Woods v. State

19 N.E.3d 415 (Table)

Donald WOODS, Appellant–Petitioner

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent.

No. 49A02–1310–PC–858.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Aug. 11, 2014.

David T. Page, Pittman & Page, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION—NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

Donald Woods appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, he maintains that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's alleged in-court failure to develop defenses, call certain experts, and conduct thorough cross-examination as well as his alleged out-of-court failure to investigate crime scenes. Finding that he failed to establish that he was prejudiced by any of his alleged errors, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts as summarized in an unpublished memorandum decision on Woods's direct appeal and adopted in the postconviction court's findings of fact are as follows:

At approximately 3:00 a.m. on March 18, 2007, Jose Raines was home alone and asleep on his couch when a loud noise awakened him. He looked up to find Donald Woods standing over him. After the two men exchanged words, Woods pulled a gun out of his pocket, pointed it at Raines, and threatened to kill him. Woods asked Raines about money and property, including a Playstation and some DVDs. During this exchange, Raines grabbed for the gun. As the two men struggled, the gun discharged. The bullet went past Raines' head and embedded in the wall behind him. Raines “felt the gunpowder and everything else.” As the struggle continued, the magazine fell out of the gun. Raines managed to push Woods out the back door of his apartment. Once outside, Woods continued to cock the gun back and forth as if it were jammed.

Police officers arrived in response to a 911 call. When they were in front of Raines' residence, they heard the distinct sound of a gun being cocked at the rear of the house. They saw Woods around the corner of the house. The officers told Woods to stop and drop his gun. Woods ran toward his residence, and the officers followed. Woods entered his house, placed a second magazine in the gun, opened the front glass storm door, and shot at one of the officers. The officer heard the bullet go by his head and returned fire. The officer's shot hit Woods. The officers arrested Woods after he exited the house and doubled up on the front porch, injured from the officer's shot.

The State charged Woods with two counts of attempted murder, a Class A felony; one count of attempted robbery, a Class B felony; one count of burglary, a Class B felony; one count of resisting law enforcement, a Class D felony; and one count of carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor. The jury found Woods guilty of all the charges.

Woods v. State, No. 49A04–0904–CR–192 (Ind.Ct.App. Apr. 16, 2010) (footnotes and internal citations omitted).

Woods appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for the attempted murder of Raines. Another panel of this Court affirmed. Woods subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his trial counsel (“Counsel”) provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to develop his self-defense claim; (2) failing to impeach certain State witnesses; and (3) failing to investigate crime scenes and challenge certain physical evidence.¹ The evidence presented at the hearing consisted of exhibits (trial transcripts and depositions) as well as testimony from Counsel and lengthy testimony from Woods's expert, Professor Frances Watson, director of the wrongful conviction clinic at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. The postconviction court denied his petition, and he now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Woods contends that the postconviction court erred in denying his petition for postconviction relief. The petitioner in a postconviction proceeding “bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ind. Postconviction Rule 1(5) ; Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ind.2013). When issuing its decision to grant or deny relief, the postconviction court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ind. Postconviction Rule 1(6). A petitioner who appeals the denial of his postconviction petition faces a rigorous standard of review. Massey v. State, 955 N.E.2d 247, 253 (Ind.2011). In conducting our review, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. “A post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Passwater, 989 N.E.2d at 770 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, if a postconviction petitioner was denied relief in the proceedings below, he must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite the one reached by the postconviction court. Massey, 955 N.E.2d at 253.

Section 1.0–Ineffective Assistance of Counsel–Standard of Review

Woods maintains that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, he must satisfy two components; he must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice resulting from it. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Deficient performance is “representation [that] fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, [where] counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Passwater, 989 N.E.2d at 770. We assess counsel's performance based on facts that are known at the time and not through hindsight. Shanabarger v. State, 846 N.E.2d 702, 709 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. Evidence of isolated poor strategy, inexperience, or bad tactics will not support an ineffective assistance claim; instead, we evaluate counsel's performance as a whole. Flanders v. State, 955 N.E.2d 732, 739 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied (2012). “[C]ounsel's performance is presumed effective, and a defendant must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.” Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ind.2007). “Strickland does not guarantee perfect representation, only a reasonably competent attorney.” Hinesley v. State, 999 N.E.2d 975, 983 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) (citation omitted), trans. denied (2014).

Prejudice occurs when a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Passwater, 989 N.E.2d at 770. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Mitchell v. State, 946 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied. “Although the performance prong and the prejudice prong are separate inquiries, failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail.” Baer v. State, 942 N.E.2d 80, 91 (Ind.2011).

The postconviction court issued extensive findings of fact, which read in pertinent part,²

6. Although Woods was initially represented by the Marion County Public Defender's Office, Woods ultimately hired private counsel, [Counsel], who represented him for the last four months of the pre-trial period, as well as throughout the jury trial and sentencing. The Petitioner confines his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the representation provided by Counsel before and during the trial. The court notes that much of the discovery conducted on behalf of petitioner, including all the pre-trial depositions, was done by the public defender's office. All such discovery was provided to Counsel. Counsel's pre-trial representation included taking a second sworn statement of Officer Anderson and of Officer Vanek; filing defense witness lists on January 8, 2009, and February 23, 2009; arguing in opposition to the State's 404(b) evidence (that Woods stole the gun, which he possessed during the alleged crimes, from Eric Dodson) during a hearing on the same.

Throughout the jury trial, Counsel participated in voir dire including voicing appropriate challenges for cause; present[ed] an opening statement; cross-examined each of the State's eleven witnesses in its case-in-chief and both of the State's rebuttal witnesses; presented testimony from two witnesses for the defense who each claimed that they were eyewitnesses to portions of the altercation with Raines and the police, each maintaining that the [sic] Woods' behavior was contrary to that testified to by State's witnesses[;] presented evidence from Woods himself; voiced pertinent objections during trial; tendered a proposed jury instruction for D-felony criminal recklessness and made argument in support thereof regarding the attempted murder count involving Jose Raines; tendered a proposed jury instruction regarding impeachment and made argument in support thereof; successfully presented argument in support of the court giving a self-defense instruction as to the attempted murder count involving Jose Raines; asked the court to reconsider its refusal to instruct the jury as to criminal recklessness and made additional argument; presented a closing argument for the defense; [and] polled the jury as to their verdict.

Following the trial Counsel did significant work in preparation for sentencing. His effectiveness in the sentencing hearing, and his preparation therefore, are not in question.

7. Counsel has been an attorney for sixteen years. He has practiced throughout Indiana and has represented clients in a variety of cases including a substantial amount of criminal defense work. He estimates having handled one hundred fifty to two

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