Wood v. Coahoma Cnty.

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LESLIE MORGAN WOOD PLAINTIFF v. COAHOMA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANT

Civil Action No. 4:21-cv-166-DAS

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Greenville Division

December 21, 2023

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAVID A. SANDERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Now before the court are Coahoma County, Mississippi's Motion for Summary Judgment and Morgan Wood's Motion to Strike Unsupported Evidence. Having reviewed the filings, as well as the applicable authorities, the court is prepared to rule.

Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

Morgan Wood (“Wood”) has a lengthy employment history with Coahoma County, Mississippi (“the County”). The County first hired Wood as clerical staff in June 2001. In February 2002, the then County Administrator notified Wood that her employment status would be changed to permanent, and she would receive a 10% raise, bringing her monthly salary to $1,705. Effective October 1, 2007, the Board of Supervisors increased Wood's annual salary to $30,000 and gave her the additional job titles of receiving clerk, solid waste manager, and administrative assistant. In February 2015, the Board of Supervisors voted to increase Wood's annual salary to $34,500 and voted again to increase her annual salary by $3,500 in July 2016, also giving her the additional roles of inventory clerk and emergency management support. On September 1, 2017, the Board of Supervisors appointed Wood as the Assistant County Administrator at an annual salary of $52,000. Only five months later, on February 1, 2018, the Board of Supervisors unanimously approved the appointment of Wood as County Administrator at an annual salary of $75,000. Exactly one year later, on February 1, 2019, the Board of Supervisors increased Wood's annual salary to $90,000.

The Board of Supervisors that voted to appoint Wood as County Administrator on February 1, 2018, consisted of three white supervisors and two Black supervisors.^[1] The same Board members voted unanimously to increase her salary to $90,000 in February 2019. On January 1, 2020, after a county-wide election, the racial makeup of the Board of Supervisors changed to three Black supervisors and two white supervisors. Supervisor Johnny Newson (Black) was voted President of the Board, and the remaining Board members were Supervisor Paul Pearson (white), Supervisor Pat Davis (white), Supervisor Derrell Washington (Black), and Supervisor Roosevelt Lee (Black).^[2] As was customary after the appointment of a new Board, on January 22, 2020, Supervisors Newson Pearson, Davis, and Washington voted unanimously to reappoint Wood as County Administrator. Supervisor Lee was not present for that vote.

On May 3, 2021, Supervisors Newson, Lee, and Washington - who are all Black - voted to terminate Wood's employment with the County. Supervisors Pearson and Davis voted against termination. In a letter dated May 4, 2021, President Newson advised Wood of her termination citing the Board's decision “to go in a different direction.” Doc 160-7. Ann Hoskins, a Black woman, replaced Wood as County Administrator.

Wood filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received notice of her right to sue by letter dated September 30, 2021. Wood filed this action on December 8, 2021, alleging the County unlawfully terminated her because of her race.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P 56(a). Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Nabors v. Malone, 2019 WL 2617240, at *1 (N.D. Miss. June 26, 2019) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

“The moving party ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “The nonmoving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings' and ‘designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Importantly, “the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the affidavits, depositions, and exhibits of record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Waste Mgmt. of La., LLC v. River Birch, Inc., 920 F.3d 958, 964 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 646 (5th Cir. 1997)). But “[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalist arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Nabors, 2019 WL 2617240 at *1 (citations omitted).

Analysis and Discussion

I. Race Discrimination

Wood contends that the County is liable under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court will analyze these claims together, as “[t]he analysis of discrimination claims under § 1981 is identical to the analysis of Title VII claims.”^[3] Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp. L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005)).

To succeed on a claim for race discrimination under Title VII or § 1981, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case either through direct or circumstantial evidence. Gilleylen v. City of Tupelo, Miss., 2017 WL 4050322, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 13, 2017). In the absence of direct evidence, as is the case herein, “the Court uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to assess the sufficiency of the evidence.” Gossett v. Allegiance Specialty Hosp. of Greenville, LLC, 2021 WL 4504694, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 1, 2021) (citing Harville v. City of Houston, 945 F.3d 870, 874-75 & n. 10 (5th Cir. 2019)).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears “the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination[.]” Harville, 945 F.3d at 875. “The prima facie case, once established, creates a presumption of discrimination and the burden then shifts to the [defendant] to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (citing Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999)). If the employer sustains its burden, “the prima facie case is dissolved, and a plaintiff ... must establish either: (1) that the employer's proffered reason is not true but is instead a pretext for discrimination; or (2) that the employer's reason, while true, is not the only reason for its conduct, and another ‘motivating factor' is the plaintiff's protected characteristic.” Mengistu v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 2017 WL 3880319, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2017), aff'd, 716 Fed.Appx. 331 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Alvarado v. Texas Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007); Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004)).

a. Prima Facie Case

The County first argues that Wood has failed to carry her burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Fifth Circuit has articulated the plaintiff's prima facie burden as follows:

To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in employment, an employee must demonstrate that she (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside [her] protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.

Morris v. Town of Independence, 827 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 319-20 (5th Cir. 2014)). The parties do not dispute that Wood satisfies the first three elements of her prima facie case - she is white, she was qualified for the position of county administrator, and the County terminated her employment. However, the County argues that Wood has not offered any admissible evidence to satisfy the fourth element, noting that her Amended Complaint only alleges that “favorable treatment was given to persons outside of the protected class and/or other similarly situated (Blacks) were treated more favorably.” Doc. 161 at 35 (quoting Doc. 26, ¶ 13).

While Wood's Amended Complaint recites only a portion of the fourth prong of the prima facie case outlined in Morris v. Town of Independence and does not specifically state that she “was replaced by someone outside h[er] protected group,” she clearly alleges and has presented evidence that this occurred. The Amended Complaint identifies Wood as a Caucasian woman and alleges that after she was fired, she was replaced by Ann Hoskins, a Black employee. Moreover, the record evidence supports Wood's allegations that the Board voted to terminate her employment with the County on May 3, 2021, and replaced her with Ann Hoskins shortly thereafter.

Because the fourth prong of the prima facie case can be satisfied by establishing that Wood “was replaced by someone outside [her] protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group,” Wood has clearly met her burden. See Morris, 827 F.3d at 401 (emphasis added); see also Cook v. Hinds Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 2023 WL 5354161 at *5 (S.D.Miss. Aug. 21, 2023) (finding the plaintiff, a white woman, pled a plausible race-discrimination claim by alleging she was replaced by a less-qualified Black employee). ...