Woodson v. Smith

L. DENISE WOODSON, Plaintiff, v. RONALD E. SMITH, JR., et al., Defendants.

No. 20-cv-02668-TNM

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 13, 2021

MEMORANDUM ORDER

TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

Denise Woodson, proceeding pro se, sues a nonprofit organization and several of its employees for discrimination and retaliatory conduct. The organization moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim.^[1] It argues Woodson did not administratively exhaust her Complaint, did not file her Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations, and did not properly plead a claim of discriminatory discharge or retaliatory conduct. The Court disagrees with the organization on all counts except Woodson's claim of retaliatory conduct. The Court will therefore grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

I.

Woodson formerly worked at Edgewood Brookland Family Support Collaborative (“Edgewood”). Hired in 2014 as a Youth Coordinator, she was promoted three years later to Community School Coordinator. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5 ECF No. 1.

Woodson alleges she has long suffered from endometriosis, a painful condition “affecting several major life activities.” Id. ¶ 6. She underwent three surgical procedures between 2007 and 2018 and “suffer[ed] from the effects of endometriosis” during her tenure at Edgewood. Id. ¶ 7. But she claims that she “perform[ed] exceptionally . . . and never received a dissatisfactory performance evaluation never was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), and never was demoted or suspended” before her termination in 2019. Id. ¶ 8.

Woodson asserts that, despite her strong performance, multiple Edgewood employees targeted her, creating a hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 9. In one instance Woodson felt threatened “following a discussion concerning a petty cash issue” and filed a police report against the alleged assailant, fellow employee Monique Hinson. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. In a separate incident Woodson asserts another employee “blurted out confidential medical information” about her to a third employee. Id. ¶ 17.

Woodson maintains the harassment continued when she filed for intermittent leave under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Id. ¶ 18. She alleges an Edgewood program director “unnecessarily questioned” her requests for leave by demanding “specific dates on which leave would be taken and attempting to interfere with the taking of leave by continuously requesting additional . . . information” from her. Id. ¶ 19. More, Woodson claims the program director disclosed her FMLA request to another Edgewood employee “who was not in a position to need to know said information.” Id. ¶ 20.

Things came to a head in November 2019. According to Woodson, she “was accused of becoming involved in a verbal altercation with a co-worker.” Id. ¶ 22. Lisette Bishins, Edgewood's new Chief Executive Officer, allegedly ordered Woodson's suspension without first investigating the incident or discussing it with Woodson. See id. ¶¶ 22-23. At the time of this incident, Bishins had been at Edgewood for only two days. See id. ¶ 22.

Edgewood terminated Woodson five days after the argument, claiming she had violated the organization's Standards of Conduct policy. See id. ¶¶ 25-26. Woodson contends that Edgewood's reliance on its Standards of Conduct is pretextual. The real reason Edgewood terminated her, she says, is because of her disability. Id. ¶¶ 27-29. She sues under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq. Id. She demands compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 5.^[2]

Edgewood moves to dismiss the Complaint. See ECF No. 13. The motion is now ripe.

II.

A party may move to dismiss a complaint because it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), supported by sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint offering mere “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” does not meet the plausibility standard. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pled factual allegations. Zimmerman v. Al Jazeera Am., LLC, 246 F.Supp.3d 257, 285 (D.D.C. 2017). Complaints filed by pro se litigants “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up).

But a pro se plaintiff cannot escape the requirements of Iqbal and Twombly. See Atherton v. D.C. Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The Court does not accept as true legal conclusions or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although generally “the court may consider only the facts alleged in the Complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the Complaint and matters of which the court may take judicial notice, ” Hurd v. D.C. Gov't, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up), the Court must consider a pro se Complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss, ” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

III.

A.

Edgewood makes two threshold arguments: first, Woodson failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and, second, her claim is time-barred. See Mem. in Support of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9, ECF No. 13 (“Def.'s Mem.”).

First, Edgewood's exhaustion argument. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a “precursor to bringing suit” and so, if proven, provides grounds for dismissal. Congress v. Dist. of Columbia, 324 F.Supp.3d 164, 170 (D.D.C. 2018). Edgewood asserts the Complaint does not “allege that [Woodson] filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC with respect to her ADA claims, ” or “that she received the requisite Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC to proceed with her ADA claims.” Def.'s Mem. at 8.

But a “plaintiff need not plead exhaustion in the Complaint” because failure to exhaust administrative remedies “is an affirmative defense that must be pled and proven by the defendant.” Tapp v. WMATA, 306 F.Supp.3d 383, 398 (D.D.C. 2016) (cleaned up); see also Congress, 324 F.Supp.3d at 170 (“As an affirmative defense, the [defendant] bears the burden of pleading and proving failure to exhaust.”). Woodson claims that she “timely filed her workplace discrimination Complaint in March 2020 and received her Right to Sue Letter on June 24, 2020.” Pl.'s Mem. in Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) at 2, 4-7, ECF No. 15. The Court accepts Woodson's representation that she has “proof of this administrative remedy being obtained” and concurs that her failure to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies in the Complaint is not a valid basis for dismissal. Id. at 5.

Second, Edgewood's statute of limitations argument. Edgewood challenges only the timeliness of Woodson's ADA claim. Def's. Mem. at 8-9. A plaintiff must file a claim with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The statute permits a plaintiff 300 days to file a claim with an equivalent state agency. Id.

Edgewood terminated Woodson on November 25, 2019. Compl. ¶ 25. Woodson says she filed her workplace discrimination Complaint with the EEOC in March 2020. Pl's. Opp'n at 4. Thus, at the most, Woodson filed her Complaint with the EEOC 127 days after the triggering incident. The EEOC gave her a Right to Sue Letter on June 24, 2020, giving her 90 days to sue in federal court. Pl's. Opp'n at 4-5. Woodson filed her lawsuit in this Court on September 21, 2020-89 days after she received the Right to Sue Letter. Id. at 5. Her suit is timely.

B.

The Court proceeds next to Woodson's discrimination claim. Under the ADA, an employer “shall [not] discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Similarly, under the DCHRA, “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice” for an employer “to discharge[] any individual[] or otherwise to discriminate against any individual, with respect to . . . her[] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” either “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon the actual or perceived . . . disability.” D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a). The Court applies the same analysis to claims under the ADA and the DCHRA. Giles v. Transit Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

“To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that she has a disability as defined in the ADA . . . (2) that she was qualified for her position, and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.” Congress, 324 F.Supp.3d at 169. Edgewood concedes that Woodson has a qualified...