Wright v. State

972 N.E.2d 417

Janet M. WRIGHT, Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 11A04–1109–CR–506.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Aug. 6, 2012.

Appeal from the Clay Superior Court; The Honorable J. Blaine Akers, Judge; Cause No. 11D01–0906–FD–244.

F. Thomas Schornhorst, Oxford, MS, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION—NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARTEAU, Senior Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The police went to Janet M. Wright's house in search of Jesse West. Jesse was not there, but during their visit the police found marijuana and paraphernalia. The State charged Wright with multiple offenses, and she filed a motion to suppress all evidence discovered by the police. The trial court denied Wright's motion in part, deferred ruling on the remainder of the motion, and granted Wright permission to pursue this interlocutory appeal. We affirm and remand.

ISSUE

Wright raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as: whether the trial court erred by denying in part her motion to suppress.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 7, 2009, Clay County Sheriff's Deputies James Switzer and Casey Judge went to Wright's house in Coalmont, Clay County, Indiana. Wright lived with Scott West. The deputies were looking for Scott's son, Jesse.

A key question is why the deputies believed that Jesse might be found at Wright's house. In early 2009, Deputy David Haddix of the Sullivan County Sheriff's Department found a stolen van in rural Clay County near Coalmont, just east of the Sullivan County line, and had it towed to an impound lot. On or around June 1, 2009, the owner of the lot informed Haddix that Jesse's identification had been found in the van. The identification indicated that Jesse lived in Coalmont, but the address provided on the identification was not the address of Wright's house. Haddix consulted electronic records and determined that Jesse had an active misdemeanor arrest warrant from Greene County.

On June 4, 2009, Haddix called the Clay County Sheriff's Department and talked with a dispatcher about Jesse. During the discussion, they determined that Jesse had a second active misdemeanor arrest warrant from another county. They also discussed a possibility that Jesse could be found at Scott's house in Coalmont. After this conversation, the dispatcher issued an e-mail to all Clay County Sheriff's deputies. The e-mail advised that Jesse was wanted on two warrants and in connection with a stolen vehicle investigation. The e-mail further advised that Jesse “is supposed to be living with his dad, Scott West. Lives in [a] run down old house on Jason St[.] in Coalmont.” Depo. of Cindy Judd, Ex. 1.

Switzer received the e-mail and examined the warrants. One of the warrants listed Wright's address as one of Jesse's residences. In addition, Switzer was acquainted with Nancy Fulford, the mother of two of Jesse's children. One of the warrants against Jesse was for non-payment of child support to Fulford, and she had discussed with Switzer Jesse's history of non-payment. She told him that Jesse would run from law enforcement if given a chance.

Based on this information, Switzer and Judge went to Wright and Scott's house as noted above. The house is on the south side of the street, and a driveway runs along the house's west side. A porch and the front door are located on the west side of the house. Switzer walked up to the front door via the driveway and directed Judge to walk to the southwest corner of the house so that she would see if someone ran out of the back of the house into nearby woods. The south end of the porch was blocked by a grill, and a tall wooden lattice extended from the west side of the house into the backyard, so Judge circled around the grill, a trash can and various other items and walked fifteen feet into the side yard where she could see past the lattice into the backyard. Judge did not enter the backyard and remained in view of Switzer.

When Switzer walked up to the front door, he smelled marijuana. He knocked several times, but no one came to the door. As Switzer was knocking, Judge looked into the backyard and saw several milk jugs on the ground along the side of the house. The tops of the jugs had been cut off, and plants were growing inside them. Judge identified the plants as marijuana and notified Switzer. Switzer walked over to Judge, and they approached the jugs. Switzer confirmed that the plants were marijuana, and he radioed for additional officers to secure the property.

Next, Scott arrived. He allowed the officers to enter the house and retrieve Wright, who had been asleep inside up to this point. Jesse was not at the house. The police removed Scott and Wright from the house, and Scott signed a consent form granting permission to the police to search the house and outbuildings. During the subsequent search the police found additional marijuana plants in the house, along with paraphernalia.

The State charged Wright with possession of marijuana, a Class D felony, Ind.Code § 35–48–4–11 (1983); maintaining a common nuisance, a Class D felony, Ind.Code § 35–48–4–13 (2001); and possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code § 35–48–4–8.3 (2003). Wright filed a motion to suppress all evidence discovered during the deputies' visit to her property. The trial court denied Wright's motion to suppress as to the marijuana that was found beside the house. The trial court deferred its ruling as to all evidence found inside the house and outbuildings, determining that it had insufficient evidence to address that matter. Wright requested leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal, and the trial court granted leave. Next, she asked this Court to accept her appeal, and we granted Wright's motion.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency issues. Pruitt v. State, 934 N.E.2d 767, 768 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied. We determine whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court's ruling. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling, but we also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Shell v. State, 927 N.E.2d 413, 418 (Ind.Ct.App.2010).

Wright argues that the deputies' discovery of the marijuana plants beside her house and the additional items inside her house and outbuildings was the result of a search that violated her federal and state constitutional protections against illegal search and seizure. We address each provision in turn.

I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....” This federal right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ind.2010). Searches performed by government officials without warrants are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind.2006). When a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search or seizure. Boggs v. State, 928 N.E.2d 855, 863 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and reasonableness is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Rush v. State, 881 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ind.2008).

Here, Wright asserts that the deputies had no legitimate reason to enter her property and that Switzer was pursuing a personal mission based on his acquaintance with Fulford. However, the deputies had been informed that Jesse could be at Wright's property, and there were pending misdemeanor arrest warrants for him. Furthermore, Jesse was wanted for questioning in connection with a vehicle theft. Switzer reviewed the warrants before going to Wright's house, and one of them listed Wright's address as one of Jesse's residences. Switzer Depo. p. 24, Judd Depo. Ex. 3. In addition, Switzer's discussions with Fulford provided evidence that Jesse had not addressed his delinquent child support payments. Therefore, the deputies had legitimate law enforcement reasons to enter Wright's property. See Boggs, 928 N.E.2d at 864 (holding that officers had a valid reason to enter Boggs' property because they wanted him to come pick up his daughter and because they discovered there was a pending warrant for his arrest).

Next, Wright contends that Judge engaged in an illegal search by entering the side yard of her house, from where Judge saw the marijuana in the backyard. A search arises out of an intrusion by a governmental actor upon an area in which a person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy. Dora v. State, 957 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), trans. denied. The land immediately surrounding and associated with a home, the curtilage, is also subject to the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home. Boggs, 928 N.E.2d at 863. When the police come onto private property to conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (such as walkways, driveways, and porches), observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.

Here, the officers had a reasonable belief that Jesse could be found on the property and had been advised that he would flee from law enforcement if possible. When the deputies entered Wright's property, Switzer approached the main...