Woodruff v. Cnty. of San Diego In-Home Support Servs. Pub. Auth.

DEBIE WOODRUFF et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO IN-HOME SUPPORTSERVICES PUBLIC AUTHORITY, Defendant and Appellant.

D072937

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

September 18, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2008-00096957-CU-OE-CTL)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald L. Styn, Judge. Affirmed.

Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, William H. Songer and Darin L. Wessel, Deputies County Counsel, for Defendant and Appellant.

Law Offices of David J. Gallo and David J. Gallo for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

I.INTRODUCTION

The Legislature enacted the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 12300 et seq.)¹ to provide supportive services to qualified aged, blind or disabled persons (IHSS recipients) to allow them to remain in their homes and avoid institutionalization. (Guerrero v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 912, 920 (Guerrero).) The California Department of Social Services (DSS) " 'promulgates regulations that implement the program, and county welfare departments administer the program' " under the supervision of DSS. (Id. at p. 921.) A county may administer its IHSS program in various ways, including by establishing a public authority. (Id. at p. 923.)

In San Diego County, the IHSS program is administered through defendant County of San Diego In-Home Supportive Services Public Authority (Public Authority). Plaintiffs Debie Woodruff, Ollie Katrina Baptiste, Miriam St. Germaine, and Cynthia Byrd provided in-home supportive services to IHSS recipients through Public Authority.

In 2008, plaintiffs filed this action against Public Authority alleging various wage and hour violations on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated IHSS providers.² In 2014, after the trial court issued numerous rulings in the matter and held a jury trial, this court issued an opinion in a prior appeal resolving several issues pertaining to the action. (Woodruff v. County of San Diego In-Home Supportive Services Public Authority (Jun. 24, 2014, D062180) [nonpub. opn.] (Woodruff I)).³

As relevant to the present appeal, the Woodruff I court concluded that Public Authority was plaintiffs' employer for purposes of plaintiffs' claims for wages, overtime, and expense reimbursements. (Woodruff I, supra, D062180, slip opn. at pp. 18-37.) The Woodruff I court also concluded that plaintiffs might be entitled to compensation for time that they spent submitting certain enrollment forms mandated by the Legislature's 2009 enactment of section 12301.24 even though plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation for time spent acting "in compliance with a government directive." (Woodruff I, supra, D062180, slip opn. at p. 43.) The Woodruff I court reasoned that although the Legislature mandated that "prospective providers" attend an in-person enrollment orientation, the Legislature did not require "current providers," such as plaintiffs,⁴ to complete the enrollment process in person. (Id. at pp. 42-43 [comparing § 12301.24, subd. (a) with subd. (c)].) Thus, the Woodruff I court concluded that plaintiffs might be entitled to compensation if they could establish that their employer, Public Authority, directed current providers to travel to an enrollment center to attend an orientation or to submit their enrollment forms in person, given the lack of any in-person requirement for current providers in 12301.24, subdivision (c). (Woodruff I, supra, D062180, slip opn. at p. 43.)

On remand from Woodruff I, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint bringing claims including: failure to pay minimum wage for current providers who were required to attend a provider orientation and complete the section 12301.24 enrollment process in person, nonpayment of overtime, and failure to reimburse for business expenses. The trial court partially granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification and certified a class solely with respect to plaintiffs' minimum wage section 12301.24 claim.

The trial court held a jury trial and the jury rendered a special verdict in favor of both the plaintiff class and the individual plaintiffs. With respect to the class claim, the jury found that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for hours worked while traveling to an enrollment center to submit their section 12301.24 enrollment forms in person.⁵ With respect to the individual claims, the jury found that each of the four plaintiffs was entitled to recover overtime compensation and reimbursement for employment expenses. The court entered a judgment for the class and the individual plaintiffs consistent with the jury's verdict and awarded plaintiffs costs and attorney fees.

On appeal, Public Authority contends that the class claim fails as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to that claim. As to the individual claims, Public Authority contends that the plaintiffs' claims for overtime compensation and expense reimbursements should be reversed because the trial court erred in determining that Public Authority is the plaintiffs' employer as a matter of law. Public Authority also claims that the judgment for the individual plaintiffs' on their claims for overtime compensation should be reversed because the trial court committed two errors related to the "personal attendant" exemption to overtime pay, one relating to the court's jury instructions with respect to this issue and the other pertaining to the court's exclusion of evidence that Public Authority sought to offer to prove the exemption. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11150, subd. (1)(B).) Finally, Public Authority maintains that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to plaintiffs' claims for expense reimbursements.

We affirm the judgment in its entirety.⁶

II.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The trial on remand from Woodruff I

As discussed in greater detail in part III.A.2.b, post, plaintiffs presented evidence that Public Authority directed the plaintiff class to submit their section 12301.24 enrollment forms in person at various enrollment centers that Public Authority operated to implement various statutes enacted in 2009.

Plaintiffs presented evidence both that they had worked uncompensated overtime and that they were not exempt from overtime pay requirements pursuant to the personal attendant exemption. Plaintiffs also presented evidence that they had incurred expenses (primarily mileage expenses) for which they had not been reimbursed by Public Authority.

B. The jury's special verdict

The jury rendered a special verdict in favor of the plaintiff class and the individual plaintiffs. The jury found that the plaintiff class was entitled to a total of $111,000 for hours worked while traveling to enrollment centers to submit their section 12301.24 enrollment forms in person, and an additional $74,925 in prejudgment interest. With respect to the individual claims, the jury found that each of the four plaintiffs was entitled to overtime compensation and reimbursement for employment expenses in varying amounts, together with corresponding prejudgment interest on the overtime claims. With respect to each plaintiff, the jury found that Public Authority had not proven that the personal attendant exemption applied to plaintiffs.

C. The judgment

The trial court entered a judgment consistent with the jury's verdict against Public Authority and in favor of the plaintiff class in the amount of $185,925, and in favor of the individual plaintiffs in the following amounts: Woodruff, $20,638.94; Baptiste, $95,230; St. Germain, $17,789.60; and Byrd, $15,513.73.

D. The appeal

Public Authority appeals from the judgment.⁷

III.DISCUSSION

A. The class claim does not fail as a matter of law and Public Authority has not established that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to that claim

Public Authority claims that the class claim for minimum wages for time that plaintiffs spent submitting section 12301.24 forms in person to Public Authority fail as a matter of law. In the alternative, Public Authority contends that the class claim must be reversed due to instructional error. We first discuss the relevant law and provide additional factual and procedural background relevant to both claims before considering each claim individually.

1. Governing law

a. Relevant provisions of Wage Order No. 15-2001

Wage Order 15-2001 (Wage Order No. 15) "applies to persons employed in 'household occupations,' including IHSS providers," such as plaintiffs. (Woodruff I, supra, D062180, slip opn. at p. 16.) The order specifies that "[e]very employer shall pay to each employee, on the established payday for the period involved, not less than the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked in the payroll period, whether the remuneration is measured by time, piece, commission, or otherwise." (Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 8, 11150, subd. (4).) The order defines " '[h]ours worked' " as "the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so." (Id., subd. (2)(H).)

b. Relevant statutory law

i. Section 12301.24

The Legislature enacted section 12301.24 in 2009. (Stats. 2009-2010, 4th Ex. Sess., ch. 17, § 3.) The statute established a set of requirements for "prospective [IHSS] providers" (id. at subd. (a), italics added) as well as then existing or "current [IHSS] providers." (Id. at subd. (c), italics added.) With respect to prospective providers, section 12301.24, subdivision (a) required that, "[e]ffective ...