Worsham v. Greenfield

978 A.2d 839

187 Md. App. 323

Michael C. WORSHAM v. Robert GREENFIELD, et ux.

No. 1810, September Term, 2007.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

August 27, 2009.

Michael C. Worsham, Forest Hill, for Appellant.

Thomas P. Ryan (Amy L. Leone, McCarthy Wilson, LLP, on brief), Rockville, for Appellee.

Panel: KRAUSER, C.J., EYLER, JAMES R. and KARWACKI, ROBERT L. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

EYLER, JAMES R., J.

The Circuit Court for Harford County, after making the requisite finding that the plaintiff maintained a suit without substantial justification, required the plaintiff to pay a defendant attorney's fees, expenses, and costs attributable to the defendant's defense of the plaintiff's suit. The principal issue presented on this appeal is whether a defendant has "incurred" attorney's fees, expenses, or costs within the meaning of Md. Rule 1-341 when the defendant's fees, expenses, and costs were paid by its liability insurance carrier.¹ We shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 25, 2003, appellant, Michael C. Worsham, pro se,² filed a six-count complaint in circuit court against four of his neighbors, including Robert and Romualda Greenfield, appellees.³ The other two defendants are not involved in this appeal. The counts alleged malicious prosecution for criminal charges brought against appellant on February 5, 2000, malicious prosecution for criminal charges brought in October of 2000, defamation, false light/invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy, and aiding and abetting.⁴ Appellant subsequently dismissed the defamation count because it was barred by the statute of limitations. On September 30, 2004, the circuit court (Carr, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of three of the defendants, including Mrs. Greenfield. The malicious prosecution counts, as they related to malicious destruction of property over $300, and which applied solely to Mr. Greenfield, survived. In November 2004, the malicious prosecution counts went to trial, and at the close of appellant's case, the circuit court (Plitt, J.) granted Mr. Greenfield's motion for judgment.

Appellant appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals denied.

On April 27, 2006, appellees filed a motion in circuit court under Md. Rule 1-341 for attorneys fees, expenses, and costs. The motion was supported by an affidavit filed by Thomas Patrick Ryan, a member of the law firm, McCarthy Wilson LLP. The affiant stated that the law firm had been retained by Erie Insurance Exchange (hereinafter "Erie Insurance") to represent appellees in the suit filed by appellant, and that the law firm had done so. The affiant further stated that attorney's fees in the amount of $38,693.00 and expenses and costs in the amount of $1,571.48 had been incurred in defending appellees.

On September 29, 2006, appellant filed his own motion under Rule 1-341, seeking an award of costs in the amount of $10.00 against appellees' counsel. In addition to seeking sanctions against attorneys with the McCarthy Wilson firm, appellant sought sanctions against H. Wayne Norman, Jr., an attorney who represented appellees with respect to the uninsured portion of the damages sought by appellant in his underlying complaint.

Following a hearing, the circuit court (Plitt, J.), in an opinion and order dated February 21, 2007, denied Mr. Greenfield's motion but, finding that Mrs. Greenfield had been joined in the action without substantial justification, granted her motion. The court also concluded that the amount of fees, costs and expenses would be determined at a later hearing. The court denied appellant's motion, characterizing the portion of it directed at Wayne Norman as "frivolous and unprofessional."

On June 18, 2007, appellant filed a motion to recuse Judge Plitt from presiding over the hearing to determine the specific amount of fees incurred by Mrs. Greenfield.

At all pertinent times, during the pendency of the underlying case and the Rule 1-341 motions practice, appellees were and are represented by counsel selected and paid by Erie Insurance.

At a July 11, 2007 hearing, Judge Plitt denied appellant's motion to recuse and then heard argument concerning the amount of an award of fees, costs, and expenses to Mrs. Greenfield. On August 29, 2007, Judge Plitt docketed a written opinion and judgment awarding Mrs. Greenfield $3,613.13 for attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. The circuit court arrived at the amount of the award by reviewing billing records and determining the portion of fees, costs, and expenses attributable to Mrs. Greenfield's defense, prior to September 30, 2004, the date summary judgment was entered in her favor.

Appellant filed motions to alter or amend and to stay enforcement, both of which were denied.

