Wren v. Yates

520 P.3d 383 (Mem)

Chelsey Ann WREN, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.Robert Lee YATES, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 119,642

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Filed November 8, 2022

ORDER OF SUMMARY DISPOSITION

¶1 Rule 1.201 of the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules provides that "[i]n any case in which it appears that a prior controlling appellate decision is dispositive of the appeal, the court may summarily affirm or reverse, citing in its order of summary disposition this rule and the controlling decision." Okla. Sup. Ct. Rule 1.201.

¶2 After reviewing the record in this case, THE COURT FINDS that its decision in Milne v. Hudson , 2022 OK 84, 519 P.3d 511, involves the same primary legal questions as those in this appeal. Our holding in Milne disposes of the issue raised here.

¶3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the trial court's order issuing a Final Order of Protection against Appellant Yates is AFFIRMED.

DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE THE 7th day of November 2022.

CONCUR: KANE, V.C.J., AND KAUGER, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COMBS (by separate writing), ROWE AND KUEHN, JJ.

CONCUR IN RESULT: DARBY, C.J. (by separate writing)

CONCUR IN JUDGMENT: GURICH, J. (by separate writing)

Darby, C.J, concurring in result:

¶1 I concur in the Court's judgment, but disapprove of the majority's use of Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.201 to resolve the decision by summary disposition. Appellate decisions by summary disposition should only be utilized in circumstances when the prior controlling appellate decision is dispositive of the appeal. See e.g. , McBee v. Fraire , 2022 OK 22, 505 P.3d 932. Milne v. Hudson , 2022 OK 84, 519 P.3d 511 is not dispositive because the issue of jurisdiction in this case, and others like it, is factually driven. Here we have parties with different or unknown tribal statuses, and potentially very different locations from that in Milne —one county was completely included within recognized reservations¹ and the other² is not. These cases demand precise determinations as to each parties' status, the location of relevant events, and the existence and/or interplay of tribal law on the relevant subject matter with that of state and federal law. At the very least, this Court's majority opinion should provide the relevant background and affirm by Okla. Sup. Ct. R. 1.200(b), affirmance by memorandum opinion.

¶2 I also reiterate my understanding that federal jurisprudence requires a comprehensive understanding of the facts in each case to appropriately evaluate tribal or state jurisdiction when there is no clear preemption. Milne v. Hudson , 2022 OK 84, ¶¶ 11-12, 519 P.3d 511 (Darby, C.J., concurring). As stated in my concurring opinion in Milne v. Hudson , 2022 OK 84, 519 P.3d 511, jurisdictional challenges between the State of Oklahoma and Tribal Nations must be reviewed on a fact-specific, case-by-case determination. Ibid ., ¶ 1, 519 P.3d 511 (Darby, C.J., concurring) (citing Williams v. Lee , 358 U.S. 217, 79 S. Ct. 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1959) ; Strate v. A-1 Contractors , 520 U.S. 438, 117 S. Ct 1404, 137 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1997) ; Montana v. United States , 450 U.S. 544, 101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) ; Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial District of Montana, in and for Rosebud County , 424 U.S. 382, 96 S. Ct. 943, 47 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1976) ). The majority disregards decades of well-settled precedent in concluding that the Indian/non-Indian and member/nonmember status of a party does not matter with respect to questions of jurisdiction. See Majority Op., ¶ 2 n.1. Obviously these factual distinctions do matter. See Williams , 358 U.S. 217, 222, 79 S.Ct. 269 (Defendant's status as member Indian was significant for recognizing exclusive tribal jurisdiction); Fisher , 424 U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943 (member Indian status of all parties involved was significant to finding tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction); Montana , 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245 ; (the location and status of persons was significant; the tribe was unable to regulate hunting and fishing of non-Indian persons on non-Indian fee land within reservation borders), Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation , 447 U.S. 134, 100 S. Ct. 2069, 65 L. Ed. 2d 10 (1980) (status as a member or nonmember Indian was significant; state had jurisdiction to tax nonmember Indians in reservations). See also , Duro v. Reina , 495 U.S. 676, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 109 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1990) (Indian tribal court did not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indian); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe , 435 U.S. 191, 98 S. Ct. 1011, 55 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1978) (Indian tribal courts do not have inherent jurisdiction to punish non-Indians.).

