Woodruff v. Alvey

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SANFORD WOODRUFF, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW ALVEY. Defendant.

CIVIL No. 1:22-cv-00826-JMC

United States District Court, D. Maryland

October 27, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

J. MARK COULSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Sanford W. Woodruff, filed the present negligence action on January 6, 2022, against the Defendant, Matthew Alvey, in his individual capacity. (ECF No. 4). Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court on April 4, 2022. (ECF Nos. 1 5). Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Substitute the United States of America as Defendant (“Motion to Substitute”) (ECF No. 23) and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (“Motion to Dismiss”) (ECF No. 24). The Court has considered both Motions, Plaintiff's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.26),^[1] and Defendant's Reply thereto (ECF No 27). No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D Md. 2023). For the reasons that follow, both Motions will be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff halted at a stop sign while exiting the Glenmont Metro Station^[2] at approximately 1:30 p.m. on January 12, 2019. (ECF No. 4 at p. 1).^[3] Defendant struck Plaintiff's vehicle from behind shortly thereafter, “Causing the Plaintiff to sustain severe and permanent personal injuries.” Id. at p. 2. According to Plaintiff, Defendant negligently operated his motor vehicle by failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to maintain his speed to avoid the collision, failing to maintain a safe following distance, operating his vehicle at a speed greater than reasonable under the circumstances, and otherwise failing to operate his motor vehicle in a reasonable manner. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff submits that he suffered injuries to his head, neck, and back resulting from the incident and filed the present action sounding in negligence. Id.

This is not the first motion to dismiss in this case. Defendant previously sought dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint on May 12, 2022, on the ground that Defendant was employed by the United States and acting in his official capacity within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred and therefore is immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FCTA”). See generally (ECF No. 9). United States District Judge Hazel denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Defendant failed to abide by the applicable statutory and procedural steps necessary to obtain personal immunity under the FTCA. See (ECF No. 13). Specifically, Judge Hazel noted that although Defendant argued he was immune from liability by virtue of acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred, that Defendant had not submitted proper evidence to support that contention. Id. Defendant then filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on February 2, 2023, before the case was temporarily stayed on March 22, 2023, for seven months because Defendant was overseas and in active duty for the U.S. Army. (ECF Nos. 15, 21). Now that the stay has been lifted, Defendant's homecoming is accompanied by the present Motions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant styles its Motion to Dismiss as one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “A federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has subject matter jurisdiction.” Scapes v. McKimm, No. CIV WDQ-09-2231, 2009 WL 4726613, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2009). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Where a moving party contends that a plaintiff's complaint “simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be found,” the moving party should prevail “only if the jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 174 F.Supp.2d 388, 391 (D. Md. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).

However, the United States Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Wong that “the FTCA's time bars are nonjurisdictional” because Congress has provided no clear intent to make the FTCA statute of limitations jurisdictional as opposed to “a mere claims-processing rule.” 575 U.S. 402, 420 (2015); see also United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 424 (4th Cir. 2018) (“In [Wong], the Court decided that the statute of limitations set forth in the [FTCA] was not jurisdictional.”). Defendant's reliance on Rule 12(b)(1) is therefore misplaced. Nevertheless, “A district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim [under Rule 12(b)(6)], and where the facts of a complaint plainly fail to state a claim for relief, the district court has ‘no discretion but to dismiss it.'” Maryland v. Territory of Md., No. CV PX 16-3426, 2017 WL 1807157, at *2 (D. Md. May 5, 2017) (quoting Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 n.10 (4th Cir. 2006)); see also Mobley v. Rudez, 106 F.3d 391, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997) (“A court may, on its own initiative, dismiss a civil complaint for failing to state a claim.”). This is particularly the case where a plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies or enumerated pre-conditions to a particular type of claim. Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2017). Case law from this Court further indicates that this Court regularly reviews motions to dismiss FTCA claims on the grounds that they are time-barred under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard. See, e.g., Brown v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. CV PJM 16-3541, 2017 WL 3149796 (D. Md. July 25, 2017), aff'd as modified, 710 Fed.Appx. 130 (4th Cir. 2018); Thompson v. United States, No. CV RDB-15-2181, 2016 WL 2649931 (D. Md. May 10, 2016), aff'd, 670 Fed.Appx. 781 (4th Cir. 2016); Parker v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. CV RDB-16-562, 2016 WL 7338412 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2016). Accordingly, the Court may dismiss an FTCA claim as time-barred if “the allegations in a complaint do not ‘contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Brown, 2017 WL 3149796 at *2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion to Substitute Will be Granted

Defendant first seeks to substitute himself with the United States of America pursuant to the FTCA. (ECF No. 23). “In a case brought pursuant to the [FTCA], the proper defendant is the United States, and not the individual employee.” Messino v. McBride, 174 F.Supp.2d 397, 398 (D. Md. 2001). This is because, under the FTCA, “Federal employees acting within the scope of their office or employment are immunized from liability for their negligent or wrongful acts or omissions.” Id. n.1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). Thus, “When a federal employee is sued, the United States Attorney, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, must certify whether that employee was in fact acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the alleged tortious act” in order for substitution to be proper. Maron v. United States, 126 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 1997). Mr. Alvey was a federal employee-employed by a branch of the U.S. Army-at the time of the motor vehicle accident. Moreover, United States Attorney Erek L. Barron certified on May 31, 2023, that Mr. Alvey was “acting within the scope of his employment as an employee of the United States at all times relevant to the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint.” (ECF No. 23-1).^[4] Therefore, and noting Plaintiff's lack of opposition on this issue, Defendant's Motion to Substitute is GRANTED and the United States of America shall be substituted as the Defendant in the case sub judice in place of Mr. Alvey.

B. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Will be Granted

An essential “prerequisite to filing suit under the FTCA involves the presentation of an administrative claim to the government within two years of the incident.'” Boone v. Conaway, No. CIV.CCB-10-790, 2010 WL 2163837, at *1 (D. Md. May 27, 2010) (quoting Kokotis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 223 F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 2000)). This prerequisite stems from 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), which provides that “A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” (emphasis added). Defendant argues that dismissal is therefore proper because “Plaintiff did not submit an administrative claim to the United States Army.” (ECF No. 24 at p. 3). Plaintiff rebuts that his cause of action accrued on September 28, 2023, when Plaintiff received the Attorney General certification, and accordingly requests the opportunity to now file “the requisite SF-95 Form with the U.S. Army Claims Department.” (ECF No. 26 at p. 2). That is, Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the time he learned that Mr. Alvey was a government employee, acting in the scope of his employment.

This Court has held that “A tort claim pursuant to the FTCA accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonable should know of the existence and the cause of his injury.” Hill v U.S. Navy, No. CIV.A. ELH-15-2270, 2015 WL 4770892, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2015); see also Mills v. Hogan, No. 20-CV-3767-LKG, 2022 WL 1110484, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2022), aff'd, No. 226421, 2022 WL 17985697 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 2022) (noting that, under federal law, “A claim accrues when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.”) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff cites two cases from the ...