Wright v. Aramark Corp.

TRACEY M. WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. ARAMARK CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO.: 1:13-CV-144 (WLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBANY DIVISION

SO ORDERED: February 5, 2014

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court are Defendants Albany State University and Everette Freeman's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint in Lieu of Answer ("the ASU Defendants' Motion to Dismiss") (Doc. 14), Defendants Aramark Campus, LLC, Henry Ward, Aaron Kelly, and Bevelia Allen's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("the Aramark Defendants' Motion to Dismiss") (Doc. 15), and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 26). For the following reasons, the Motions to Dismiss (Docs 14 & 15) are GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 26) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On September 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint pro se against Defendants and a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Docs. 1 & 2.) On September 4, 2013, she filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 4.) Following an order to supplement and Plaintiff's supplement in compliance thereto, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss. (Docs. 5-7, 9-10.) On October 11, 2013, Plaintiff's request for IFP status was granted. (Doc. 7.) After Plaintiff was ordered to respond to the Motions to Dismiss, she filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 12 & 13.)

In Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, she claims that she was formerly employed by Aramark Corporation and worked at the Albany State University campus. (Doc. 13 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that she applied and was interviewed for a position as Office Manager, but "after she was hired[,] for no reasons given[,] her position was changed to 'office work' with less pay despite [the fact that] she was doing the work of office manager until she was terminated." (Id. at 5-6.) She claims that, while employed with Aramark, she was "subjected to harassment, discrimination, inappropriate remarks" such as when dog bones were allegedly placed on her office chair "implying that [she] is a 'dog.' " (Id. at 5.) She asserts that she is entitled to relief because Aramark failed to place her as Office Manager, failed to promote her, underutilized her, engaged in occupational segregation, considered various protected characteristics when making employment decisions, failed to compensate her fairly, knowingly hired and promoted people with "propensities to discriminate" against Plaintiff, denied her the use of electronic devices, denied her religious accommodations, and penalized her for complaining about "unlawful discriminations." (Id. at 7-8.)

Plaintiff claims that "Aaron Kelly . . . and Bevelia Allen initiated the discriminatory practices." (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that, on January 9, 2012, Henry Ward "ordered her to go home and never to return" after she volunteered to clean the office after it was left in an unsanitary condition following Christmas break. (Id. at 5, 14.) Plaintiff claims that her termination was an act of discrimination on the basis of her gender, age, religion, and disability. (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff also claims that "Defendants violated [her] rights under the [Family Medical Leave Act by] reprimanding her for tak[ing] the leave and for interfering with her medical leave [that] she needed due to her and [her] family." (Id. at 16.) Further, she claims that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act because she "was denied accommodation for her medical disability through her employment" since another employee's "offensive perfume odor that trigger[ed]" her "respiratory and breath[ing] problem" was not addressed by management. (Id. at 17-18.) Plaintiff alsoasserts that Defendants are liable for wrongful termination and a violation of the Equal Pay Act. (Id. at 19; Doc. 13-2 at 3.)

On November 25, 2013, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 14 & 15.) In the ASU Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ASU and Everette Freeman claim that they are entitled to dismissal because ASU is not capable of being sued and Ms. Freeman is not subject to individual liability under any of the statutes cited by Plaintiff. (See Doc. 14-1 at 5, 8.) Also, the ASU Defendants assert that they should be dismissed because they are not Plaintiff's "employer" as defined by the statutes at issue. (Id. at 6.) Similarly, Defendants Ward, Kelly, and Allen argue that they are not subject to individual liability under any of the statutes cited by Plaintiff, and they are not Plaintiff's "employer" as defined by the statutes cited by Plaintiff. (See Doc. 15.) Aramark claims that it is entitled to dismissal because Plaintiff's charge of discrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") only includes sex discrimination, and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Title VII or any other statute. (See id.) On November 5, 2013, Aramark submitted a copy of the Charge of Discrimination Plaintiff filed with the EEOC. (Doc. 10-1.)

On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff was ordered to respond to the Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. 17.) At that time, the Court reminded Plaintiff that the Second Amended Complaint rendered her previous complaints and the corresponding motions to dismiss legal nullities. (See id.) On December 9 and 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed responses to the Motions to Dismiss. (See Docs. 18 & 19.) Plaintiff also included various documents related to the EEOC proceedings. (See Doc. 18-1.) In her response to the ASU Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff claims that ASU is capable of being sued under Title VII and was her employer under that statute because "[t]he stationary use[d] by [Aramark] . . . says Albany State University is a 'component' of [Aramark] or [Aramark] is a 'component' of Albany State University." (Doc. 18 at 9.) In her response to the Aramark Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff claims that, under Title VII, supervisors may be held vicariously liable. (Doc. 19 at 10.) As such, Plaintiff asserts that her claims against all Defendants are proper. (Id.)

On December 23, 2013, Defendants filed replies to Plaintiff's responses. (See Docs. 21 & 22.) The ASU Defendants assert that Plaintiff's argument regarding the definition of "employer" under Title VII is erroneous but, even under her definition, neither ASU nor Everette Freeman qualify as her employer. (Doc. 21 at 4.) Those Defendants also argue that the cases cited by Plaintiff "possibly as authority supporting individual liability" under Title VII "do not stand for the proposition that Title VII allows for individual liability." (Id. at 6.) The Aramark Defendants argue that "it is undisputed that [Plaintiff's] charge of discrimination only names Aramark and only alleges sex-based discrimination." (Id. at 3.) Those Defendants also assert that Plaintiff's conclusory statements and scant factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Title VII or FMLA. (Id. at 4.)

On January 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendant ASU's Reply. (Doc. 26.) Therein, she argues that the "[r]eply filed by Albany State University on 12/23/2013 was untimely and should be stricken on the ground that the only motion filed by ASU was declared moot and has been denied and there was no other motion filed by Defendants (ASU) that warrants reply." (Id. at 2.) On January 27, 2014, the ASU Defendants filed a response. (Doc. 27.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to assert by motion the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted unless the plaintiff fails to plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible, and not merely just conceivable, on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper if the factual allegations are not 'enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.' " Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)). "Stated differently, the factual allegations in the complaint must'possess enough heft' to set forth 'a plausible entitlement to relief.' " Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1291 (citation omitted).

While the Court must conduct its analysis "accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff," Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003), in evaluating the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleadings, the Court must "make reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, 'but we are not required to draw [P]laintiff's inference.' " Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)). The Supreme Court instructs that while on a motion to dismiss "a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint," this principle "is inapplicable to legal conclusions," which "must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, for the proposition that courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" in a complaint). In the post-Twombly era, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.

II. Analysis

A. Claims against Albany State University & Individual Defendants

Individual employees are not subject to liability under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), or the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). Fodor v. D'Isernia, 506 F. App'x 965, 966 (11th Cir. 2013) (...