Wood v. Welch

1

RYAN WOOD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GARRETT WELCH, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-2279-DDC

United States District Court, D. Kansas

June 7, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DANIEL D. CRABTREE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

When a tow truck shows up to repossess property, a disturbance may ensue, and it's not uncommon for someone to involve the police. A tow truck is owned, of course, by a private party. But if police officers intervene in the repossession too substantially, then the repossession can begin to look like state action. And the state, of course, can't seize property without a warrant or without any process. So, if officers affirmatively intervene to aid the repossessor, they risk liability for violating the Constitution. Plaintiffs Ryan and Waymond Wood allege defendant Officer Garrett Welch did just that.

Both ends of the caption have moved for summary judgment. Doc. 64; Doc. 66. For his part, Officer Welch asserts he's entitled to qualified immunity against plaintiffs' claims. As explained below, the court agrees, and grants Officer Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 64). This decision moots plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 66). So it denies that motion.

The court's work to explain its reasoning begins with the relevant background.

I. Background

Plaintiffs purchased a 2009 Ford Flex from Miller Investment^[1] in September 2021. Doc. 63 at 3 (Pretrial Order ¶ 2.a.iv.). Plaintiffs fell behind on the Ford's payments. Id. (Pretrial Order ¶ 2.a.v.). So, Miller Investment hired Heartland Recovery, Inc. to repossess the Ford. Id. (Pretrial Order ¶ 2.a.vii.). And, in March 2022, Heartland Recovery sent a tow truck to plaintiffs' address. Id. (Pretrial Order ¶¶ 2.a.viii., 2.a.ix.). The Ford was parked in plaintiffs' driveway. Id. (Pretrial Order ¶ 2.a.viii.).

The Heartland Recovery tow truck backed up to the Ford in the driveway and parked, with part of the truck in the driveway and part of the truck in the street:

(Image Omitted)

Doc. 66-6 (Pls. Ex. E). As the tow truck driver approached plaintiffs' home, holding papers, plaintiff Waymond Wood walked into the driveway. Id. Waymond^[2] testified “I was actually going out, because I had a job that I had to go do, and I was going to start it, it was cold.” Doc. 66-3 at 7 (W. Wood Dep. 18:15-20). Waymond didn't know he and his husband had fallen behind on payments for the Ford. Id. at 8-9 (W. Wood Dep. 20:25-21:4). Waymond thought the tow truck was “here to steal another vehicle of ours.” Id. at 9 (W. Wood Dep. 21:5-11).

Waymond walked up to the Ford on the driver's side. Doc. 66-6 (Pls. Ex. E). As Waymond approached the car, the tow truck driver said, “No, no, no.”^[3] Id. Waymond responded, “Oh yes.” Id. And he got into the car. Id. The tow truck driver returned to his truck and backed his tow truck toward the Ford:

(Image Omitted)

Id.^[4] Waymond yelled at Ryan to call the police. Doc. 66-6 (Pls. Ex. E). Waymond reversed the Ford and drove it through the yard to get around the tow truck:

(Image Omitted)

Doc. 66-7(Pls.Ex.F).

Waymond drove away, and the tow truck followed. Id. Waymond planned to drive to a job, but he realized the tow truck was behind him and he didn't have his phone. Doc. 66-3 at 10-11 (W. Wood Dep. 25:9-26:6). So, Waymond drove toward his house, and “did small loops until [he] saw the police were there.” Id. When Waymond saw a police officer, he flagged the officer down, and the tow truck driver stopped following him.^[5] Id. at 12 (W. Wood Dep. 27:10- 20). The parties dispute whether Heartland Recovery had given up on repossessing the Ford by this point.

Meanwhile, Ryan called the police. Doc. 66-9 (Pls. Ex. H). Ryan explained a tow truck had parked in the driveway, preventing Waymond from leaving. Id. at 0:05-0:012. Ryan also said the tow truck was attempting to hit the Ford. Id. Ryan further reported Waymond had left the driveway, and the tow truck “chased after” Waymond and “blew through a stop sign.” Id. at 1:50-2:44. Lawrence Police dispatched defendant, Officer Garrett Welch, in response to Ryan's call. Doc. 63 at 3 (Pretrial Order ¶ 2.a.xi.).

