Wright v. Residence Inn By Marriott, Inc.

207 A.3d 970

Bryan WRIGHT, Appellant

v.RESIDENCE INN BY MARRIOTT, INC.

No. 3607 EDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted July 23, 2018

Filed April 09, 2019

Robert A. Gelinas, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Paul K. Leary, Jr., Andrea E. Hammel, and Matthew Bleich, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

Bryan Wright appeals from the judgment entered following a jury verdict in his favor in this slip-and-fall case. Although Wright succeeded in his claim, he requested a new trial on damages only based on the trial court's erroneous preclusion of testimony from Wright's sole medical expert. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's denial of a new trial.

Briefly, the relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On January 5, 2014, Wright was staying at the Residence Inn by Marriott—Philadelphia Willow Grove, located in Horsham, Pennsylvania. That morning, as Wright walked outside on a paved pathway from one building to another at the hotel, Wright slipped on a four to six foot patch of ice and fell. As a result of the fall, Wright injured his left shoulder and bruised his hip and shoulder. He underwent treatment for his shoulder, including arthroscopic surgery. Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/18 at 1-2.

Wright filed suit against Marriott seeking damages for his injuries. A two day jury trial was held in August 2017. On the eve of trial, during jury selection, Marriott filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the expert report and video testimony of Wright's sole medical expert, Paul Sedacca, M.D., along with five other motions in limine . Plaintiff intended to have Dr. Sedacca testify regarding the nature of Wright's injuries, the cause of his injuries, and his resulting treatment. The trial court granted Marriott's motion in part, but allowed limited testimony from Dr. Sedacca concerning Wright's medical bills. The next day, Wright asked the trial court to reconsider this issue, but the trial court again denied his request. Consequently, Wright could not present any testimony about Dr. Sedacca's qualifications, or the objective findings of Dr. Sedacca's physical examination of Wright. He also had no expert testimony regarding the nature of his injuries, the cause of those injuries, or the resulting treatment and prognosis.

After presentation of all of the evidence, the jury entered a verdict finding Marriott was negligent and Marriott's negligence was the sole cause of Wright's injuries. The jury awarded Wright $ 8,896.44 for his medical expenses and $ 55,000 for non-economic damages.

Dissatisfied with the amount, Wright filed post-trial motions arguing for a new trial. He claimed the trial court erred when it ruled that his only medical expert, Dr. Sedacca, was unqualified, because he was not an orthopedist, and prohibited him from testifying at trial. This further precluded Dr. Sedacca from introducing Wright's medical records at trial. Given the timing of Marriott's motion, the eve of trial, Wright could not obtain another medical expert. Moreover, Marriott used the lack of medical testimony and medical records against Wright during its closing argument. Wright believed that these circumstances severely prejudiced him and warranted a new trial on damages. The trial court denied Wright's post-trial motions, and he timely appealed.¹

Wright raises the following issues for our review:

Did the trial judge abuse her discretion by precluding the testimony of Paul J. Sedacca, M.D. when he was qualified to render opinions about plaintiff's shoulder injuries?

Should Plaintiff be granted a new trial on damages when the trial judge's order precluding Plaintiff's only medical expert was prejudicial?

Appellant's Brief at 3.

Our standard of review regarding a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial is as follows: "The Court will not reverse a trial court's decision regarding the grant or refusal of a new trial absent an abuse of discretion or an error of law." Reott v. Asia Trend , 7 A.3d 830, 839 (Pa. Super 2010), aff'd , 618 Pa. 228, 55 A.3d 1088 (2012). Specifically, " ‘[d]ecisions regarding admission of expert testimony, like other evidentiary decisions, are within the sound discretion of the trial court’ and ‘[w]e may reverse only if we find an abuse of discretion or error of law.’ " Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. , 978 A.2d 961, 972 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Paoli Memorial Hosp. , 885 A.2d 1012, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2005) ), appeal denied , 604 Pa. 706, 987 A.2d 161 (2009). "The trial court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or when a manifestly unreasonable, biased or prejudiced result is reached." Girard Trust Bank v. Remick , 215 Pa.Super. 375, 258 A.2d 882 (1969). Additionally, "for such evidentiary ruling to constitute reversible error, it must have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party. A party suffers prejudice when the trial court's error could have affected the verdict." Reott , 7 A.3d at 839 (internal citations omitted). With this standard in mind, we address Wright's issues.

