court's role is to “assess the legal feasibility of the complaint; it is not to assess the weight of the evidence that might be offered on either side.” Lynch v. Cty. of N.Y., 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020). The essential question is whether the complaint has provided “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III. DISCUSSION

USERRA is an anti-discrimination statute: it mandates that, at virtually all U.S. employers, employees with military status must be treated equally to other similarly situated employees when it comes to certain employment rights and benefits. As interpreted by the Department of Labor's implementing regulations, where an employer provides “benefits,” including pay, to employees on a leave of absence, USERRA requires that employers offer the “most favorable treatment accorded to any comparable form of leave when [an employee] performs service in the uniformed services.” 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150(b). This case principally addresses whether USERRA requires any paid leave for military absences at all, and, if so, whether Amazon violates USERRA with the particular “benefits” it provides for military leaves as compared with other, comparable kinds of leave. The court begins with standing, proceeds to those statutory questions, and then addresses claim splitting and which defendants have been properly named.

A. Justiciability

As a threshold matter, Amazon makes two arguments as to Won's Article III standing. First, it contends that Won's claim was mooted when the company corrected its administrative error and tendered Won the differential pay that Amazon provides for military leave. Second, it argues that Won has not suffered an injury “even under her own theory,” i.e., that USERRA entitles her to full pay. (Defs.' Mot. at 6.) The court rejects both arguments, but concludes nonetheless that Won has failed to demonstrate standing as to her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Those claims are therefore DISMISSED.

1. Mootness

As to Amazon's first argument, the company argues that Won's claim was mooted when it paid her the differential pay it generally provides eligible employees for military leaves. (See Defs.' Reply (Dkt. 22-6) at 6.) Believing that USERRA requires nothing more, Amazon argues that Won has received what she is due and any claim she may have had arising from the company's earlier administrative error is now moot.

This argument, however, badly disfigures Won's USERRA claim, which is that she should retain her full Amazon pay while on military leave because employees on comparable leaves retain theirs. (Pl.'s Opp'n. (Dkt. 22-5) at 9.) That injury has not been mooted for the simple reason that Won never received the full pay she claims she is entitled to; instead she received lesser, differential pay. The fact that, before she amended her complaint, she was also seeking the differential pay Amazon had mistakenly failed to remit is of no moment. See Woodard v. New York Health & Hosps. Corp., 554 F.Supp.2d 329, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (reasoning that a post hoc offer of monetary relief can only moot a legal claim if “there is no injury that remains to be redressed”). Her claim for damages has not been mooted because she properly amended her complaint to seek pay she has undisput-edly not received.

2. Standing

a. Won's Claim for Damages

For similar reasons, as to her claim for those damages, Won has pleaded a concrete injury in fact: she received less pay than she alleges she is entitled to. To state an injury under USERRA, Won need only allege that Amazon is a qualifying employer under 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A) and that she has been plausibly denied “rights and benefits” that the company provides to non-military employees on comparable types of leave, in violation of § 4316(b). See 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(1)(B) (requiring employers to provide the same benefits “as are generally provided...