When Officer Welch arrived, Ryan told him the tow truck had tried to block Waymond from leaving. Doc. 66-5 at 7 (R. Wood Dep. 58:6-13). Ryan testified he “brought up breach of . . . the peace”^[6] to Officer Welch, but Officer Welch “didn't really seem phased by” this. Id. at 9 (R. Wood Dep 65:10-16). Ryan also showed Officer Welch a video of the events. Id. at 11 (R. Wood Dep. 69:11-24). Officer Welch testified the video “depict[ed] the tow truck driver arriving on scene, walking up toward the front door with a piece of paperwork, and then the tow truck driver suddenly looks to his left and then sprints back to the tow truck, and then the vehicle in question drives through the yard[.]” Doc. 65-2 at 2-3 (Welch Dep. 20:18-21:1).

At some point-the record isn't clear exactly when-Officer Welch ordered the tow truck to return to plaintiffs' address. Doc. 66-5 at 8 (R. Wood Dep. 64:1-7); Doc. 66-10 (Pls. Ex. I). Both Heartland Recovery and Waymond returned to plaintiffs' address, while Officer Welch was present. Doc. 63 at 3 (Pretrial Order ¶ 2.a.xii.). Officer Welch told Ryan that if Heartland Recovery had the repossession paperwork, then plaintiffs had to return the vehicle. Doc. 69-2 at 4-5 (R. Wood Dep. 64:22-65:9). Officer Welch told plaintiffs the Heartland Recovery driver “had repossession paperwork for their Ford Flex that was in the driveway, which [he] confirmed by looking at the VIN.” Doc. 69-1 at 3 (Welch Dep. 21:14-17). Ryan admitted to Officer Welch that plaintiffs were behind on the Ford's payments. Id. at 4 (Welch Dep. 22:8-12); Doc. 69-2 at 2-3 (R. Wood Dep. 58:24-59:3). Plaintiffs removed their personal property from the Ford. Doc. 69-2 at 6 (R. Wood Dep. 71:17-19). Officer Welch told the Heartland Recovery driver to back up to secure the Ford. Id. at 7 (R. Wood Dep. 72:5-8). And, ultimately, Heartland Recovery repossessed the Ford. Doc. 63 at 3 (Pretrial Order ¶ 2.a.xiii.).

The court must recount a few additional details about Officer Welch's role in the repossession; the importance of these additional details will become apparent later. Officer Welch stood by and watched the repossession. Doc. 69-3 at 1 (Welch Aff. ¶ 9). Officer Welch never told plaintiffs he would arrest them or take them to jail for failing to comply with the repossession. Id. (Welch Aff. ¶¶ 7, 8). Though Officer Welch never explicitly told plaintiffs that their conduct risked arrest or jail, Ryan testified,

[H]e did tell me to keep trying to call the finance company . . . and . . . I had told him they were supposed to be giving me a call back, and he said well, hopefully they call back here shortly, because this vehicle is leaving; there's basically no way around not giving up the vehicle. And I wasn't about to object to a law enforcement officer who's supposed to help protect you or whatever and object. I don't know what you're supposed to do when an officer tells you what to do except to provide what they tell you to do.

Doc. 70-2 at 7 (R. Wood Dep. 71:2-16). In plaintiffs' view, Officer Welch had conveyed to them that failure to comply would result in an arrest or jail.

Plaintiffs filed suit and have brought a claim against Officer Welch under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating their constitutional rights. Doc. 63 at 13 (Pretrial Order ¶ 4.a.iii.).

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that “no genuine dispute” exists about “any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). When it applies this standard, the court views the evidence and draws inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2010). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine' ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party' on the issue.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “An issue of fact is ‘material' ‘if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim' or defense.” Id. (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998)). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The moving party bears “‘both the initial burden of production on a motion for summary judgment and the burden of establishing that summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.'” Kannady v. City of Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 979 (10th Cir. 2002)). To meet this burden, the moving party “‘need not negate the non-movant's claim, but need only point to an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's claim.'” Id. (quoting Sigmon v. CommunityCare HMO, Inc., 234 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2000)).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party “‘may not rest on its pleadings, but must bring forward specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial [on] those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.'” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1996)); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. “To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 (citing Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992)). When deciding whether the parties have shouldered their summary judgment burdens, “the judge's function is...