Woodruff v. State

356 Ga.App. 659

848 S.E.2d 670

WOODRUFF

v.The STATE.

A20A1083

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

September 11, 2020

David T. Lock, Savannah, for Appellant.

Margaret Heap, Sarah Johnson Doan, for Appellee.

Reese, Presiding Judge.

A jury found Donovan Woodruff guilty of family violence aggravated assault.¹ On appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, Woodruff argues that the prosecutor made inappropriate comments during closing argument, that the trial court erred in allowing e-mails to go out with the jury during deliberations, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,² the evidence shows the following. On June 16, 2015, Woodruff and the victim, T. G., had been dating for approximately two years. T. G. was 15 weeks pregnant. That evening, T. G.’s neighbor heard a woman screaming, "[g]et off of me." The neighbor called the police and went outside to talk to T. G. The neighbor saw T. G. run out of the apartment "like she was running for her life."

Police officers arrived at the apartment. While talking with Woodruff, an officer located T. G. walking down the street. The officers observed that T. G. had red marks and imprints around her neck that were consistent with choking. Pictures of these injuries were published to the jury. An officer described T. G. as "very, very distraught" with "recent tear marks running down her face."

T. G. told the police that Woodruff had been drinking earlier in the evening. Woodruff fell asleep, and T. G. hid his car keys so that he would not be able to get more alcohol or drive while intoxicated. When Woodruff woke up, he was very irate and demanded the car keys. During the argument, Woodruff pressed his arm against T. G.’s throat while she was on the ground. T. G. was still able to breathe and described this to the officers as "play-fighting[.]" But then Woodruff grabbed her neck with both hands and pressed into her esophagus, preventing her from breathing. T. G. panicked and grabbed a nearby knife in an attempt to get away from Woodruff. T. G. did not cut or stab Woodruff with the knife, and the officers did not observe any injuries on Woodruff. Woodruff took the knife from T. G., and she asked him to let her leave the apartment. Woodruff refused, but T. G. was able to get around Woodruff and flee out the door toward Woodruff's grandmother's house.

At trial, T. G. recounted a different series of events and did not remember the account she had given to the officers the day of the incident. T. G. testified that, while Woodruff was sleeping, she went through his phone and saw a few numbers she did not recognize. She then went over to Woodruff and punched him in the face. T. G. started attacking him, and a knife fell out of his pocket. T. G. testified that she picked up the knife and cut Woodruff on the arm, causing him to bleed.

The State also introduced evidence of an incident that occurred almost two years later in Fife, Washington. Fife city police officers testified that they responded to a 911 call placed by T. G. from a motel. T. G. was in the motel office with her 16-month old son. T. G.’s first words to the officers were "[h]e choked me." T. G. told the officers that she and Woodruff had been arguing. During the argument, T. G. told Woodruff that her child was not his. Woodruff then rolled on top of her on the bed and began choking her with both hands. The officers observed abrasions and nail marks on T. G.’s neck. Pictures of these injuries were published to the jury.

T. G. testified that she did not remember calling 911 and that she did not remember what she had told the officers. She testified that she punched and slapped Woodruff in the face and neck, and that Woodruff did not attack her. The day of the incident, Woodruff also told officers that T. G. had struck him. However, the officers did not observe any injuries on Woodruff or on T. G.’s hands.

The jury found Woodruff guilty of family violence aggravated assault. The court sentenced him to twenty years, with the first seven years to be served in confinement. Woodruff filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal followed.

"We review a decision regarding an improper closing argument for abuse of discretion."³ We also review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.⁴ "In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, we give deference to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo."⁵ With these guiding principles in mind, we now turn to Woodruff's specific claims of error.

1. Woodruff argues that the State violated his due process rights by commenting on the "cycle of violence" during closing argument. Woodruff contends that testimony regarding the cycle of violence and its effect on his child, who had not been born at the time of the charged crime, was not in evidence.

During closing argument, the prosecutor argued:

I am not asking y'all to try and understand the psychological dynamics of this relationship between this Defendant and [T. G.].

I don't expect you to know why she came in here and recanted, why she chooses to go back to him time and time again, why she doesn't leave. But what I'm asking you to do today is accept it, because you may not like [T. G.]. You may not like her, because it's easy to say, you know what, if she doesn't care, why should I? Why should I care?

But you should care because this case, domestic violence, doesn't just affect [T. G.]. It affects ... their son, who is now two years old, who saw his dad strangle his mom in Washington [approximately two years after the charged offense].

...

Domestic violence is a learned behavior, essentially telling their son ... "Hey, you can do all sorts of things to your girlfriend and your wife. You can do it over and over again and she'll forgive you."

And this domestic violence cycle, this domestic violence mentality is going to get passed down for [their son] and the cycle will continue.

So you may not like [T. G.], but you have to look at this big picture of domestic violence, because although it happens within the confines of the home or a hotel room, the effects of domestic violence are felt throughout this community.

"As a general rule, prosecutors are granted wide latitude in conducting closing argument. This wide latitude encompasses the prosecutor's ability to argue reasonable inferences raised by the evidence."⁶ We have held that similar statements by prosecutors were reasonable extrapolations of the evidence presented at trial.⁷

Given the testimony and evidence presented a trial, which included an e-mail from T. G. to Woodruff detailing the effect of violence on their child, the prosecutor's statements here were a reasonable extrapolation of the evidence.⁸

2. Woodruff argues that the trial court erred in allowing e-mails sent by Woodruff to T. G. while he was in jail to go out with the jury during deliberations. He contends that the e-mails were not authenticated and that the e-mails violated the continuing witness rule.

At trial, the State had T. G. read letters and e-mails sent between T. G. and Woodruff while Woodruff was incarcerated. Although T. G. denied sending or receiving the e-mails, she testified that she had been communicating with Woodruff while he was incarcerated. The State submitted a certificate of authenticity from the jail regarding the e-mails, and the trial court admitted the e-mails as evidence.

Under OCGA § 24-9-901 (a), authentication of evidence may be achieved through any of a variety of means affording evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Documents from electronic sources are subject to the same rules of authentication as other more traditional documentary evidence and may be authenticated through circumstantial evidence, which may include the appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the documents, taken in conjunction with circumstances. Once the party seeking to authenticate evidence presents a prima facie case that the evidence is what it purports to be, the evidence is properly admitted, leaving the ultimate question of authenticity to be decided by the jury.⁹

With respect to the continuing witness rule:

In Georgia, the continuing witness objection is based on the notion that written testimony is heard by the jury when read from the witness stand just as oral testimony is heard when given from the witness stand. But, it is unfair and places undue emphasis on written testimony for the writing to go out with the jury to be read again during deliberations, while oral testimony is received but once. The types of documents that have been held subject to the rule include affidavits, depositions, written confessions, statements, and dying declarations.¹⁰

In this case, the State authenticated the e-mails such that there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that T. G. had sent and received the e-mails in question. The State provided a certificate of authenticity from the jail, T. G. acknowledged that she had been communicating with Woodruff, and the e-mails contained information related to the details of the case.¹¹ "Under all of these circumstances, it is very unlikely that anyone other than [Woodruff and T. G.] had written the [e-mails]."¹² Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the e-mail records.

Nor did the trial court violate the continuing witness rule by allowing the e-mails to go out with the jury. The e-mails did not constitute "statement[s] in lieu of testimony," which include affidavits, depositions, or answers to interrogatories.¹³ "Instead, [the e-mails] were original documentary evidence, and were properly allowed to go out with the jury."¹⁴

3. Woodruff...