Worrell v. Commonwealth

Richard Carl Worrell, Jr., Appellant v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing

No. 291 C.D. 2014

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Submitted: July 18, 2014

September 2, 2014

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER

Richard Carl Worrell, Jr. (Licensee) appeals from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County (trial court) denying his appeal from the suspension of his operating privilege by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1)(ii) of the Vehicle Code¹ for refusal to submit to chemical testing. On appeal, Licensee argues thatthe trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statement to the arresting police officer that he was driving the vehicle when: (1) the Department did not establish the corpus delicti in this case; and (2) he was clearly in police custody, but had not been advised of his legal rights before he was questioned about whether he was driving the vehicle. Licensee argues further that the trial court's denial of his appeal was against the weight of the evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

By notice mailed October 16, 2013, the Department notified Licensee that it was suspending his operating privilege for eighteen months pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1)(ii) for refusing to submit to a chemical test on September 24, 2013. Licensee appealed the suspension, and a de novo hearing was held before the trial court.

During the hearing the Department presented documentary evidence, including Licensee's driving record, which showed Licensee's prior convictions for violating Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802, and the testimony of Officer Matthew Liberatore, who was the only witness to testify. Based on Officer Liberatore's testimony, the trial court found as follows. OnSeptember 24, 2013, Officer Liberatore was on patrol when he noticed "a green pickup truck parked sideways with half of the vehicle on the sidewalk and the other half on the roadway." (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Licensee was "standing on the sidewalk next to the vehicle" zippering his pants. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Officer Liberatore smelled a strong odor of alcohol when he approached Licensee. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Officer Liberatore asked Licensee what he was doing, and Licensee "responded that he had been drinking at the Polish National Alliance Club" (Club), which was three to four blocks away. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Licensee responded further that he drove from the Club to where the vehicle was parked and that he had stopped because he needed to urinate. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) The vehicle's engine was not running, but the keys were in the ignition. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) The vehicle was registered to Licensee's wife. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.)

Officer Liberatore administered three field sobriety tests which Licensee failed to properly perform. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Officer Liberatore also conducted a portable breath test which indicated that Licensee's blood alcohol content was .17 percent. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Officer Liberatore placed Licensee under arrest for driving under the influence and transported him to the local hospital for chemical testing. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) Upon arrival at the hospital, Licensee became argumentative, would not cooperate, and interrupted Officer Liberatore when he read Licensee the chemical testing warnings. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2.) After being warned that his operating privilege would be suspended if he refused to submit to chemical testing, Licensee refused to submit. (Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3.)

At the conclusion of Officer Liberatore's testimony, Licensee's counsel argued, based on the corpus delicti rule, that the Department failed to meet its burden of proof because it did not present any evidence independent of Licensee's statement to Officer Liberatore to prove that Licensee operated the vehicle while he was intoxicated. (Hr'g Tr. at 20.) Counsel argued further that Licensee's Miranda² rights were violated because he was in police custody and had not been advised of his legal rights when he made the incriminating statement that he drove the vehicle to the location where Officer Liberatore found it parked. (Hr'g Tr. at 25.)

The trial court issued an Order denying Licensee's appeal and reinstating the Department's suspension of Licensee's operating privilege. In an opinion in support of its Order, the trial court found Officer Liberatore's testimony credible and further found, based on that testimony, that Officer Liberatore had reasonable grounds to believe that Licensee was operating the vehicle while intoxicated. (Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6, 10.) The trial court pointed out that Officer Liberatore observed: (1) the vehicle parked sideways on the road; (2) Licensee urinating in public; (3) a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Licensee; (4) the keys to the vehicle were in the ignition; (5) Licensee's failure to pass three field sobriety tests; and (6) the portable breath test indicated that Licensee's blood alcohol content was .17%. (Trial Ct. Op. at 6.) Therefore, the trial court concluded that it did not err by admitting Officer Liberatore's testimony that Licensee stated that he was driving the vehicle because there was other evidence that supported its finding thatOfficer Liberatore had reasonable grounds to believe that Licensee was driving under the influence of alcohol. (Trial Ct. Op. at 6.)

Next, the trial court determined that Officer Liberatore was not constitutionally required to advise Licensee of his Miranda rights before Licensee made any statements because the encounter between Officer Liberatore and Licensee was an investigatory detention. (Trial Ct. Op. at 8.) Finally, the trial court concluded that its Order denying Licensee's appeal was not against the weight of the evidence because the credible evidence established that Officer Liberatore had reasonable grounds to believe that Licensee was operating the vehicle under the influence of alcohol and that he refused to submit to chemical testing. (Trial Ct. Op. at 9-11.) Licensee now appeals the trial court's Order to this Court.³

In support of his appeal, Licensee first argues that, because there is no evidence independent of his verbal statement that he was driving the vehicle, the Department failed to prove that Licensee was operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Licensee points out that Officer Liberatore testified that when he approached the vehicle: (1) Licensee was standing outside the vehicle; (2) he never saw Licensee inside the vehicle; (3) the vehicle was not running; and (4) no one was ever seen inside the vehicle. Therefore, Licensee asserts, the Department failed to prove the corpus delicti in this case.

Initially, we note that Licensee's reliance on the corpus delicti rule is misplaced. As explained by our Superior Court, "[t]he well-established corpus delicti rule provides that 'a criminal conviction may not stand merely on the out[-]of[-]court confession of one accused, and thus a case may not go to the fact[-]finder where independent evidence does not suggest that a crime has occurred.'" Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 61 A.3d 292, 295 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 555 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. 1989)) (emphasis added, alterations in original, footnote omitted). "This rule is rooted in the hesitancy to convict a person of a crime solely on the basis of that person's statements." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the corpus delicti rule is applicable in criminal matters. However, suspensions of operating privileges for refusal of chemical testing are civil proceedings, not criminal proceedings. Sitoski v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 11 A.3d 12, 21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Thus, the trial court was not prohibited, pursuant to the corpus delicti rule, from considering Licensee's statements to Officer Liberatore in this civil proceeding.

The Department's burden in license suspension cases is to prove that the arresting officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle while under [the] influence of alcohol."⁴ Banner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa. 1999). "In assessing whether it has met thisburden, we consider the totality of the circumstances and determine, as a matter of law, whether a person in the position of the arresting officer could have reasonably reached this conclusion." Helt v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 856 A.2d 263, 266 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (citing Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207). This standard is not very demanding, and the arresting officer's belief that the licensee had been driving while under the influence of alcohol need not be correct. Koutsouroubas v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 61 A.3d 349, 353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). The legal question of whether reasonable grounds exist is "reviewable by the court on a case by case basis." Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207.

When determining if reasonable grounds exist, the following may be considered: "the location of the vehicle, whether the engine was running and whether there was other evidence indicating that the motorist had driven the vehicle at some point prior to the arrival of the police." Id. It is not necessary that the licensee "be observed behind the steering wheel of the vehicle while it was in motion" or "even necessary that the licensee be observed behind the steering wheel." Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Bendik, 535 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988).

In this matter the trial court found that, even without considering Licensee's statement that he drove the vehicle from the Club and had stopped to urinate, Officer...