Questions Presented

As phrased by appellant, the questions are:

1. Whether the trial court erred in granting Romualda Greenfield's Motion under Rule 1-341, and awarding her a judgment of $3,613.13 for attorney's fees she admits she never paid.

2. Whether the trial judge who heard the underlying criminal trial erred in not recusing himself as the judge over the subsequent civil malicious prosecution trial and Motion under Rule 1-341.

3. Whether Worsham's Rule 1-341 [s]hould have been granted.

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellant contends that Mrs. Greenfield lacked standing to file a motion under Md. Rule 1-341 because all of the fees, costs, and expenses she sought, including the $3,613.13 awarded to her, were paid for by the Greenfields' insurer, Erie Insurance. Appellant argues that a party who suffered no damages cannot seek or be awarded damages that they never suffered, referring us to Seney v. Seney, 97 Md.App. 544, 631 A.2d 139 (1993), in support of his position. Appellant adds that, under the definition of "incurred" used by the trial court,⁵ Mrs. Greenfield never incurred attorney's fees, costs, and expenses because she never became or was at risk of becoming liable for such fees, costs, and expenses. Appellant also claims that the trial court failed to consider the policy behind Md. Rule 1-341. He states that parties and their insurers are different entities with different motivations and that the trial court erred in equating the parties with their insurance company.

Appellant further contends that Mrs. Greenfield's motion was untimely. He notes that she waited until after Mr. Greenfield's trial, the appeal to this Court, and the denial of Mr. Worsham's petition for writ of certiorari before filing her motion. He asserts that if Mrs. Greenfield truly felt aggrieved, she should have filed the motion under Rule 1-341 before the appellate proceedings. He thus claims that Mrs. Greenfield's motion is untimely under a reasonableness standard.

Finally, appellant contends that there was an insufficient showing of lack of substantial justification or, if there was, the court abused its discretion in making an award.

Appellant does not challenge the court's methodology in determining the amount of the award, as distinguished from entitlement, which he does challenge. Appellant also does not contend that the court failed to make findings or failed to exercise its discretion. As noted above, he does contend that the findings were unsupported and that the court abused its discretion.

Mrs. Greenfield responds that the purpose of Md. Rule 1-341 is to prevent parties and/or attorneys from abusing the judicial process by filing or defending actions without substantial justification or in bad faith. Mrs. Greenfield asserts that the focus of the Rule is on the offending party and/or attorney and his or her actions. As a result, she claims that whether an aggrieved party personally pays the attorney's fees or whether they are paid by a third party is irrelevant. Mrs. Greenfield states: "It does not serve the purpose of the Rule to limit its application to those instances where the litigant himself and not his insurer or some other third party paid the costs of representing him against the abusive litigation."

A.

In the present case, we are asked to interpret Maryland Rule 1-341, which provides that a court, after making the necessary findings, may require the offending attorney or party to pay to the adverse party fees, costs, and expenses "incurred" by the adverse party.

In Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 428-29, 701 A.2d 419 (1997) (citations and footnote omitted), the Court of Appeals explained:

To interpret rules of procedure, we use the same principles and canons of construction as are used to interpret statutes. When construing a rule, the Court first looks to the text of the rule, giving those words their ordinary and natural meaning. When the words are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily our inquiry ends. When, however, the language of the rule is ambiguous, we look elsewhere to discern the legislative intent. It then becomes necessary to survey the surrounding circumstances in which the rule was drafted to accurately discern the intent of the Court of Appeals in promulgating that rule.

See also Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 668, 684 A.2d 445 (1996) ("We look to the rule's history to aid us in discerning the reasonable intendment of the language used in the light of the purpose to be effectuated.") (Citations omitted). "Yet the goal remains to give the rule its most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used." Greco, 347 Md. at 429, 701 A.2d 419.

"Incur" has been defined as "To suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense)." Black's Law Dictionary 771 (7th ed.1999). "Liability" has been defined in part, as "A financial or pecuniary obligation." Id. at 925. "Liable" has been defined, in part, as (of a person) subject to or likely to incur (a fine, penalty, etc.). Id. at 927. Random House Webster's...