Woodens v. Cameron, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-0212

JOSEPH WOODENS, Petitioner v. KENNETH CAMERON, et al., Respondents

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-0212

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

January 18, 2018

(Judge Mannion)

MEMORANDUM

I. Procedural Background

On February 7, 2014, Joseph Woodens, an inmate presently confined at the Pine Grove State Correctional Institution, Indiana, Pennsylvania (SCI-Pine Grove), filed this pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. 1). The required filing fee has been paid. Petitioner is challenging his 2008 conviction and his LIFE, without parole, sentence imposed by the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas for first degree murder.

On March 6, 2014, Petitioner completed and filed a Miller/Mason Notice of Election indicating that he wished to withdraw his original petition and file an amended petition. (Doc. 7). See United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999); Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000).

By Order dated April 14, 2014, Petitioner's amended petition, memorandum of law and exhibits were served on Respondents. (Doc. 10). A response and traverse were filed. (Docs. 17, 19).

By Order dated April 8, 2016, the Court, upon review of the record, determined that, while the Respondent had filed a partial answer to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, contrary to this Court's order to show cause, no supporting memorandum had been filed. (Doc. 21). Additionally, the Court noted that, while the Respondent contends that the issues raised in the Petitioner's post-conviction proceedings have not been exhausted and should therefore be dismissed, the Respondent has not addressed whether the issues raised by the petitioner on direct appeal have been exhausted or should be considered on their merits. Id. Thus, the Court ordered the Respondent shall file a memorandum of law setting forth all of the relevant facts and the procedural history of the petitioner's case. Id.

On May 27, 2016, in accordance with this Court's April 8, 2016 Order, a response to the petition was filed. (Doc. 24). No traverse has been filed. For the reasons outlined below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.

II. Factual Background

The following background has been extracted from the Pennsylvania Superior Court's January 14, 2011 Memorandum Opinion affirming Petitioner's judgment of sentence. (Doc. 24-2, Commonwealth v. Woodens, No. 216 MDA 2009, Superior Court Opinion at pp. 1-3).

Following a jury trial, Appellant, along with his codefendant, Lahme Perkins (hereinafter "Perkins"), was found guilty of Murder of the First Degree, Criminal Conspiracy and Firearms not to be Carried without a License.¹ These convictions arose out of the shooting death of the nineteen (19) year old victim, Quinton Robinson (hereinafter "the victim") as he sat on a park bench in a playground. In its Memorandum Opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court thoroughly and adequately sets forth the relevant facts of this case. See Trial Court Memorandum Opinion filed 7/1/09, at 1-13. As such, we will not restate them and incorporate them by reference herein.

Appellant was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence on the murder charge along with sentences of ten (10) years to twenty (20) years in prison on the criminal conspiracy charge and two (2) years to four (4) years in prison on the carrying a firearm without a license charge, both of which were to run concurrently to the life sentence.

On December 29, 2008, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion requesting a new trial and alleging the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence which the trial court denied on January 5, 2009. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on February 3, 2009, and the trial court ordered him to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) the next day. Appellant filed the same on February 25, 2009, wherein he averred the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder and that "[t]he verdict is against the weight of the evidence."

. . . . . .

[C]ounsel provides the following Statement of the Questions presented for our Review:

I. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to sustain a conviction for the first count, first degree murder?

II. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to sustain a conviction for the second count, criminalconspiracy?

III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for new trial when the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial in that it did not support Appellant's conviction of first degree murder?

Id. By Memorandum Opinion dated January 14, 2011, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, finding that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant's weight of the evidence claim in light of the physical and testimonial evidence presented. Specifically, its determination that the jury's conviction on the first degree murder charge was consistent with and therefore not contrary to the evidence as to shock the conscience is supported by the record, and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial for this reason was proper." Id. No petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was filed.

On November 3, 2011, Woodens filed a pro se petition for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§9541 et seq. (Doc. 14, at 25).

By Memorandum and Order dated March 6, 2012, the PCRA court granted counsel's February 3, 2012, motion to withdraw under the Post Conviction Relief Act, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 Pa. 1988, conducted an independent review of the record, Petitioner's PCRA petition, relevant statutes and case law, found that Petitioner was not entitled to PCRA relief, and provided him with twenty (20) days notice to respond tothe Court's intention to dismiss the PCRA petition. (Doc. 17-5, at 1-15). Petitioner failed to file a response within twenty (20) days and on March 29, 2012, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Id.

On April 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was dismissed by Order dated April 12, 2012. Id. Petitioner argued that his motion for reconsideration was mailed on March 26, 2012, the last day Petitioner could have responded to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, and that the mail-box rule applied to his filing. Id. The PCRA court found that Petitioner's failure to mail his motion for reconsideration to the proper filing office, prevented him the protection afforded under the mail-box rule. Id.

On November 12, 2012, Petitioner filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court raising the following issues for review: (1) whether the PCRA court erred in failing to accept as timely filed Appellant's pro se response to the court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss the PCRA petition; (2) whether the PCRA court erred in failing to consider the substance of the pro se response; and (3) whether the PCRA court's recusal is warranted upon remand. (Doc. 17-6, at 1-64).

By Memorandum Opinion dated May 3, 2013, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's dismissal of Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, finding that Petitioner had "failed to point to any legal authority that would allow him to benefit from the prisoner mailbox rule under these circumstances." (Doc. 17-7). On June 27, 2013, Petitioner filed apetition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on February 11, 2014.

On February 28, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he raises the following challenges to his conviction and sentence:

1. Petitioner's first degree murder conviction represents a violation of due process rights because the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of first-degree murder.

2. Petitioner's criminal conspiracy conviction represents a violation of his due process because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of conspiracy.

3. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to protect Petitioner's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, specifically, he alleges that he was not given his rights after he was charged with criminal homicide to which he made incriminating statement to Detective Rivera.

4. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to impeach Detective Rivera at trial with his preliminary hearing testimony.

5. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to pursue and/or request suppression of evidence found in Ms. Wise's home after the initial search.

6. Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to impeach Teven Rainey's trial testimony.

7. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising an issue of insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for carrying a firearm without a license.

8. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not objecting to jury verdict slips.

9. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not raising an issue on direct appeal regarding the verdict slips.

(Doc. 5).

III. Discussion

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), went into effect and amended the standards for reviewing state court judgments in federal habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. §2254. A §2254 habeas corpus petition is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). However, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Rather, federal habeas review is restricted to claims based "on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28...