In his first issue, Wright contends that the trial court erred by refusing to qualify Dr. Sedacca as an expert. Wright maintains that Dr. Sedacca possessed the necessary qualifications and experience to offer his expert opinion about the nature of Wright's injuries, the cause of those injuries, Wright's treatment, and prognosis. Wright claims this ruling prejudices him. Consequently, he seeks a new trial, but only on the question of damages. See Wright's Brief at 15, 35.

Marriott strongly contests Dr. Sedacca's qualifications to testify. Also, it claims that Wright waived his issue regarding expert testimony because he failed to raise the issue of prejudice in his post-trial motion. Marriott's Brief at 19. Wright disagrees. He references several places in the record where he addressed how he was prejudiced. See Wright's Brief at 35.

Indisputably, "in order to preserve an issue for review, litigants must make timely and specific objections during trial and raise the issue in post-trial motions." Allied Elec. Supply Co. v. Roberts , 797 A.2d 362, 364 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied , 570 Pa. 680, 808 A.2d 568 (2002). The purpose of requiring that an issue be raised in post-trial motions is, in part, to give the trial court an opportunity to correct any errors after it has made its initial decision. See Benson v. Penn Central Transp. Co. , 463 Pa. 37, 342 A.2d 393, 395 (1975).

Our review of the record indicates that Wright objected to the preclusion of Dr. Sedacca's testimony at the time Marriott presented its motion in limine. Additionally, Wright asked for reconsideration of the matter the next day. Wright subsequently raised the issue in his post-trial motion.

However, Marriott contends that Wright must show that he was harmed by the trial court's ruling. Marriott thus argues that Wright needed to raise prejudice as a separate issue in his post-trial motion.

We find that Wright did raise the issue of prejudice in his post-trial motion. Wright specifically stated that "[d]uring oral argument on defendant's [m]otion in limine and the subsequent oral [m]otion for [r]econsideration, counsel for [Wright] informed the trial court that Paul J. Sedacca, M.D. was [Wright's] ‘only medical expert witness’ and that [Wright] would be severely prejudiced by the court's [p]reclusion [o]rder." Wright's Post-Trial Motion at 12. Wright argued in his post-trial motion that the ruling was particularly prejudicial given the lateness of Marriott's motion to preclude Dr. Sedacca's testimony. Wright could not obtain a substitute expert.

Wright further argued that he was prejudiced in his supplemental brief² in support of his motion for post-trial relief. He claimed he "suffered severe prejudice as a result of the trial [c]ourt's decision to preclude his only medical expert", Dr. Sedacca. Wright's Supplemental Brief at 21-23. The trial court's decision also affected Wright's ability to introduce his medical records at trial. Wright argued that this prejudiced him because Marriott used the lack of expert testimony and medical records against him during its closing argument, negatively affecting the jury's verdict.

Moreover, in deciding Wright's post-trial motions, we note that the trial court did not find waiver. Rather, the trial court dedicated two entire sections of its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion to address how its decision to preclude Dr. Sedacca's testimony did not prejudice Wright. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/18 at 5, 9. Thus, the record shows Wright raised the issue of prejudice in his post-trial motion. The trial court had the opportunity to reconsider the issue and correct any errors, satisfying the purpose of the rule regarding issue preservation. Thus, we conclude that Wright adequately preserved this issue for appeal. We now turn to the merits of Wright's first appellate issue—whether Dr. Sedacca was qualified to offer expert medical testimony in this case.

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert may testify, "if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by a layperson will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Pa.R.E. 702 (emphasis added).

The law regarding the qualification of an expert witness is well settled. In Pennsylvania, the standard for qualification of an expert witness is a liberal one. Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern , 541 Pa. 474, 664 A.2d 525, 528 (1995). The test to be applied when qualifying a witness "is whether the witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation." Id. (emphasis added). The witness need not possess "all of the knowledge in a given field" but must only "possess more knowledge than is otherwise...