¶3 In this case, Justice Gurich's concurring opinion recites the relevant facts available from the record on appeal. As she has already done so, we find it unnecessary to repeat the facts here. Because the state district court's exercise of jurisdiction is not preempted by federal law, and does not infringe on the Chickasaw Nation's right to govern themselves, the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was proper. See Milne v. Hudson , 2022 OK 84, ¶ 2, 519 P.3d 511 (Darby, C.J., concurring). Consequently, the district court order must be affirmed.

COMBS, J., with whom KAUGER, J., joins, concurring specially:

¶1 As with Milne v. Hudson , 2022 OK 84, 519 P.3d 511, this case comes down to the plain language of the state statute and the tribal statute, neither of which conditions the issuance of a protective order upon the parties' status as Native American or non-Native American. The state statute provides:

§ 60.2 Protective order—Petition—Complaint requirement for certain stalking victims—Fees

A. A victim of domestic abuse, a victim of stalking, a victim of harassment, a victim or rape, any adult or emancipated minor household member on behalf of any other family or household member who is a minor or incompetent, or any minor age sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years [to] seek relief under the provision of the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act.

1. The person seeking relief may file a petition for a protective order with the district court in the county in which the victim resides, the county in which the defendant resides, or the county in which the domestic violence occurred. ...

22 O.S.Supp.2020, § 60.2 (amended 2022). Similarly, the tribal statute provides:

SECTION 5-1201.2 PROTECTIVE ORDER; PETITION

A. The [tribal] Court shall have full civil jurisdiction to issue and enforce Protective Orders involving any person in matters arising in the Indian Country of the Chickasaw Nation or otherwise within the authority of the Court.

B. The following persons may seek relief under the provision of this Section by filing a petition for Protective Order with the Court:

1. any victim of Domestic Abuse who is age sixteen (16) years or older;

2. any victim of Stalking who is age sixteen (16) years or older;

3. any victim of Harassment who is age sixteen (16) years or older; or

4. any adult or emancipated Child who is a Family or Household Member of a victim who is a Child or incompetent, on behalf of such victim .

....

Chickasaw Nation Code § 5-1201.2 (last amended Feb. 22, 2021), https://code.chickasaw.net/Title05.aspx (emphasis added). Only the location of the offending conduct or the location of one party's residence matters. Where that location can be classified as both state and tribal territory, both courts have jurisdiction—that is, concurrent jurisdiction —to issue a protective order.

Gurich, J., concurring in judgment:

¶1 As with my separate writing in Milne v. Hudson , 2022 OK 84, 519 P.3d 511, I believe the majority opinion reaches the correct conclusion in this proceeding. Nevertheless, I believe the decision should be limited by its unique facts. Additionally, because the majority summary opinion does not provide necessary background, and every jurisdictional dilemma involving Indian country is dependent on its particular circumstances, I have outlined the pertinent case history below.

¶2 Robert Lee Yates is an enrolled member of the Caddo Nation of Oklahoma and a resident of the Chickasaw Nation Reservation. On March 16, 2020, Yates was charged with two counts of child sexual abuse in Stephens County District Court, Case No. CF-2020-57. Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the state court lacked jurisdiction because (1) Yates was an Indian; (2) the alleged criminal acts took place within the boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation Reservation;¹ and (3) the United States had exclusive jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act.² On April 1, 2021, the trial court dismissed the State's criminal case based on the Supreme Court decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma .³ Subsequently, Wren initiated a civil proceeding in Stephens County District Court, requesting issuance of a protective order on behalf of her daughter. Yates filed another motion to dismiss, this time arguing the state court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with any civil matter involving an Indian for acts in Indian country. During oral argument before the trial judge, counsel maintained that exclusive jurisdiction over the matter should lie in either the Chickasaw Nation Tribal Court or the Court of Indian Offences.⁴ Similar to the facts in Milne v. Hudson , we are faced with acts by a non-member Indian which occurred within Indian country, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151.⁵ However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Wren or her daughter are Indian.

¶3 As a general rule, state courts lack jurisdiction for acts involving member Indians within Indian country absent an express grant of authority from Congress. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee , 358 U.S. 217, 220-21, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959) ("Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation. ... Significantly, when Congress has wished the States to exercise this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which ...