Wright v. Guadarrama

1

IAN WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. WARDEN GUADARRAMA, Respondent.

No. 3:21-cv-710 (SRU)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

January 3, 2022

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Stefan R. Underhill United States District Judge.

Petitioner Ian Wright (“Wright”), incarcerated at the Osborn Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut and proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the failure of the Board of Pardons and Paroles to schedule him for a deportation parole eligibility hearing. Respondent Warden Guadarrama (“Guadarrama”) has filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for habeas relief. For the following reasons, Guadarrama's motion is granted.

I. Background

Connecticut General Statutes section 54-125d(c) provides that the state Board of Pardons and Paroles “shall enter into an agreement with [federal immigration authorities] for the deportation of parolees who are aliens . . . and for whom an order of deportation has been issued. . . .” Conn. Gen Stat. § 54-125d(c). The statute further provides that “any person whose eligibility for parole is restricted under said subdivision shall be eligible for deportation parole under this section after having served fifty percent of the definite sentence imposed by the court. . . .” Id. Section 54-125d, in conjunction with a 1997 agreement between the state Board of Pardons and Parole and federal immigration officials, “allows foreign-born nationals convicted of deportable crimes at the state level to be eligible to be paroled directly to the custody of INS for deportation after serving as little as 50% of their sentence.” Taylor v. Warden, No. CV124004709, 2014 WL 783569, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2014). Although extant, the agreement has not been put into practice. Id.; see also Pet's. Opp'n, Doc. No, 22 at 3 (citing to correspondence and testimony by the Board of Pardons and Paroles arguing same).

Wright, a Jamaican national, was convicted of murder in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-54a and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-35 on March 22, 2002. Pet., Doc. No. 1 at 7; Wright v. Comm'r of Corr., 201 Conn.App. 339, 342 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 905 (2021). He was sentenced to a total effective term of imprisonment of thirty-five years. Id. In 2013, the United States Immigration Court ordered Wright removed to Jamaica. Wright, 201 Conn.App. at 342.

After completing fifty percent of his sentence, Wright submitted several requests to the state Board of Pardons and Paroles seeking a hearing to determine deportation parole eligibility under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125d(c). Id. Notwithstanding the requests, Wright was not provided a hearing. Id.

In 2018, Wright filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court. Id. His petition claimed that a deportation parole eligibility hearing was required by section 54-125d(c) and that the government's denial of such hearing violated his due process rights. Id. The Connecticut Superior Court rejected Wright's interpretation of section 54-125d, emphasizing the discretion retained by immigration officials to establish an eligibility process, and dismissed the habeas petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 343. The Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Wright had no protected liberty interest in deportation parole. Id. at 345-53. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification. Wright v. Comm'r of Corr., 336 Conn. 905 (2021) (Mem.).

On May 25, 2021, Wright filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, again challenging the defendant's failure to schedule him for a deportation parole eligibility hearing pursuant to section 54-125d(c). Pet., Doc. No. 1 at 2. The petition alleges that the Department of Correction and Board of Pardons and Paroles violated Wright's due process rights arising under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article First Section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution by failing to provide a hearing and by failing to adopt or implement a regulation to determine his parole eligibility under section 54-125d(c). Id. at 7. He seeks a deportation parole hearing or eligibility for deportation parole. Id. at 8.

Thereafter, I issued Guadarrama an order to show cause. Doc. No. 6. On August 4, 2021, in response, Guadarrama filed the instant motion to dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 10 at 1. He argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is no federal constitutional right to parole and section 54-125d does not give rise to a liberty interest. Id. Wright filed an opposition, and Guadarrama filed a reply. Docs. No. 22-23.

II. Standard of Review

Wright states that he files this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but he is a sentenced state prisoner. See Pet., Doc. No. 1, ¶ 4. State inmates challenging their convictions or sentences must seek relief through a petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A state prisoner . . . not only may, but according to the terms of section 2254 must, bring a challenge to the execution of his or her sentence-in this case with respect to revocation of Cook's parole-under section 2254.”) Thus, “a petition under section 2241 is therefore unavailable to him.” Id.; see also Griffin v. Cook, No. 3:20-cv-589 (JAM), 2020 WL 2735886, at *3 (D. Conn. May 26, 2020) (same). Accordingly, pursuant to the special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants, I construe his petition as filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010).

The federal court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a state court conviction only if the petitioner claims that his custody violates the United States Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Guadarrama moves to dismiss the petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a cognizable claim for habeas relief. The Second Circuit has stated that “the standards for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are substantively identical.” Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

“Under Rule 12(b)(1), an action is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ‘when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.'” Pouncey v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n, 2021 WL 4502951, at *1-2 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2021) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). In analyzing a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Id. The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests with the petitioner. Id.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a petition should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To survive dismissal, the petition must present a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In making this assessment, the court accepts the allegations in the petition as true, draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner, and views all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Trustees of Upstate New York Engineers Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016).

III. Discussion

In the petition, Wright contends that section 54-125d(c) confers a protected liberty interest in deportation parole and that the government's failure to provide a deportation parole eligibility hearing violates his rights to due process. Pet., Doc. No. 1 at 6 ¶ 13. I disagree.

First, Wright cannot establish that he has a protected liberty interest in deportation parole. “In order to state a claim for a denial of procedural due process . . . a prisoner must allege that he possessed a protected liberty interest[] and was not afforded the requisite process before being deprived of that liberty interest.” Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000); Anthony A. v. Comm'r of Corr., 326 Conn. 668, 674-75 (2017) (quoting same). “Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Wright's argument is fatally flawed, because the Due Process Clause does not establish a federal constitutional right to parole and state law does not give rise to a liberty interest.

One, Wright is wrong about his repeated assertion that there is a constitutional and “inherent” right to deportation parole. E.g., Pet.'s Opp'n, Doc. No. 22, at 7. The Supreme Court has patently held that there is no constitutional right to parole. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. . . . A state may . . . establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so.”). Instead, the decision to create a liberty interest in parole or deportation parole, and the extent of that interest, is a discretionary state law decision. See Perez v. Commissioner of Corr., 326 Conn. 357, 370 (2017). Accordingly, to establish a due process violation, Wright must show that state law- section 54-125d(c), in particular- created a protected liberty interest.

Two Wright cannot establish a protected liberty interest under state law. “[T]o have a protectable liberty interest, a prisoner must...