Woods v. Warden, Warren Corr. Inst.

FRANKLIN WOODS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Warren Correctional Institution Respondent.

Case No. 1:20-cv-618

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

February 23, 2021

District Judge Timothy S. Black

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case, brought pro se by Petitioner Franklin Woods under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is before the Court for decision on the merits. Relevant pleadings are the Petition (ECF No. 1), the State Court Record (ECF No. 7), the Warden's Return of Writ (ECF No. 8), and Petitioner's Reply (ECF No. 9).

The Magistrate Judge reference in the case was recently transferred to the undersigned to help balance the Magistrate Judge workload in the District. Final decision of the case remains with District Judge Timothy Black.

Litigation History

This case arises out of two cases in the Common Pleas Court of Lawrence County, Ohio. On December 16, 2015, Woods waived indictment and pleaded not guilty to an information charging him with one third-degree felony count of gross sexual imposition in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05(A)(4)(Lawrence County Case No. 15-CR-301)(Waiver of Indictment, State Court Record, ECF No. 7, Ex. 1).

On February 24, 2016, a Lawrence County, Ohio, grand jury indicted Woods on four fourth-degree felony gross sexual imposition counts in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05(A)(1); four third-degree felony gross sexual imposition counts in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05(A)(4); four first-degree felony rape counts in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02(A)(2); two first-degree felony rape counts in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02(A)(1)(b); three second-degree felony sexual battery counts in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.03(A)(5); and one third-degree felony sexual battery count in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.03(A)(5)(Lawrence County Case No. 16-CR-33)(Indictment, State Court Record, ECF No. 7, Ex. 14).

After the trial judge denied Woods' motion to suppress, the cases were tried jointly to a jury in November, 2016, which found Woods guilty of one first-degree felony rape charge and four third-degree felony gross sexual imposition charges, but not guilty of the other indicted charges. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 32.5 years to life imprisonment.

Woods appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Fourth District which affirmed the convictions. State v. Woods, 2018-Ohio-4588 (Ohio App. 4^th Dist. Nov. 7, 2018), appellate jurisdiction declined, 2019-Ohio-3731 (2019). He then timely filed his petition in this Court, raising the following grounds for relief:

GROUND ONE: Two step interrogation prohibited by the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert.

GROUND TWO: The trial court erred when it denied "Petitioner Woods" motion to suppress when Deputy Chaffins failed to "scrupulously honor" Woods' assertion of his right to remain silent.

GROUND THREE: Trial court findings regarding statements obtained by Amber Stamper are factually inaccurate and not supported by the record.

GROUND FOUR: Randy Thompson and Amber Stamper should be considered agents of law enforcement.

GROUND FIVE: Woods' convictions were based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence.

(Petition, ECF No. 1).

Analysis

Ground One: Improper Interrogation Techniques

Ground Two: Error in Denial of Motion to Suppress

Ground Three: Inaccurate Factual Findings Regarding Statements Taken By Amber Stamper

Ground Four: Randy Thompson and Amber Stamper Should Be Considered Law Enforcement Agents

In his First Ground for Relief, Woods claims he was subjected to the method of interrogation which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). In his Second Ground he asserts his motion to suppress should have been granted because his right to remain silent was not properly honored by Deputy Sheriff Chaffins. His Third Ground challenges the accuracy findings regarding his statements taken by Amber Stamper. And in his Fourth Ground he claims Amber Stamper and Randy Thompson should be treated as law enforcement agents for purposes of enforcing his Fifth Amendment rights.

Respondent defends these claims on the merits, asserting that the Fourth District's decision of them is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent (Return, ECF No. 8, PageID 1433, et seq.). In his Response, Woods asserts that his children had already been removed from his home when he was first interviewed (ECF No. 9, PageID 1463-64). He asserts he was under the influence of alcohol, marijuana, and mood stabilizers during the interviews. Id. at PageID 1464-66. He also asserts Chaffins and Thompson together used questioning which failed to respect his right to remain silent. Id.

The relevant portions of the Fourth District's decision are as follows:

[*P34] In his first and second assignments of error Woods asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to social worker supervisor Thompson and Deputy Sheriff Chaffins. Appellate review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress raises a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Hobbs, 133 Ohio St.3d 43, 2012-Ohio-3886, 975 N.E.2d 965, ¶ 6. Because the trial court acts as the trier of fact in suppression hearings and is in the best position to resolve factual issues and evaluate the credibility of witnesses, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. Accepting these facts as true, we must then "independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard." Hobbs at ¶ 8, citing Burnside at ¶ 8.

2. Two-Step Interrogation Technique

[*P35] First Woods asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his statements to Thompson and Deputy Sheriff Chaffins were inadmissible as part of the two-step interrogation technique prohibited by the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). The plurality in Seibert held that a "midstream recitation of [Miranda] warnings after interrogation and unwarned confession" does not "comply with Miranda's constitutional requirement." Id. at 604. In that case a police officer intentionally questioned a defendant at a police station following her arrest without providing Miranda warnings. During this questioning thedefendant made incriminating statements. The officer then gave the defendant a 20-minute break. After the break the same officer gave the defendant Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and resumed questioning. During this second round of questioning the officer confronted the defendant with the prewarning statements. The defendant repeated her incriminating statements.

[*P36] The court referred to the police officer's "midstream" warning as a specifically designed police strategy of "question-first." Id. at 609-611. The court determined that "[t]he object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has already confessed." Id. at 611. After an objective determination from the perspective of the suspect about whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective enough to accomplish their purpose, the plurality held that the defendant's postwarning statements were inadmissible. Id. at 615-616. The Supreme Court of Ohio applied Seibert in State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985.

[*P37] But before we apply Seibert, we must first decide whether Woods made his prewarning statement to Thompson in the context of a custodial interrogation by a law enforcement officer or agent. If Woods was not subjected to custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings were not necessary, making Seibert and Farris inapplicable. See State v. Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d 857, ¶ 105-106.

[*P38] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court established procedural safeguards for securing the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Id. To protect this right the court held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

[*P39] The key issue in this case is whether Woods was in custody when Thompson questioned him. Custodial interrogation is that "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; City of Cleveland v. Oles, 152 Ohio St.3d 1, 2017-Ohio-5834, 92 N.E.3d 810, ¶ 9. "'Custody' is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion."

Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). In determining whether a person is in custody, courts must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to ascertain whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Id. "The ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). "The relevant inquiry in determining whether a person is subject to custodial interrogation focuses upon how a reasonable person in

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