Wright v. Frontier Mgmt. LLC

JOSHUA WRIGHT, LORETTA STANLEY, HALEY QUAM,and AIESHA LEWIS on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. FRONTIER MANAGEMENT LLC, FRONTIER SENIOR LIVING LLC,and GH SENIOR LIVING LLC, dba GREENHAVEN ESTATES ASSISTED LIVING, Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01767-JAM-CKD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

May 28, 2021

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Joshua Wright, Loretta Stanley, Haley Quam, and Aiesha Lewis ("Plaintiffs") filed this putative class action against Frontier Management LLC, Frontier Senior Living LLC, and GH Senior Living LLC (collectively, "Defendants") over several of their wage and hour policies. See First Am. Compl. ("FAC"), ECF No. 56. Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' FAC for failing to plead sufficient facts to state plausible meal, rest period, and unpaid wage claims. See Mot. to Dismiss ("Mot."), ECF No. 68. Defendants also argue that Wright's reimbursement claim fails, as do Plaintiffs' derivative claims. Id. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. See Opp'n, ECF No. 69.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants operate a chain of retirement and assisted living communities. FAC ¶ 39. Wright worked as a medication technician at one of the assisted living locations in California from April 12, 2018, until March 15, 2019. FAC ¶ 13. Stanley worked as a lead medical technician and caregiver at a facility in Oregon from December 2018, until September 2019. FAC ¶ 14. Quam worked as a caregiver at a facility in Washington from September 2017, until September 2018. FAC ¶ 15. Lewis worked as a caregiver at a facility in Illinois from July 2017, until October 2017. FAC ¶ 16. Plaintiffs, collectively, allege that Defendants' wage and hour practices violate the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. See FAC ¶¶ 81-91.

Wright, on behalf of the California class, alleges violations of several provisions of the California Labor Code and behavior amounting to unfair business practices in violation of the California Business and Professions Code. See FAC ¶¶ 92-104, 105-16, 117-25, 126-37, 138-47, 148-58, 159-66, 167-79. Quam, onbehalf of the Washington class, alleges violations of Washington labor law and the Washington Consumer Protection Act. See FAC ¶¶ 180-91, 192-207, 208-24, 225-33, 234-42, 243-50, 251-58. Lewis, on behalf of the Oregon class, alleges a host of labor violations pursuant to Oregon law. See FAC ¶¶ 259-76, 277-83, 284-90, 291-303, 304-14, 315-20. Stanley, on behalf of the Illinois class, alleges violations of Illinois labor law, consumer fraud, and deceptive business practices. See FAC ¶¶ 321-31, 332-45, 346-59, 360-68, 369-82. Plaintiffs' state law claims are similar in that they generally allege that Defendants failed to properly compensate them and denied them several employee entitlements like meal and rest periods and accurate, itemized wage statements. See generally FAC.

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC in its entirety, arguing Plaintiffs have failed to present any specific, non-theoretical factual allegations supporting the twenty-seven claims against them. See generally Mot. Defendants argue the motion to dismiss is rife with unsupported legal conclusions. Id. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing Defendants seek to inappropriately impose a heightened pleading standard on their FAC. See generally Opp'n.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Courts must dismiss a suit if the plaintiff fails to "state a claim uponwhich relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must "plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This plausibility standard requires "factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At this stage, the court "must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint." Id. But it need not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id.

B. Meal and Rest Break Claims

Plaintiffs' fourth, twelfth, twenty-first, and twenty-second causes of action are unpaid meal and rest break claims. See FAC ¶¶ 117-25, 208-24, 304-14, 315-20. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants require them to remain on duty during rest breaks and while clocked out for meal periods. FAC ¶ 44. Further, Defendants require them to carry communication devices-like cellphones and pagers—at all times, so that they can be reached to handle any job-related issues. FAC ¶ 45. Plaintiffs contend that this policy denies them their statutorily required meal and rest breaks. FAC ¶ 46. In addition, Plaintiffs are not compensated for any meal and rest breaks missed as a result of this policy. FAC ¶ 47.

Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed because they are "conclusory, incomplete, and entirely theoretical." Mot. at 11-13. The Court agrees. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which an employee has a mealor rest break interrupted by a phone call to help with a resident of one of the assisted living facilities. However, the allegations in the FAC "stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Plaintiffs do not describe an instance in which Defendants actually interfered with one of their meal or rest breaks, alleging only that Defendants "require [them] to carry communication devices . . . with them at all times" and that Defendants "require [them] to respond to calls [] regardless of whether they are taking a meal or rest break." FAC ¶ 45. These allegations are factually lacking. The Court cannot reasonably infer that Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged from the few and unspecific facts presented in support of the meal and rest break claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Moreover, as this Court determined in Chavez v. RSCR Cal., Inc., 2019 WL 1367812, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2019), Plaintiffs' "failure to plead at least one occasion on which [they were] impeded from taking a meal of rest break likely runs afoul of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., 771 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 204), as amended (Jan. 26, 2015)." See Landers, at 645-46 (holding that "at a minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA overtime provisions must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week."); Bush v. Vaco Tech. Servs., LLC, 2018 WL 2047807, ay *8 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding the reasoning of Landers, based on the Ninth Circuit's readingof Twombly and Iqbal, persuasive in determining overtime claim asserted under the California labor Code); see also Guerrero v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 2018 WL 6494296, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (collecting district court cases applying Landers standard to meal and rest period claims under the California Labor Code).

Plaintiffs argue that the FAC alleges that the putative classes were "on call" during their meal and rest periods, and that fact alone is sufficient to state a claim under California, Oregon, and Washington law, regardless of whether an interruption actually occurred. See Opp'n at 5-6. Plaintiffs are correct that, under California, Washington, and Oregon law, an employee should either not be on call during his meal or rest breaks, or else receive compensation for being on call. See Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc., 2 Cal.5th 257, 273 (2016) (California law prohibits on-duty and on-call rest periods); White v. Salvation Army, 118 Wash.App. 272, 278 (Washington law permits on-call meal periods "provided the employee is paid."); Talarico v. Hoffman Structures, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20898, at *9 (D. Or. 1999) (Oregon law permits on-call meal breaks so long as employee is paid). But these legal conclusions have no impact on the FAC's factual deficiencies.

Plaintiffs have vaguely alleged that Defendants require them to remain on duty "during rest breaks and while clocked out for meal periods." FAC ¶ 44. The only fact that speaks to Defendants' failure to provide off-duty meal and rest breaks is Defendants' policy requiring employees to have communication devices on them at all times. FAC ¶ 46. From this, Plaintiffsask the Court to infer that they were interrupted and asked to work during their off-duty meal and rest breaks. The Court declines to do so. In this instance, there is little difference between drawing an inference and mere speculation. Thus, Plaintiffs' meal and rest break allegations fall short of plausibility.

The Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs' fourth, twelfth, twenty-first, and twenty-second causes of action for on-duty and unpaid meal and rest breaks.

C. Unpaid Wage Claims

Plaintiffs' first, second, third, fifth, tenth, eleventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty fifth causes of action assert various types of unpaid wage claims. See FAC ¶¶ 81-91, 92-104, 105-16, 126-37, 180-91, 192-207, 234-42, 243-50, 259-76, 277-83, 284-90, 321-31, 332-45, 346-59. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed or refused to pay them minimum and overtime wages, did not pay them for all hours worked, and made unlawful deductions from their wages. Id. In support of these allegations, Plaintiffs contend:

• Employees are not paid for "work performed while clocked out for meal periods" or "missed breaks and meal periods";

• Employees are "regularly required to work off-the-clock" filling out paperwork, waiting to be relieved of their posts, helping

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