Wood v. Hogan

PHILLIP WOOD, Plaintiff, v. ELIZABETH HOGAN, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13-2453 (FLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DATED: May 6, 2014

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

PHILLIP WOOD, #15067

Plaintiff Pro Se

WOLFSON, District Judge:

Phillip Wood, who is civilly committed to the Ann Klein Forensic Center in New Jersey, seeks to file a Complaint without prepayment of the filing fee, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 17 officials at Ann Klein Forensic Center. This Court will grant Wood's application to proceed in forma pauperis and, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Over 30 years ago, when he was 19 years old, Wood set fire to the family home while his family was inside sleeping. See Wood v. Main, 789 F.Supp.2d 519 (D.N.J. 2011), certificate of appealability denied, C.A. 11-2684 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1100 (2012); In re Commitment of Phillip A. Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Dec. 12,2007), certif. denied, 194 N.J. 444 (2008) (table).¹ All family members escaped by jumping from second floor windows, except his two-month old nephew, who died in the fire. In 1981, Wood was found not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGI") of felony murder and aggravated arson in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County. He was involuntarily committed to a state hospital as an NGI acquittee, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:8b(3), and received periodic review hearings, in accordance with State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975).²

By order filed March 31, 2010, the New Jersey Superior Court terminated Wood's NGI Krol status, effective April 18, 2010, and ordered Ann Klein Forensic Center to immediately evaluate him to determine whether or not he should be committed pursuant to the New Jersey Civil Commitment Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.1 et seq. A hearing was conducted, and Wood was civilly committed effective April 18, 2010, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15 (a), which provides that "[i]f the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the patient needs continued involuntary commitment to treatment, it shall issue an order authorizing the involuntary commitment of the patient and the assignment or admission of the patient . . ."

Prior to the expiration of his 30-year Krol term, Wood's Krol hearings were suspended by court order during the time he served two separate terms of criminal incarceration. See Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d at 521-23; In re Commitment of Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 at *1. On May 3, 2000, Wood was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment, based on his guilty plea to aggravated assault on a psychiatrist, and on March 5, 2007, Wood was sentenced to a four-year term of incarceration based on his guilty plea to third-degree assault. A state court order dated July 21, 2000, suspended Krol hearings for Wood during the time he was in the custody of the New Jersey Department of Corrections, but provided that 90 days prior to his release date, the court would schedule a Krol hearing.³ Id. Wood's Krol hearings were suspended, pursuant to the July 21, 2000, order, during the time he served these terms; prior to the expiration of each term of incarceration, the state court conducted a Krol hearing, determined that Wood posed a danger to himself, others, and property, if released to the community, and reinstated his Krol commitment.

Wood appealed the orders suspending and reinstating his Krol hearings to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, arguing that the suspension and reinstatement of his hearings violated due process. See In re Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 at *1. On December 12, 2007, the Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Id. The Appellate Division noted that, although state law required "periodic reviews of the [NGI] commitment no later than (1) three months from the date of the first hearing, and (2) nine months from the date of the first hearing, and (3) 12 months from the date of the first hearing, and (4) at least annually thereafter, if the patient is not sooner discharged," id. (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(f)(2)), the Law Division's orders had properly relaxed this rule. Id. at *3. "If Wood had been afforded a Krol hearing while imprisoned, he would not have been released, even if it were determined he was no longer a danger to self or others." Id. The Appellate Division found that, because there was no purpose to be accomplished by a Krol review while Wood was incarcerated, a relaxation of R. 4:74-7 was appropriate, did not violate Wood's constitutional rights, and was in accordance with his consent. Id. The Appellate Division also rejected Wood's argument that his transfer to prison for service of the new criminal sentence necessitated termination of his Krol status because he was no longer mentally ill. Id. On March 12, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied Wood's petition for certification. See In re Wood, 194 N.J. 444 (2008) (table).

Wood has filed 31 actions in this Court, including habeas corpus petitions and civil rights complaints. Of particular interest, on September 5, 2008, while he was serving his second term of incarceration, Wood filed his first § 2254 petition challenging the orders suspending and reinstating his Krol hearings. See Wood v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 08-4515 (JBS) opinion (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2009). On February 20, 2009, this first petition was dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdiction because, at the time he filed it, Wood was incarcerated at the New Jersey State Prison serving the four-year sentence imposed on March 5, 2007, and he was not "in custody" on the orders challenged in the petition. On April 1, 2010 (17 days before Wood's NGI commitment expired), Wood filed a second § 2254 petition challenging the orders suspending and reinstating his Krol hearings on due process grounds. See Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d 519. On June 6, 2011, this second § 2254 petition was dismissed as moot and, alternatively, on the merits. The court found that the due process claims raised in the petition became moot when New Jersey terminated Wood's NGI Krol status on April 18, 2010, and then civilly committed him under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to civil committments under N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4-27.15(a) because there was no injury-in-fact attributable to Wood's previous commitment on NGI Krol status under the preponderance of the evidence standard that could be remedied by a favorable decision on his habeas petition.⁴ Alternatively, the court found that Wood was not entitled to habeas relief on the merits of his due process claims because the adjudication of these claims by the Appellate Division was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Wood, 789 F.Supp.2d at 532.

In the Complaint presently before this Court, Wood raises three due process claims. In Count One, he claims that he was wrongfully committed in violation of due process after the expiration of his prison terms by the July 21, 2000, and October 18, 2002, orders of the Law Division. (Complaint, Count One, ECF No. 1 at 20.) Wood asserts that, "although he remains confined under civil commitment as the result of the invalid Krol orders of July 21, 2000, and October 18, 2002, that are constitutionally defective, he has no remedy available because the federal court has also determined that the court lacks jurisdiction because he is no longer under Krol status as well." (ECF No. 1 at 16.) In Count Two, Wood claims that "defendants . . . denied plaintiff the ability to access adequate treatment programs or any form of treatment, and deliberately and willfully den[ied] him adequate treatment which resulted in a form of punishment rather than adequate treatment . . . in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (ECF No. 1 at 21.) In Count Three, Wood claims that defendants violated his liberty interest, created by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2(e)(2) and (d)(3), to the "'least restrictive setting' by not providing plaintiff with any treatment programs; or providing a way so that plaintiff could have access to adequate assigned treatment programs, and by having him isolated, secluded, and confined at AKFC." (ECF No. 1 at 21.) For violation of his constitutional rights, Wood seeks declaratory relief, an injunction enjoining "defendants from violating plaintiff's due process rights," and compensatory and punitive damages. (ECF No. 1 at 23.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a person is proceeding in forma pauperis and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from adefendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because this Court is granting Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis.

"[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim⁵, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal...