Worthington City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Moore

WORTHINGTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Plaintiff, v. LANCE AND SUSAN MOORE, in their individual capacities and asparents and guardians of C.M., a minor, Defendants.

Case No. 2:20-CV-3155

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

July 15, 2020

Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge Jolson

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Worthington City School District Board of Education's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. (ECF No. 2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants Lance and Susan Moore are the parents of C.M., a minor child, who all reside within the bounds of the Worthington City School District ("the District"). (ECF No. 2 at 4). C.M. is autistic and has been identified as a student with a disability pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). (Id.). Plaintiff, the Worthington City School District Board of Education ("the Board"), alleges C.M. was being educated by the District until 2014, when Defendants brought their first due process complaint to the Ohio Department of Education ("ODE") alleging the District's individualized education program ("IEP") was failing to provide C.M. with free appropriate public education ("FAPE") pursuant to IDEA. (Id.). As a result of the complaint, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, in which the District agreed to cover the expense of sending C.M. to Bridgeway Academy. (Id.). At the end of the 2018 school year, the District declined to extend the term of the settlement agreement because it believed it could fulfill its obligations to provide C.M. with FAPE. (Id. at 5). Defendants brought a second due process complaint in June of 2018, and C.M. returned to the Worthington City School District while the complaint was ongoing. (Id.). Defendants filed an amended complaint in January of 2019, alleging C.M. was still not receiving FAPE at the Worthington City School District. (Id.).

On June 26, 2019, the parties entered into another settlement agreement ("the Agreement"), which is at issue in this case. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3). The Agreement provided for, among other things, C.M.'s placement at Bridgeway Academy at the District's Expense. (Id.). In turn, Defendants agreed to release and discharge the District from "any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action or suits at law or in equity of whatsoever kind and nature, which [Defendants] and/or C[.M.] may have had, now have, or may now or hereafter assert against the Board and its Agents for the entire period prior to this Agreement, and during the term of this Agreement, with respect to C[.M.] and his education including but not limited to claims regarding the provision of FAPE ..." (Id. at ¶ 17). The Agreement defined the term as "the beginning of the summer of 2019 to the end of the summer of 2024." (ECF No. 1 Ex. 3).

On February 19, 2020, Bridgeway Academy discharged C.M. from its school. (ECF No. 2 at 6). Defendants then filed another due process claim on March 5, 2020 with the ODE, alleging the District has denied C.M. FAPE by refusing to provide any programming since February 19, 2020. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 4). In their request for a due process hearing, Defendants allege any waiver "is for past claims and any services delivered by the agreed-upon service provider." (Id. ¶ 19). Because Bridgeway Academy "is a third party not bound by this Agreement" and "is no longer willing to provide services, the District cannot legally absolve itself of its FAPE responsibility and hide behind a now unenforceable defunct agreement." (Id.). Defendants alleged C.M.'s currentIEP fails to provide FAPE, that Bridgeway Academy was the only viable alternative, and that the District is now refusing to pay for any placement that exceeds the costs of Bridgeway. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-16). The Parties disagree as to the Board's level of commitment to settle the issue and provide education to C.M. The Board claims the District informed Defendants it would be willing to amend the Agreement with a different placement so long as its financial obligations did not increase. (ECF No. 2 at 6). It claims it identified three programs that educate children with autism in Central Ohio that it would pay for, though it does not allege C.M. has been accepted into any of those schools. (ECF No. 7 at 1-2). Defendants, however, contend that the Board denied any obligation to provide FAPE to C.M. pursuant to the Settlement Agreement after he was expelled from Bridgeway. (ECF No. 6 at 3). As a result of the request for a due process hearing, the impartial hearing officer ("IHO") issued an opinion on May 15, 2020 scheduling a due process hearing beginning on July 16 and stating that she did not have the authority to issue a decision on any alleged breach of contract claims relating to the Agreement. (ECF No. 1 Ex. 5).

The Board now brings claims under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F) for enforcement of the IDEA settlement and for breach of contract against Defendants, in their individual capacities and as parents and guardians of C.M. (ECF No. 1). The Board brought this motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief seeking an order: "(i) ordering Defendants to dismiss, without prejudice, their Due Process Complaint, Case Number SE 3856-2020; (ii) barring Defendants from accruing additional legal costs in pursuit of Defendants' Due Process Complaint, Case Number SE 3856-2020; (iii) barring Defendants from filing additional administrative complaints against the District related to C.M.'s education; and (iv) any additional equitable relief deemed fair and just by this Court." (ECF No. 2 at 15). This Court held a Rule 65.1 conference on June 25, 2020 and orally denied the Board's Motion for a TRO, finding no immediacy orirreparability of harm. The Board is proceeding with its Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendants filed their Response in Opposition on July 2, 2020 and the Board filed its Reply on July 7. (ECF Nos. 6, 7). This Court held a preliminary injunction hearing on July 14, 2020.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A preliminary injunction "is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Hunt v. Mohr, No. 2:11-CV-00653, 2012 WL 368060, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2012) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)). Preliminary injunctive relief "should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it." Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). The "purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held." Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, (1981). In light of its "limited purpose," a preliminary injunction is "customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits." Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, a party need not prove their case in full at a preliminary injunction hearing. Id. But see Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the "proof required for the plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary judgment motion").

When considering a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court balances four factors: "(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of the injunction." Cremeans v. Taczak, No. 2:19-CV-2703, 2019 WL 5420256, at *2-3(S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2019) (citing Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 590-91 (6th Cir. 2012). These four considerations are "factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met." Certified Restoration, 511 F.3d at 542. Whether the combination of the factors weighs in favor of issuing injunctive relief in a particular case is left to the discretion of the district court. See Leary, 228 F.3d at 739.

III. ANALYSIS

This Court previously held in its TRO Order that Plaintiff had not met the requirements for a temporary restraining order based on irreparability and immediacy of harm. (ECF No. 8). The Court went on to consider the remaining preliminary injunction factors, and though not dispositive, found they also weighed against injunctive relief. (Id.). Plaintiff has not made substantively different arguments in its Reply or at the preliminary injunction hearing than it did in its original Motion, and for that reason and the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not met its burden to obtain a preliminary injunction.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Board argues it will likely prevail in its enforcement of the Agreement under IDEA because of Defendants' breach of the waiver provisions of the contract. (ECF No. 2 at 8). The Court analyzes the Board's claim under 20 U.S.C. §1415(e)(2)(F) and its state law breach of contract claim together, since both pertain to Defendants' alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement. The Court finds Plaintiff's arguments misconstrue the terms of the Agreement and ignore the likely invalidity or impossibility of the Agreement.

This Court has held, "a settlement agreement is a contract, and as such, is enforceable under contract law principles." Echols v. Williams, 267 F.Supp.2d 865, 867 (S.D. Ohio 2003). In order to make out a claim for breach of contract, plaintiff must show: "(1) the existence of a contract,(2) performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4) damages or loss...